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PREFACE 
Each year, the Directorate-General for Regional Policies of the Commission of the European 
Communities launches a number of studies in the field of Regional Policy and Regional Plan-
ning. These studies mainly aim at providing a basis for policy formulation internally, as well as 
the preparation of programmes and initiatives and a basis for analysing the impact of current or 
planned activities. The most interesting or innovative of these will now be published in a series 
entitled 'Regional Development Studies'. With this series the Directorate-General hopes to stim-
ulate discussion and action in a wider sphere on the research results received. The publication 
of the studies is addressed to politicians and decision-makers at European, regional and local 
level, as well as to academics and experts in the broad fields of issues covered. 
It is hoped that by publicizing research results the Commission will enrich and stimulate public 
debate and promote a further exchange of knowledge and opinions on the issues which are 
considered important for the economic and social cohesion of the Community and therefore for 
the future of Europe. 
Readers should bear in mind that the study reports do not necessarily reflect the official position 
of the Commission but first and foremost express the opinion of those responsible for carrying 
out the study. 

FOREWORD 
This report comprises the Final Report to the Commission of the 
European Communities for the project Socio-Economie Situation and 
Development of the Regions in the Neighbouring Countries of the Community 
in Central and Eastern Europe. 
The report presents an overview of regional economic conditions and 
regional development strategies and options in six countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe - Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and 
Yugoslavia - as well as East Germany (formerly the German Democratic 
Republic). 
The research project was undertaken by the European Policies Research 
Centre in collaboration with the following specialist research institutes: 
- Vienna Institute for Comparative Economic Studies, Austria 
- National Centre for Regional and Urban Development, Bulgaria 
- TERPLAN, Czechoslovakia 
- Niedersachsishes Institut fuer Wirtschaftsforschung, Germany 
- UNCHS Habitat, Hungary 
European Institute for Regional and Local Development, Poland 
Institute of Geography, Romania 
- Civil Engineering Institute, Yugoslavia 
The research team, which was assembled at short notice during March 
1990, collected and analysed a considerable volume of information and data 
in a short space of time. For much of the project, the team worked under 
considerable pressure to meet deadlines, despite problems due to the 
absence or inadequacy of data and delays or intermittent functioning of 
postal and telecommunications systems. The comprehensive contributions, 
professional advice and goodwill of the project participants in response to 
extensive requests for information was highly valued. 
The research team received cooperation from a wide range of Central 
and Eastern European government departments and national statistical 
offices whose assistance was appreciated. The project team would also like 
to express their thanks to Adrian Dierx, Ronnie Hall and Leo Kowalski from 
DG XVI of the European Commission for their guidance and advice throughout 
the course of this project. 
Finally, it should be noted that most of the research for this report 
was carried out during 1990. The rapidity of political, economic and 
social change in Central and Eastern Europe means that some conditions will 
inevitably have changed since the report was written. 
European Policies Research Centre 
University of Strathclyde 
Glasgow 
November 1991 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This report provides an analysis of regional socio-economic 
development conditions in Central and Eastern Europe. It also undertakes 
an evaluation of regional and structural policy reforms implemented in 
East Germany and the "Six" i.e. Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania and Yugoslavia. The following section provides a summary of the 
main issues and conclusions to emerge from the analysis of regional 
disparities and problems and the evaluation of policy responses. 
REGIONAL DISPARITIES AND PROBLEMS 
Part I of the report examines regional conditions and disparities in 
Central and Eastern Europe relating to population and demographic trends, 
patterns of employment and unemployment, output and income differences, 
foreign investment flows, environmental conditions, and the provision of 
technical and social infrastructure. 
( 1 ) The distinctive feature of regional economic structures in Central 
and Eastern Europe is the predominance of primary and secondary 
activities. In the manufacturing sector, the spatial distribution 
of industry is often highly concentrated which presents major 
challenges for regional economic restructuring, especially in 
monostructure regions. 
The structure of employment in Central and Eastern Europe is strongly 
biased towards the primary and secondary sectors. The employment share of 
industry (including construction) is large by EC standards, averaging 
almost half of the economically-active population in Central and Eastern 
Europe compared to one-third in the Community. Heavy industry accounts for 
much of the industrial employment, notably in the engineering, chemicals, 
textiles and ferrous metals sub-sectors. Regional disparities in 
industrial employment are greatest in Poland and Romania, reflecting the 
continued importance of the agricultural sector. Regional industrial 
employment shares range from 12 to 61 percent in Poland, for example. Both 
Hungary and East Germany also have significant north-south differences in 
regional industrial employment as a consequence of the bias in industrial 
employment in the southern Laender of East Germany and the north-eastern 
and north-western parts of Hungary. 
By contrast, the service sector in Central and Eastern Europe has 
hitherto been comparatively underdeveloped. Employment shares in the 
so-called "non-productive" sectors, combined with transport and 
communications and trade and commerce, are generally in the range of 30-40 
percent of total employment. The exception is Romania where the service 
sector is extremely small (25 percent). At regional level, only in the 
capitals and major cities, eg. Sofia, Prague, Bratislava, Budapest and 
Warsaw, does the share of service employment exceed 50 percent. 
The organisation of industry has featured a considerable degree of 
vertical integration in large production units. Industry has been almost 
entirely in state-ownership, operated through centrally-planned "national 
enterprises". In Hungary, for instance, more than 80 percent of 
manufacturing employment was accounted for by 1,140 state-owned enterprises 
with an average of more than 1,000 employees. 
The spatial distribution of industry is based on major 
industrial-urban agglomerations in the form of industrial "zones" or 
"axes". For the most part, these equate with the availability of raw 
materials: Hungarian heavy industry is concentrated along an "energy axis" 
running from the north-east to the south-west of the country corresponding 
to the availability of coal, non-ferrous ores and other primary industrial 
raw materials. Polish industrial development is also based primarily on 
resource exploitation (coal and iron-ore mining), notably around Upper 
Silesia, Lodz and Walbrzych. Similarly, much of Yugoslav industrial 
development is in the north - Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Vojvodina -
related to the availability of iron ores, oil and agricultural products; 
while the geography of industrial development in Romania is dominated by 
the availability of oil in the central and south-east of the country. 
Across the region as a whole, eastern areas were favoured as sites to 
facilitate the processing of raw materials imported from the Soviet Union. 
Other important location factors include water supplies (especially for the 
chemicals industry) and manpower availability - a crucial factor in the 
drive for rapid industrial growth. 
In addition to the locational influence of basic raw material supplies 
and other factors, state planning has attempted to impose 
centrally-determined patterns of industrial location. Since 1950, the 
Polish government has developed five new industrial areas in the central 
and southern parts of Poland (Konon, Legnica-Glogow, Tarnobrzeg, Oulawy and 
Plock), based on copper, sulphur, coal and other energy resources, in order 
to counter-balance the concentrations of industrial growth in older 
industrial regions. In Bulgaria, most industrial capacity is located 
within an area defined by an elliptically-shaped transport route (based in 
the centre of the country but running through all the Bulgarian regions) 
which has been used to determine the location of industrial enterprises. 
State planning in Hungary has also attempted to distribute industry more 
evenly - away from the capital Budapest and southwards from the northern 
"energy axis" to cities such as Szeged, Pecs and Debrechen, as well as to 
several smaller and medium-sized towns. 
Economic restructuring will affect all areas. The experience of 
Central and East European countries with more advanced economic reforms is 
that even comparatively "strong" industrial sectors may be affected by 
economic collapse because of uncompetitive processes and products. Some 
regions, which have a relatively diversified industrial structure, should 
be able to manage the transition better, enabling job losses in particular 
sectors and enterprises to be more easily absorbed. However, even 
diversified structures do not guarantee restructuring free of economic 
dislocation and hardship. 
The impact is likely to be particularly severe where the large scale 
and organised division of industrial operations is based on individual, or 
a limited number of heavy industrial sectors ie. monostructure regions 
with few alternative job opportunities. Many of these sectors are now at 
risk from economic restructuring and associated major regional problems, 
notably in areas dominated by raw materials such as coal and metal ore, and 
industrial sectors like heavy engineering, chemicals and textiles. The 
closure of particular industrial plants, or the decline of production, with 
redundancies as a natural consequence, are likely to cause some of the most 
serious regional problems. Even if output rises, the productivity increase 
arising from investment in new machinery will lead to job losses. 
Further disadvantages may arise from the cessation of armaments 
production or the conversion of armament factories to civil production. 
Although alternative production may safeguard some jobs, it is likely to 
yield considerably lower earnings for employees. The reorientation of 
trading relationships away from trade and barter agreements with the Soviet 
Union, and the break-up of the CMEA, could also be detrimental. It has 
been estimated that, for some regions, this could involve a loss of 
production of up to 50 percent. 
In summary, therefore, economic restructuring will lead to a 
short-term decline in employment and performance in nearly all sectors of 
economic activity. This is likely to be a nationwide phenomenon. However, 
monostructure regions, raw material based regions, under-industrialized 
regions, and Soviet export-oriented areas are likely to be most affected. 
(2) The agricultural sector also accounts for signficant employment in 
Central and Eastern Europe. Privatisation and productivity 
improvements will have a considerable impact on certain regions. 
There are several inter-related regional development problems relating 
to agriculture, all of which could lead to a rise in unemployment as a 
consequence of restructuring. Privatisation and efficiency improvements 
such as greater use of technology and improved local infrastructure could 
lead to major job loss and outmigration. 
First, the proportion of employment engaged in agriculture is very 
high, by West European standards, in parts of Central and Eastern Europe. 
The agricultural sector (including forestry and fishing) accounts for 21 
percent of employment, compared to a figure of eight percent for the 
European Community. The main differences are between countries: 
agricultural shares range from 10-11 percent in East Germany and 
Czechoslovakia to 27 percent in Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia. Within 
countries, regional disparities are relatively low, with the exception of 
Poland where the maximum regional employment share in agriculture exceeds 
60 percent and eight further provinces have more than half of all employees 
working in the agricultural sector. 
The process of agricultural change is likely to reduce the labour 
intensity of agriculture considerably. Even in areas like the fertile 
agricultural regions of the Great Hungarian Plain, the efficiency of food 
production will have to be raised significantly to compete on world 
markets, especially against highly-subsidised products from other 
countries. 
Second, large areas of agricultural land have, in the past, been 
nationalised and organised into cooperatives. This varies between 
countries: in Czechoslovakia and Romania, almost 90 percent of 
agricultural land was nationalised. By contrast, in Poland 75 percent of 
the land is privately owned; in Hungary and Yugoslavia the equivalent 
figures are 70 and 83 percent respectively. State-owned agriculture was 
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characterised by vast agricultural complexes. Bulgaria has 300 complexes, 
averaging 18,000 ha each and covering four-fiths of the agricultural land. 
Paradoxically, in view of the previous point, the redistribution of land 
may increase the labour-intensity of agriculture: the consequences of 
privatisation may be a rising input of manpower, a return to subsistence 
farming especially in countries with the most severe employment problems, 
and declining productivity. 
Third, there is the problem of underdevelopment. In parts of Central 
and Eastern Europe, conditions for agriculture are good with fertile soils 
and favourable climate. Examples include north-east Bulgaria, southern 
Romania, east of the Danube in Hungary, along the rivers Elbe (central 
Bohemia) and Morava (central and southern Moravia), and in western and 
eastern Slovakia, in Czechoslovakia, and along the rivers Sava and Danube 
(Panonia Lowland) in Yugoslavia. However, in terms of efficiency and 
productivity, many agricultural regions are relatively backward, again 
mainly because of lack of appropriate infrastructure and technology. In 
Hungary, it is estimated that unfavourable conditions (upland terrain, poor 
soils, inadequate technology etc) in the highland and mountainous parts of 
the country would, in a free-market situation, make farming unprofitable in 
the case of 30-40 percent of agricultural units. In Poland, half of the 
2.75 million farms, mainly in the central and southern parts of the 
country, are less than five hectares in size; and in Yugoslavia, the size 
of private sector holdings averages c.3.5 hectares. 
(3) Infrastructure deficiencies present a major obstacle to economic 
restructuring. Peripheral areas of individual countries, and the 
eastern parts of Central and Eastern Europe appear to be particularly 
badly served. 
The shortage of infrastructure is considered a major causal factor of 
many current problems in Central and Eastern Europe. Transport 
infrastructure in the region is generally of poor quality and overloaded. 
For example, rail networks are extensive but significant parts are 
one-track (in Hungary only 14 percent is double track), the load-bearing 
capacity is low, and many sections are not capable of high-speed travel. 
Electrification is limited, and the rolling stock suffers from 
under-investment. With respect to the road network, in both Czechoslovakia 
and Hungary less than one percent of the total road network consists of 
express highways, and many rural roads are not metalled. 
There are two main characteristics of regional communications 
infrastructure provision in Central and Eastern Europe. First, 
infrastructure development relating to transport and telecommunications in 
most countries has concentrated on the major urban areas and the axes of 
economic activity: eg. Sofia-Varna and Sofia-Bourgas in Bulgaria; 
Prague-Brno-Bratislava (the only express highway links) in Czechoslovakia; 
and within the Budapest region in Hungary. The concentrations of 
urban/industrial development in the southern parts of East Germany (and in 
Berlin) are also associated with higher levels of telephone ownership and 
living space. In Poland, the provision of telephones in rural, eastern 
parts of the country (eg. Ostroleka, Siedlce, Krosno or Cezestochowa) is 
less than half the level in Warsaw, Lodz or Krakow. The concentration of 
infrastructure in core regions means that infrastructure and services in 
rural areas, and connections with peripheral and border regions, are very 
secondary. This pattern has in turn encouraged further concentration of 
industrial location of economic activities and agglomeration. 
The second characteristic is the west-east difference in 
infrastructure provision; the availability of infrastructure decreases 
with distance from Western Europe. This reflects the history of 
industrialization in different countries and investment for military 
purposes. Thus, the density of road and rail network is relatively high in 
East Germany, although the quality of construction and maintenance is very 
poor. In Poland, the main feature of transport infrastructure is in the 
decline density from western to eastern regions of the country (eg. a 
decrease of railway track from 12km to 4km per 100 sq.km and a reduction in 
road surface from 70km to 40km per 100 sq.km). 
Social infrastructure, in the form of basic education and healthcare 
facilities, appears to be relatively evenly distributed, although 
insufficient information is available for substantive conclusions regarding 
regional differences to be drawn. In both fields the major problem is 
quality rather than quantity. Healthcare and educational facilities are 
characterised by under-investment and serious shortages of equipment and 
materials. 
(4) A key indicator of the effects of reform policies and economic 
restructuring is unemployment. Agricultural regions have experienced 
the most immediate effects, but in the medium term it is likely that 
certain industrial regions will experience very severe job losses. 
Explicit unemployment is a relatively new phenomenon in Central and 
Eastern Europe (except for Yugoslavia), although "hidden unemployment" has 
always been in existence. At the end of 1990, estimates of unemployment 
ranged from 1-5 percent in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania, 
5-10 percent in East Germany and Poland, and over 10 percent in Yugoslavia. 
However, estimates predict that unemployment will exceed 10 percent in most 
Central and East European countries during 1991-92. Across the region, it 
has been suggested that unemployment could reach 12-14 million in Central 
and Eastern Europe by 1994. 
A feature of the employment situation in East Germany, in particular, 
is the extent of unemployment concealed through short-time work 
arrangements. Many short-time workers are expected to be made redundant in 
the course of 1991. The total under-employment in East Germany, comprising 
unemployment and under-employment, was estimated at 30 percent of the 
economically-active population at the start of 1991. 
In the short term, the most immediate effect of restructuring has been 
in the agricultural sector where the introduction of privatisation and 
efficiency improvements is resulting in serious job losses. These regions 
are also characterized by vulnerable industries, a predominance of 
companies with low market share, fewer immediate alternative employment 
opportunities and low political "bargaining potential". Low levels of 
industrialization, backward infrastructure and high birth rates usually 
made unemployment widespread in these areas even before restructuring. 
Thus, the highest unemployment in East Germany has so far occurred in the 
rural parts of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, notably in the districts of Schwerin 
and Neubrandenburg. Likewise, unemployment rates are highest in the 
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agricultural parts of Czechoslovakia (West and East Slovakia), Yugoslavia 
(Macedonia) and Poland (eastern provinces). 
In the medium term, however, industrial areas will be affected to a 
greater extent than agricultural regions. Traditional industrial sectors 
are likely to experience the greatest levels of unemployment as a result of 
economic restructuring, since many firms have been inefficient, 
unproductive, labour-intensive and heavily subsidised. The highest job 
losses can be expected in monostructure raw material, heavy industry and 
Soviet trade-based regions. The impact of restructuring on these regions 
has hitherto been limited because industrial closures have yet to take 
place on a significant scale, and there is considerable hidden unemployment 
and underemployment (eg. short-time working). 
(5) Demographic indicators produce a highly differentiated map of 
regional population change across Central and Eastern Europe. The 
distribution of population is characterised by agglomeration 
tendencies in some major cities and peripheral depopulation and 
underdevelopment. Inter-regional and international migration flows 
may increase, encouraged by the effects of restructuring. 
There is considerable regional variation in population trends across 
Central and Eastern Europe. In most countries, there are regions with 
birth rates exceeding 14 per thousand population. Death rates are also 
high (and have been increasing recently), with regional levels exceeding 12 
per thousand. However, regional disparities are significant, and 
differences in the rate of population change between regions range from 10 
to 20 percent, especially in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. 
The rate of population growth should continue to decrease as birth 
rates fall further. Death rates should also decline significantly as 
health care and environmental conditions are improved, and the consequent 
ageing of the population is likely to produce age structures similar to 
those in West European countries. Nevertheless, economic development 
differences, the influence of religion and the presence of regional 
minorities will maintain considerable spatial variation in population 
change, notably with respect to birth rates, between and within countries. 
The distribution of population is characterised by significant 
concentration and agglomeration in some major cities. Capital cities such 
as Prague, Budapest and Sofia have seen population development 
out-stripping the provision of services. The consequence of agglomeration 
has been the deprivation or neglect of smaller rural localities, 
particularly those in border areas and remote or upland regions. 
Depopulation and underdevelopment is a common characteristic of peripheral 
regions (especially in Bulgaria and Romania) which were deprived of centres 
large enough in size and functions to counter negative migration processes. 
The effect of a very imbalanced distribution of population, associated 
with considerable upheaval arising from industrial and agricultural 
restructuring, is likely to be substantial migration. The restructuring 
processes imply a significant reallocation of production factors arising 
from the break-up of major state enterprises, the closure of loss-making 
firms and increases in productivity. The mobility of labour will be an 
essential part of the process, yet population migration could also be an 
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undesirable consequence of lack of jobs and poverty. 
On the other hand, the mobility of labour is constrained by an overall 
decrease in employment opportunities. Growing regional differences in the 
price of housing (apart from the general housing shortage) will also reduce 
mobility. 
In the past, migration in Central and Eastern Europe has been largely 
inter-regional within countries apart from the repatriation of ethnic 
minorities and emigration to the West following political upheavals. 
Inter-regional migration has been substantial (regional gains and losses of 
+/- 10 percent over the period 1980-88) and dominated by movement from 
backward to advanced regions and movement from rural to urban areas. 
In the future, international migration to Western Europe could present 
Central and East European with major problems of labour shortage arising 
from the loss of young and skilled people. Within countries, less 
developed rural areas could be severely affected as a result of further 
rural-urban and inter-regional outmigration losses combined with a falling 
birth rate, an ageing of the population (as death rates fall), and fewer 
employment opportunities. 
For the present, however, migration has not yet caused major labour 
shortages. The exception is East Germany which has hitherto been most 
affected by migration flows. A combination of the desire for consumer 
goods, wage differentials of around 35 percent (between West and East 
Germany), rising unemployment in East Germany and major differences in 
living standards has caused "intra-German" migration of about 256,000 
people during 1989 and 238,000 in the first half of 1990. During 1989-90, 
much of the high level of emigration from East Germany originated in the 
southern regions (Sachsen lost almost three percent of its population 
during 1989-90). The outmigration continues at a high rate; in early 
1991, 10,000 people per month were leaving from Sachsen alone. 
In Poland it has been estimated that up to 12 million people are 
"potential migrants". Although it is unlikely that migration will actually 
involve such large numbers, it is anticipated that major migration will 
take place - particularly from the Upper Silesia region (and surrounding 
area) - if industrial restructuring causes high unemployment and if severe 
environmental damage is not rectified. In Central and Eastern Europe as a 
whole, more than 1.3 million people (including citizens of the Soviet 
Union) have migrated to the West since the political events of 1989. The 
high levels of unemployment may increase this flow as people seek 
employment opportunities and higher living standards in Western Europe. 
(6) Environmental pollution of soil, water and air is a consequence of 
major industrialisation combined with inadequate technology and 
under-investment in waste processing. In certain regions, the impact 
of environmental degradation is extremely severe, although the worst 
effects seem relatively localised. 
The scale and nature of environmental problems in Central and Eastern 
Europe are the result of rapid industrialisation and massive exploitation 
of raw materials combined with inadequate environmental controls or 
consideration of environmental impact. The use of low-grade brown coal as 
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an energy source, inefficient industrial and transportation technology and 
under-investment in processing and purification facilities have contributed 
to major air and water pollution as well as the despoilation of forests and 
countryside. Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany appear to face the 
most widespread and serious environmental problems, primarily in regions 
with a high concentration of extractive and processing industries. 
Environmental conditions are sub-standard, by comparison with Western 
Europe, in many parts of the region. The consequences are apparent in 
health effects such as pollution-related diseases, high infant mortality 
and lower life expectancy. However, extremely severe pollution (eg. 
relating to very high sulphur dioxide emissions or concentrations of heavy 
metals in rivers or soils) tends to be restricted to localised and 
contained areas. These include Upper Silesia (in Poland), North Bohemia 
and North Moravia (Czechoslovakia), Halle and Cottbus (East Germany); the 
Sofia region (Bulgaria); Jesenica in Slovenia (Yugoslavia); and Resita 
and Copsa Mica (Romania). Clearly, policy efforts will be concentrated on 
these severe cases of environmental damage, but pollution levels should 
also decline as production in heavy industry decreases. 
(7) With greater political and social freedom, tensions between 
territorial minorities and the host population may be exacerbated in 
certain regions. 
One of the distinctive regional problems of Central and East European 
countries consists of regions with territorial minorities. Cultural and 
social differences have been translated into hostility, especially where 
the minority has been subject to chauvinist pressures and repression under 
Communist rule eg. the Turkish minority in Bulgaria or Hungarians in 
Romania. The combination of greater political and personal freedoms, 
together with economic dislocation again has the capacity for causing 
social tension and migration flows. In Poland, for example, many people in 
Upper Silesia have declared themselves to be ethnic Germans; such actions 
inevitably distort relationships between the majority population and the 
regional minority. More generally, many regional and local political 
pressures were kept subdued under former regimes, and these are now being 
released. 
The problems are greatest in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania -
less so in East Germany and Hungary. The potential for social tensions in 
Yugoslavia is especially significant, as the civil disturbances and 
military conflicts during 1991 have shown. Aside from the ethnic variation 
among the various republics, the country's population of 24 million also 
includes significant minorities of Albanians, Hungarians, Roma, Turks and 
Romanians. Even in countries which do not have these problems, the 
consequences are apparent in the form of refugees and the growth in the 
"black" and "underground" economies eg. Hungary has some 100,000 migrants, 
mainly from Romania. 
(8) The patterns of regional disparities and regional problems are likely 
to change considerably, even in the short term, as a consequence of 
political and economic restructuring. 
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The analysis of regional disparities and the identification of 
regional problems in this report was based largely on data representing 
conditions in Central and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s ie. prior to 
the start of significant political and economic liberalisation. As noted 
above, the whole of Central and Eastern Europe now faces a serious 
recession with declining production, high inflation and rising 
unemployment. Within the context of restructuring processes which will 
have negative nationwide and region-wide effects, the map of regional 
disparities is likely to change significantly, even in the short to medium 
term, as reforms are introduced. Three sets of trends may be identified. 
First, economic restructuring is likely to change regional employment 
structures significantly, with effects on all three sectors. The 
rationalisation of agriculture has the potential to reduce agricultural 
employment shares very considerably (especially in eastern Poland), a trend 
that is already apparent in the northern parts of East Germany. The 
closure of unprofitable or environmentally damaging factories, mines and 
power stations is creating significant unemployment (primarily in regions 
with few opportunities for diversification). These trends will stimulate 
urban-rural and inter-regional labour mobility, altering both regional 
demographic and employment structures and the requirements for regional 
social and economic infrastructure (although the degree of labour mobility 
may be impeded by the shortage of jobs). The easing of international 
travel restrictions will provide the option for people to emigrate as well 
as moving between regions within countries. 
Second, the development of urban areas, especially secondary centres, 
is likely to increase. There is very considerable potential for 
development of the service sector in Central and Eastern Europe, 
particularly the expansion of consumer and producer services in urban 
areas. The reform of territorial structures, with greater autonomy and 
responsibility at regional level, will also promote the development of 
local and regional administrative centres, especially regional capitals. 
New legislation on property ownership will increase the demand for private 
housing, promoting suburbanisation and the development of small and 
medium-sized towns and cities. 
Third, some peripheral and rural areas will gain from the opening of 
borders and the opportunities associated with cross-border trade and 
development. An increase in international tourism may also create 
significant growth for certain regions. 
(9) Beyond the spatial disparities within individual countries, the 
region of Central and Eastern Europe as a whole presents a 
highly-differentiated map of development potential for restructuring 
processes. Progress with economic reforms and spatial differences in 
socio-economic criteria indicates that development conditions are 
more favourable in the western parts of the region. 
Across the region of Central and Eastern Europe, there is a clear 
opportunity for west-east (and north-south) differences to emerge as the 
region undergoes a transition to a market economy at varying rates of 
progress. East Germany has been reunited with West Germany and absorbed 
into the EC; Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary have made considerable 
progress with economic reform; in Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Romania, the 
outcome of political reforms is still uncertain. Beyond the study area, 
the Soviet Union's western republics (the Baltic States, Ukraine and 
Byelorussia) are showing signs of seceding from the USSR amidst a major 
economic crisis. 
Key socio-economic criteria also suggest that the conditions for 
regional development are more favourable in the western part of Central and 
Eastern Europe. The clearest regional differences relate to population 
change and employment structure. 
Demographic criteria indicate that population growth during the 1980s 
has been high in many parts of Central and Eastern Europe, compared to EC 
averages. However, birth rates and the proportion of children in the 
population is exceptionally high in the eastern parts of the region - much 
of eastern Poland, the eastern regions of the Slovak Republic, the 
north-eastern regions of Romania, as well as some southern republics of 
Yugoslavia. 
To a certain extent, population growth is synoymous with the degree of 
economic (under)development. The proportion of employment in agriculture, 
forestry and fishing (which is also very high in comparison with EC 
countries) is higher in the peripheral areas of individual countries and, 
overall, in the eastern parts of Central and Eastern Europe. The most 
industrialised areas tend to be in the west of the region: the southern 
districts of East Germany, western Poland, central Czechoslovakia, northern 
Yugoslavia, north-west Hungary and the western regions of Bulgaria. 
The level of infrastructure provision also declines from west to east. 
Based on limited data, it appears that road, rail and telecommunications 
links diminish in density and quality from the western to the eastern parts 
of the region, as noted earlier. 
Lastly, the orientation of past and present trading links is an 
important issue. Regions in the east of Central and Eastern Europe, 
oriented towards the Soviet Union, are losing an important trading partner 
with the break-up of the CMEA and fall in Soviet trade. Western border 
regions, by contrast, are in an extremely favourable position to benefit 
from trade, foreign investment, infrastructure development and cross-border 
ventures with West European countries. 
Thus, although all countries and regions are expected to suffer 
significant economic and social dislocation, some areas are better placed 
than others. There is a risk that, even with current consensus on the 
objectives of restructuring, political and economic reforms will be 
obstructed by dissatisfaction and demoralisation among the population. The 
danger of the spatial variations in the state of economic transition and 
regional development is the negative impact on the relationship between 
individual countries and regions. This compounds the problems derived from 
the region's history of political instability, national and regional 
hostilities and socio-cultural differences. 
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Β. POLICY RESPONSES 
Part II of the report examines structural reforms and regional 
development in Central and Eastern Europe with respect to the main 
components of macro-economic policies, past regional development strategies 
and the future prospects for regional policy. 
(1) The potential for developing regional policies in the immediate 
future may be limited. Past regional policies involved mainly the 
regional allocation of centrally-planned development resources. The 
development of new regional policies will be delayed by the priority 
accorded to national economic policies and the rapidly changing 
regional economic conditions. 
There are important obstacles to the development of market-based 
regional policy. First, at the current stage in the reform process, 
countries such as Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia perceive it to be 
premature to consider regional development strategies. The initial 
priority is to develop policies at the national level. Current economic 
restructuring is focusing on key measures such as price reform, 
privatisation, improvement of foreign investment conditions, international 
trade and relations, and social policies. 
Second, there are difficulties in identifying regional disparities as 
a basis for policy. In a situation of rapid change and uncertainty, the 
"regional problem" still has to become apparent and to be defined. There 
is the likelihood that current assumptions will become erroneous as new 
development options emerge. Thus, prognoses of regional development 
requirements are extremely difficult. 
Third, there is little experience with market-based regional policies. 
In the past, regional development strategies tended to involve regional 
planning and the regional implementation of sectoral plans. Decentralised 
decision-making for economic development was limited, tightly controlled 
from the centre and subject to reversal at times of crisis. 
Lastly, the reform of territorial structures is in progress in several 
countries. The structure of territorial units and the relationships 
between central, regional and local government are being reorganised to 
create systems more appropriate to market economies. The emphasis is more 
on régionalisation than regional policy. 
The exception to the delay in implementing regional policies is in 
East Germany. Unification has meant the West German system of regional 
economic aid under the Gemeinschaftsaufgabe being extended together with 
budgetary allocations under the ERP Special Fund and other special regional 
programmes. Initially, regional aid was applied across the whole of East 
Germany. The extent of economic development problems, the need to await 
the emergence of regional disparities and the absence of sophisticated 
designation criteria mean that regional differentiation of aid was not 
possible. However, during 1991, a special regional programme has been 
introduced to assist those East German regions experiencing the most severe 
restructuring problems. 
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(2) In the short term, regional preferences in the promotion of economic 
development will have to focus on those areas of greatest development 
potential. However, emergency regional aid may also be required to 
assist areas of major unemployment and areas suffering the most 
severe ecological damage. 
The requirements of national economic survival during the transition 
phase may allow few resources for the reduction of regional disparities. 
Any regional component of economic development policies will have to 
promote potential growth areas which have the best opportunities for 
leading the restructuring process. Such regions are primarily diversified 
industrial regions with a relatively good material and technical base, 
experienced personnel, good infrastructure and international links. Other 
areas with development potential are fertile agricultural regions, centres 
attractive to foreign investment, regions sharing borders with developed 
market economies, and tourist areas with attractions for the international 
tourist trade. 
However, the scale of industrial restructuring and social consequences 
in the form of high unemployment and population migration may require 
selective emergency regional aid to contain the worst effects of job 
losses. Immediate action to start rectifying the most severe environmental 
problems may also be required in the interests of human health and 
overloaded ecosystems. 
(3) In the medium term, the development of new regional policies could 
encompass a wide range of possible measures. Priority should be 
given to infrastructure investment and support for local and regional 
restructuring. 
Once major macro-economic reforms are in place in Central and Eastern 
Europe with a new framework of national economic development, it will be 
necessary to consider longer term regional development issues. In addition 
to the general task of industrial restructuring and environmental clean-up, 
key problems include congestion and over-development in the large 
urban/industrial agglomerations, the lack of investment and infrastructure 
in peripheral areas, and a more balanced distribution of settlement and 
industry. 
Among potential regional policy measures, the first important priority 
is infrastructure development, especially high-quality, national and 
international road and rail links, international airports and regional 
transit hubs. The development of regional telecommunications 
infrastructure is also urgent, especially to rectify local deficits in the 
efficiency of local switching systems and telephone exchanges, the 
availability of telephone connections and access to fax and telex 
facilities. The second major target for regional policy is local and 
regional restructuring with emphasis on maintaining the competitiveness of 
diversified industrial regions but diversifying in areas dominated by 
monostructures with support for small and medium-sized enterprises. 
Managing the privatisation and reorganisation of state-owned enterprises is 
important eg. through reconversion companies and enterprise subsidiaries. 
The most severe problem areas should be the focus for comprehensive, 
concentrated and coordinated restructuring programmes comprising SME 
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support, environmental improvement, local and regional infrastructure 
development, training and social facilities. 
Additional targets for regional policy measures would be environmental 
improvement and protection, agricultural restructuring and the development 
of rural areas, the equalisation of urban and regional development, and 
international cooperation and cross-border development. 
(4) The effectiveness and efficiency of regional policy in Central and 
Eastern Europe could be significantly improved by the transfer of 
information and competence from Western Europe and the creation of 
East-West networks to promote the flow of expertise and experience. 
The countries of Western Europe have enormous experience and expertise 
in the field of regional development under market economic systems. 
Strategies employed over the past 40 years have addressed a range of 
regional problems at various spatial scales. Numerous regional instruments 
and policies have been tried, and there is a wealth of evaluation knowledge 
on the efficiency and effectiveness of different mechanisms - at the level 
of individual countries and the European Community as a whole. 
This knowledge would be of great value for regional policy-makers in 
Central and Eastern Europe as they begin to address regional disparities. 
It is important, therefore, to develop structures, networks and fora that 
can promote and organise the transfer and interchange of information, ideas 
and competence between Western and Eastern Europe. 
(5) East Germany is experiencing a much more rapid transition to a market 
economy than other parts of Central and Eastern Europe. Although the 
processes and policies of restructuring in East Germany may provide 
some lessons for neighbouring countries in the region, there are 
considerable limitations to the comparison and transfer of 
development experiences. 
For the purposes of this study, East Germany has generally been 
treated as a "country" in comparing regional economic and social conditions 
in the different parts of Central and Eastern Europe. This is justifiable 
insofar as much of the socio-economic data relates to the pre-1990 period 
when the GDR existed. Moreover, the speed with which East Germany is 
having to adapt to a market economy provides valuable insights into the 
effects of economic reforms; other Central and East European countries are 
undertaking reform measures, and experiencing the effects of economic 
restructuring over longer timescales. Consequently, the scale of the 
problems has become more readily apparent in East Germany: the rise and 
greater visibility of unemployment, first in agriculture and then in 
urban/industrial areas, particularly monostructure towns and regions; the 
inefficiency and under-investment in plant and machinery; infrastructure 
deficits; and the upgrading of industry required to meet West European 
environmental standards. 
The exposure of the East German population to full market economic 
conditions is also revealing. Many East German people are experiencing 
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difficulties in adapting to competition, the elimination of subsidies and 
loss of certain social services, and western expectations of "enterprise" 
and "entrepreneurship" - despite considerable assistance from west German 
organisations. The populations of other Central and East European 
countries are being confronted with these problems more slowly but, 
ultimately, the effects may be more severe. It has been argued that, if 
East Germany - at one time the "shop-window of socialism" - is experiencing 
such severe transitional problems, then the prospects for other Central and 
East European countries (which have no access to the substantial resources 
of West Germany) are likely to be worse. 
However, the comparison of development problems and opportunities in 
East Germany with those of other Central and East European countries has 
considerable limitations. The abolition of the GDR has removed a range of 
important national policy options, particularly related to trade and 
monetary policy - exchange rates, interest rates, prices, taxation, import 
controls etc - which could be used to manage a more progressive and 
controlled restructuring process. Furthermore, while the GDR economy was 
well developed compared to other Central and East European countries, East 
Germany is now the only part of the region to face direct competition from 
Western countries. East Germany, therefore, faces some very distinct 
restructuring problems compared to its former CMEA partners. 
Thus, the analysis of regional development problems and policies in 
East Germany provides useful lessons for other Central and East European 
countries, but the transfer of experiences and (in particular) policy 
responses has to be undertaken with great caution. 
XV 
RESUME ET CONCLUSIONS 
Le présent rapport analyse la situation socio-économique des régions de 
l'Europe centrale et orientale et se propose, en outre, d'évaluer les réformes 
de la politique régionale et des structures intervenues dans l'Allemagne de 
l'Est et dans les "Six", à savoir la Bulgarie, la Tchécoslovaquie, la Hongrie, 
la Pologne, la Roumanie et la Yougoslavie. La section qui suit fournit un 
exposé succinct des principales questions et conclusions découlant de 
l'analyse des disparités et des problèmes régionaux existants, ainsi que de 
l'évaluation des politiques en la matière. 
A. DISPARITES ET PROBLEMES REGIONAUX 
La partie I du rapport est consacrée à l'examen de la situation et des 
disparités régionales des pays d'Europe centrale et orientale qui concerne la 
population et l'évolution démographique, la structure de l'emploi et du 
chômage, les écarts de production et de revenus, les investissements 
étrangers, l'environnement et la mise en place d'infrastructures techniques 
et sociales. 
(1) La principale caractéristique de la structure économique des régions 
d'Europe centrale et orientale réside dans le rôle prédominant des 
activités du secteur primaire et secondaire. Dans le secteur 
manufacturier, les entreprises sont souvent fortement concentrées du 
point de vue de leur répartition géographique, lançant un défi 
considérable à la restructuration économique, notamment dans les 
régions monostructurelles. 
La structure de l'emploi en Europe centrale et orientale repose 
principalement sur les secteurs primaire et secondaire. Le taux d'emploi que 
représente le secteur industriel (y compris la construction) est élevé par 
rapport aux paramètres de la CE; ce secteur emploie près de la moitié de la 
population active d'Europe centrale et orientale contre un tiers dans la 
Communauté. L'industrie lourde (notamment l'ingénierie, la chimie, le textile, 
les métaux ferreux) occupe une grande partie des effectifs industriels. Les 
disparités régionales au niveau de l'emploi industriel 
sont le plus marquées en Pologne et en Roumanie, reflétant l'importance 
persistante du secteur agricole. Cet état de fait peut être illustré par la 
Pologne, où l'emploi industriel régional varie de 12 à 61 % ou, encore, par 
la Hongrie et l'Allemagne de l'Est qui présentent des différences Nord-Sud 
sensibles résultant du rôle différent de l'emploi industriel dans les Länder 
du sud de l'Allemagne de l'Est et dans la partie nord-est et nord-ouest de la 
Hongrie. 
En revanche, le secteur des services des pays d'Europe centrale et 
orientale se révèle relativement sous-développé. En effet, les secteurs dits 
"non productifs", couplés au secteur des transports et des communications 
ainsi qu'au secteur du commerce, emploient en général 30 à 40% des effectifs 
totaux, en dehors de la Roumanie où le secteur des services s'avère 
extrêmement réduit (25%). A l'échelon régional, seules les capitales et les 
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grandes villes, telles que Sofia, Prague, Bratislava, Budapest et Varsovie, 
voient plus de 50% des effectifs totaux occupés dans le secteur des services. 
Les industries présentent un degré considérable d'intégration verticale dans 
de grandes unités de production. L'industrie reposait presque entièrement sur 
les "entreprises nationales" à planification centrale. En Hongrie, par 
exemple, plus de 80% des emplois manufacturiers étaient assurés par 1.140 
entreprises publiques comptant plus de 1.000 employés en moyenne. 
Les entreprises se concentrent, au niveau géographique, dans de grandes 
agglomérations industrielles urbaines sous la forme de zones ou d'axes 
industriels, correspondant, pour la plupart, à la présence de matières 
premières. L'industrie lourde hongroise est répartie le long d'un "axe 
énergétique" allant du nord-est au sud-ouest du pays et regroupant diverses 
ressources (charbon, minerais non ferreux et autres matières premières 
industrielles). Le développement industriel de la Pologne repose également sur 
l'exploitation des ressources (charbon et minerai de fer), surtout dans les 
zones cerclant la Haute-Silésie, Lodz et Walbrzych. De même, la Yougoslavie 
a vu son industrie se développer principalement dans le Nord, à savoir dans 
les régions de minerais de fer et de produits pétroliers et agricoles 
(Slovénie, Croatie, Bosnie et Vojvodine); en revanche, le développement 
industriel de la Roumanie est dominé par l'exploitation du pétrole au centre 
et au sud-est du pays. 
Dans l'ensemble de la région, on constate que les zones orientales se 
sont vu attribuer un rôle de prédilection en vue de faciliter la 
transformation des matières premières importées de l'Union soviétique. Parmi 
les autres facteurs importants d'implantation, on peut citer les possibilités 
d'approvisionnement en eau (surtout pour le secteur de la chimie) et la 
disponibilité de main-dOeuvre, élément clé de l'essor industriel. 
Outre le rôle important que jouent les ressources en matières premières 
ainsi que d'autres facteurs dans le choix du site d'implantation, l'Etat a 
tenté, par les plans, d'imposer des critères déterminés à l'échelon central. 
C'est ainsi que, dès l'année 1950, le gouvernement polonais a lancé le 
développement de cinq nouvelles zones industrielles dans les parties centrales 
et méridionales du pays (Konon, Legnica-Glogow, Tarnobrzeg, Oulawy et Plock), 
basées sur l'exploitation du cuivre, du soufre, du charbon et d'autres 
ressources énergétiques, afin de faire contrepoids au développement industriel 
concentré dans les zones plus anciennes. En Bulgarie, l'essentiel du potentiel 
industriel se trouve concentré dans une zone déterminée par un axe routier de 
forme elliptique (partant du centre du pays pour desservir toutes les régions 
bulgares), qui a servi de base à l'implantation des entreprises industrielles. 
En Hongrie, la planification étatique a également tenté de répartir les 
industries de manière plus égale: à l'écart de la capitale Budapest et au sud 
de l'axe énergétique, à savoir vers les villes Szeged, Pecs et Debrechen, 
ainsi que vers des villes plus petites ou de taille moyenne. 
La restructuration économique affectera toutes ces zones. L'expérience 
des pays d'Europe centrale et orientale ayant connu des réformes économiques 
plus poussées a révélé que même des secteurs industriels relativement "sains" 
peuvent décliner, faute de méthodes et de produits compétitifs. Il semble que 
certaines régions, dotées d'un appareil industriel relativement diversifié, 
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soient mieux armées pour faire face à la transition, les perspectives 
d'absorption de la perte d'emplois dans certains secteurs étant plus 
favorables. Néanmoins, la diversification n'est pas une garantie contre les 
problèmes économiques et les dures épreuves qu'ils entraînent. 
L'impact de ces réformes sera particulièrement aigu dans les régions où 
la division organisée et à grande échelle des opérations industrielles est 
basée sur des secteurs industriels lourds distincts ou sur un nombre réduit 
de ces secteurs (régions monostructurelles présentant peu de possibilités 
d'emploi). A l'heure actuelle, la restructuration économique et les problèmes 
régionaux qui en sont le corollaire constituent une menace pour un grand 
nombre de ces secteurs, notamment dans les zones où prédominent les matières 
premières (charbon et minerai) ainsi que les branches telles que la 
construction mécanique, la chimie et le textile. La fermeture de certaines 
entreprises ou la régression de la production, avec comme corollaire naturel 
des licenciements, seront probablement à l'origine des plus graves problèmes 
auxquels les régions seront confrontées. Même en présence d'une progression 
de la production, la productivité accrue découlant des investissements en 
nouveaux équipements conduira à des pertes d'emploi. 
Par ailleurs, la cessation de la production d'armements ou la conversion 
des fabriques de ce secteur vers des productions civiles pourrait ajouter aux 
difficultés. Si les productions nouvelles peuvent absorber certains emplois, 
les revenus que les employés en retireront devraient subir une baisse 
sensible. La nouvelle orientation imprimée aux échanges 
commerciaux-distanciation par rapport aux échanges et aux accords de troc avec 
l'Union soviétique- ainsi que la dissolution du COMECON pourraient également 
avoir des effets négatifs. Les estimations indiquent, pour certaines régions, 
une baisse de la production allant jusqu'à 50%. 
On peut conclure, par conséquent, que la restructuration économique 
entraînera une régression à court terme de l'emploi et de la performance dans 
la quasi-totalité des secteurs d'activité économique, phénomène qui revêtirait 
un caractère national. Il n'en demeure pas moins que les régions 
monostructurelles, les régions basées sur les matières premières, les régions 
sous-industrialisées et les zones dont les exportations sont orientées vers 
l'Union soviétique en seront probablement les plus affectées. 
(2) Le secteur agricole emploie une part importante de la population active 
d'Europe centrale et orientale. La privatisation et l'amélioration de 
la productivité auront un impact sensible sur certaines régions. 
Il existe un ensemble intimement lié de problèmes de développement 
régional concernant l'agriculture, lequel pourrait accentuer le chômage à la 
suite de la restructuration. La privatisation et l'amélioration de 
l'efficacité (utilisation accrue de technologies et meilleures infrastructures 
locales) pourraient aboutir à des pertes d'emplois importantes et â un 
phénomène d'exode. 
En premier lieu, le taux d'emploi que représente l'agriculture dans 
certaines parties de l'Europe centrale et orientale s'avère très élevé par 
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rapport au chiffre atteint en Europe occidentale. Le secteur agricole (y 
compris les forêts et la pêche) absorbe 21 % de l'emploi, contre 8% pour la 
Communauté européenne. Les principaux écarts apparaissent entre pays: la part 
de l'agriculture dans l'emploi varie de 10-11 % en Allemagne de l'Est et en 
Tchécoslovaquie, à 27% en Pologne, en Roumanie et en Yougoslavie. A 
l'intérieur des pays, les disparités régionales se révèlent relativement 
faibles, à l'exclusion de la Pologne, où le taux d'emploi régional maximal 
dans le secteur agricole excède 60% et où huit provinces comptent plus de la 
moitié des effectifs agricoles. 
Le processus de restructuration agricole réduira probablement de manière 
considérable le coefficient de main-d'oeuvre agricole. Même dans les zones 
telles que les régions agricoles fertiles de la Grande Plaine de Hongrie, 
l'efficacité de la production alimentaire devra faire l'objet d'une 
amélioration significative, en vue de faire face à la concurrence des marchés 
mondiaux, et notamment à celle de produits étrangers hautement subventionnés. 
En deuxième lieu, de grandes portions de la superficie agricole ont été 
par le passé nationalisées et organisées en coopérative. Le taux de 
nationalisation varie d'un pays à l'autre : en Tchécoslovaquie et en Roumanie, 
près de 90% de la superficie agricole a été nationalisée. En revanche, en 
Pologne, 75% des terres appartiennent à des particuliers; en Hongrie et en 
Yougoslavie, les chiffres équivalents se montent respectivement à 70% et à 
83%. L'agriculture d'Etat était caractérisée par de vastes complexes 
agricoles. La Bulgarie compte 300 complexes, d'environ 18.000 hectares chacun, 
couvrant quatre cinquièmes de la superficie agricole. Eu égard à ce qui 
précède, on peut affirmer - assez paradoxalement - que la redistribution des 
terres peut avoir pour effet une augmentation de la proportion de travail dans 
l'agriculture. En effet, la privatisation peut avoir pour effet une croissance 
de la main-d'oeuvre, un retour à l'agriculture de subsistance notamment dans 
les pays affectés le plus durement par des problèmes d'emploi et une 
productivité décroissante. 
En troisième lieu, il existe un problème de sous-développement. L'Europe 
centrale et orientale bénéficie, dans certaines régions, de conditions 
favorables au développement de l'agriculture (sols fertiles, climat approprié, 
etc.). On peut citer, à titre d'exemple, le nord-est de la Bulgarie, le sud 
de la Roumanie, l'est du Danube en Hongrie, la partie le long de l'Elbe 
(Bohême centrale) et de la Morava (Moravie centrale et Moravie méridionale), 
la Slovaquie occidentale et orientale en Tchécoslovaquie, ainsi que la partie 
yougoslave longeant la Save et le Danube (plaine pannonienne). Néanmoins, de 
nombreuses régions agricoles sont relativement attardées sur le plan de 
l'efficacité et de la productivité, la raison principale étant encore une fois 
le manque d'infrastructures et de technologies appropriées. En Hongrie, on 
estime que les conditions défavorables existant dans les zones de montagne 
(altitude, pauvreté du sol, technologie inadéquate, etc.) rendraient, dans une 
économie de marché, l'agriculture non rentable dans 30 à 40 % des unités 
agricoles. En Pologne, la moitié des 2,75 millions d'exploitations, notamment 
dans les parties centrales et méridionales, sont d'une taille inférieure à 
cinq hectares; en Yougoslavie, la taille des exploitations privées avoisine 
3,5 hectares. 
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(3) Les déficiences infrastructurelles constituent un obstacle majeur à la 
restructuration économique. Les zones périphériques des pays considérés 
et les parties orientales de l'Europe centrale et orientale semblent 
particulièrement mal loties. 
Le manque d'infrastructures est considéré comme la principale cause des 
problèmes affectant actuellement l'Europe centrale et orientale. Les 
infrastructures de transport y sont généralement de faible qualité et 
saturées. Par exemple, les réseaux de chemin de fer sont étendus mais 
comportent de nombreuses parties à voie unique (en Hongrie, les doubles voies 
ne représentent que 14 % ) , leur résistance est faible et bien des sections 
s'avèrent impropres à de grandes vitesses. Le réseau d'électricité se révèle 
peu développé et le matériel roulant souffre de sous-investissement. En ce qui 
concerne le réseau routier, en Tchécoslovaquie aussi bien qu'en Hongrie, les 
autoroutes représentent moins de 1 % du réseau routier total et bien des 
chemins d'exploitation ne sont pas revêtus. 
Les infrastructures de communication régionales présentent deux 
caractéristiques en Europe centrale et orientale. En premier lieu, le 
développement des infrastructures de transport et de télécommunication, dans 
la plupart des pays, se trouve concentré dans les principales zones urbaines, 
suivant les axes d'activité économique : Sofia-Varna et Sofia-Bourgas en 
Bulgarie; Prague-Brno-Bratislava (les seules autoroutes) en Tchécoslovaquie; 
et dans la zone de Budapest en Hongrie. La concentration du développement 
urbain/industriel au sud de l'Allemagne de l'Est (et à Berlin) tiennent 
également aux possibilités accrues d'accès au téléphone et à un espace vital 
plus étendu. En Pologne, la dotation en téléphones des zones rurales, à l'est 
du pays (par exemple Ostroleka, Siedlce, Krosno ou Cezestochowa) représente 
moins de la moitié des équipements de Varsovie, Lodz ou Cracovie. La 
concentration d'infrastructures dans des régions centrales met en lumière le 
caractère largement secondaire des infrastructures et services des zones 
rurales et de leurs liaisons avec les régions périphériques et frontalières. 
Cela a accentué la concentration des activités économiques et des 
agglomérations. 
La deuxième caractéristique réside dans les disparités ouest-est que 
présentent les infrastructures; celles-ci diminuent au fur et à mesure que 
l'on s'éloigne de l'Europe occidentale. Cette situation s'explique par le 
développement, dans les différents pays, de l'industrie et de l'investissement 
a des fins militaires. Aussi la densité du réseau routier et ferroviaire 
s'avère-t-elle relativement élevée dans l'ex-RDA, bien que la qualité de la 
conception et de l'entretien y soit largement insuffisante. En Pologne, les 
infrastructures de transport se caractérisent principalement par une densité 
qui décroît à mesure que l'on va vers l'ouest du pays (diminution des voies 
ferrées de 12 km à 4 km par 100 km2 et une réduction de la surface de 
roulement de 70 km à 40 km par 100 km2). 
Les infrastructures sociales (enseignement fondamental et soins de 
santé) semblent inégalement réparties, mais les informations disponibles ne 
suffisent pas pour tirer des conclusions valables quant aux disparités 
régionales. Ces deux secteurs sont confrontés principalement à un problème 
d'ordre qualitatif plutôt que quantitatif; leurs problèmes sont liés aux 
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sous-investissements et â un manque considérable d'équipements et de 
matériels. 
(4) Les réformes politiques et la restructuration économique se traduisent 
par un élément clé : le chômage. Les régions agricoles en ont subi les 
effets les plus directs, mais certaines régions industrielles 
souffriront vraisemblablement, à moyen terme, de très fortes pertes 
d ! emploi. 
La reconnaissance officielle du chômage est un phénomène relativement 
récent en Europe centrale et orientale (à l'exception de la Yougoslavie), 
alors que le chômage caché a toujours existé. A la fin de 1990, les taux de 
chômage variaient comme suit : 1-5 % en Bulgarie, Tchécoslovaquie, Hongrie et 
Roumanie; 5-10 % pour 1 ' ex-RDA et la Pologne, et plus de 10 % pour la 
Yougoslavie. Néanmoins, il est estimé que le chômage excédera 10 % dans la 
plupart des pays de l'Europe centrale et orientale pendant les années 
1991-1992 et qu'il pourrait atteindre 12 à 14 millions de personnes en Europe 
centrale et orientale d'ici à l'année 1994. 
L'Allemagne de l'Est en particulier est touchée par un phénomène de 
chômage étendu, dissimulé sous la forme de travail â temps partiel. De 
nombreux travailleurs à temps partiel devraient être licenciés en 1991. Le 
sous-emploi total dans ce pays, y compris le chômage et le sous-emploi, était 
estimé à 30 % de la population active au début de 1991. 
A court terme, l'effet le plus direct de la restructuration s'est 
produit dans le secteur agricole, où l'introduction de la privatisation et 
l'amélioration de l'efficacité entraînent de considérables pertes d'emploi. 
Ces régions présentent d'autres éléments caractéristiques: présence 
d'industries vulnérables, prédominance d'entreprises faiblement présentes sur 
le marché, perspectives d'emplois alternatifs immédiats moins favorables, 
faible "pouvoir de négociation" politique. Industrialisation peu développée, 
infrastructures obsolètes et taux de naissance élevé, tels sont les facteurs 
qui avaient déjà engendré, dans ces régions, un chômage largement répandu, 
même avant la restructuration. C'est pourquoi le taux de chômage le plus élevé 
que l'Allemagne de l'Est ait connu à ce jour a été enregistré dans les zones 
rurales de Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, et notamment dans les districts de Schwerin 
et Neubrandenburg. De même, les taux de chômage enregistrés dans les zones 
agricoles de la Tchécoslovaquie (Slovaquie occidentale et orientale), de la 
Yougoslavie (Macédoine) et de la Pologne (provinces orientales) sont des plus 
élevés. 
A moyen terme néanmoins, les régions industrielles seront affectées plus 
durement que les régions agricoles. Des secteurs industriels traditionnels 
devraient subir, à la suite de la restructuration économique, le chômage de 
plein fouet, de nombreuses entreprises étant inefficaces, non productives, 
intensives en main-d'oeuvre et considérablement subventionnées. Les pertes 
d'emplois les plus graves devraient intervenir dans les régions 
monostructurelles dotées de matières premières, d'une industrie lourde et 
fondant leur économie sur les échanges avec l'Union soviétique. Dans ces 
régions, l'impact de la restructuration a été jusqu'à présent limité, leurs 
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industries n'ayant pas encore fait l'objet de fermeture à grande échelle; en 
outre, elles sont confrontées à un phénomène de chômage caché et de 
sous-emploi (travailleurs à temps partiels). 
(5) Les indicateurs démographiques tracent des diagrammes hautement 
différenciés des modifications démographiques intervenues dans les 
régions d'Europe centrale et orientale. La distribution de la 
population révèle une tendance à la concentration dans les grandes 
villes ainsi qu'un dépeuplement et un sous-développement des régions 
périphériques. Les flux migratoires interrégionaux et internationaux 
pourraient accuser une hausse sous l'effet de la restructuration. 
En Europe centrale et orientale, les tendances démographiques varient 
sensiblement d'une région à l'autre. Dans la plupart des pays, certaines 
régions enregistrent un taux de naissance de plus de 14 pour 1.000. Les taux 
de mortalité sont également élevés (et se sont accrus récemment), les taux 
régionaux excédant 12 pour 1.000. Néanmoins, les disparités régionales 
demeurent considérables, le taux des modifications démographiques variant 
d'une région à l'autre (de 10 à 20 % en ce qui concerne en particulier 
l'Allemagne de l'Est et la Tchécoslovaquie). 
Le taux de croissance démographique devrait continuer à décliner dans 
la mesure où les taux de naissance sont en déclin. Les taux de mortalité 
devraient également diminuer de manière sensible, eu égard à l'amélioration 
des soins de santé et des conditions environnementales, et le vieillissement 
de la population qui en résultera donnera probablement lieu à des structures 
par âge similaires à celles des pays d'Europe occidentale. Néanmoins, les 
différences de développement économique, l'influence de la religion et la 
présence de minorités régionales entraîneront le maintien d'une variation 
géographique considérable de l'évolution démographique entre pays et au sein 
de ceux-ci (notamment en ce qui concerne les taux de naissance). 
La distribution de la population se caractérise par une concentration 
considérable dans quelques grandes villes. Dans certaines capitales (Prague, 
Budapest, Sofia), le développement démographique a dépassé les possibilités 
de fourniture de services. La formation d'agglomérations a eu pour effet le 
déclin de certaines localités rurales plus petites, notamment celles situées 
dans les régions frontalières et dans les régions montagneuses ou reculées. 
Le dépeuplement et le sous-développement constituent une caractéristique 
commune aux régions périphériques (notamment en Bulgarie et Roumanie), privées 
de centres de taille et de fonctions suffisamment importantes pour éviter 
1'exode. 
La répartition très inégale de la population, couplée aux graves 
perturbations résultant de la restructuration industrielle et agricole, aura 
probablement pour effet d'importants flux migratoires. Les processus de 
restructuration nécessitent une redistribution significative des facteurs de 
production découlant de la dissolution des principales entreprises d'Etat, de 
la fermeture des entreprises non performantes et d'une augmentation de la 
productivité. La mobilité de la main-d'oeuvre constituera un élément clé de 
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ces processus, mais les flux migratoires peuvent être également la conséquence 
d'un manque d'emploi et de la pauvreté. 
Par ailleurs, la mobilité de la main-d'oeuvre est freinée par une 
régression générale des offres d'emploi. Les écarts régionaux croissants entre 
les prix des loyers (en dehors de la crise générale du logement) réduiront 
davantage ce phénomène. 
Par le passé, le phénomène de migration revêtait un caractère 
interrégional (à l'intérieur des pays), si l'on excepte le rapatriement de 
minorités ethniques et les flux migratoires vers l'Ouest consécutifs à des 
troubles politiques. Les flux migratoires interrégionaux se sont révélés 
substantiels (gains et pertes régionaux de plus ou moins 10 % sur la période 
1980-1988), allant principalement des régions arriérées vers les régions 
développées et des zones rurales vers les zones urbaines. 
Dans l'avenir, le phénomène de migration internationale vers l'Europe 
occidentale pourrait engendrer, pour l'Europe centrale et orientale, des 
problèmes aigus de pénurie de main-d'oeuvre dus au départ de personnes jeunes 
et de personnes qualifiées. A l'intérieur des pays, les zones rurales moins 
développées pourraient être durement affectées par la persistance de l'exode 
rural au profit des zones urbaines et de la migration interrégionale, 
phénomènes auxquels s'ajoutent un taux de naissance décroissant, le 
vieillissement de la population (en raison de la baisse du taux de mortalité) 
et des offres d'emploi moins nombreuses. 
Néanmoins, la migration n'a pas encore engendré de grandes pénuries de 
main-d'oeuvre, à l'exclusion de l'Allemagne de l'Est qui, jusqu'ici, a été le 
pays le plus touché par les flux migratoires. L'action combinée de plusieurs 
facteurs, tels que le désir d'acquérir des biens de consommation, les écarts 
salariaux entre l'Allemagne de l'Est et l'Allemagne de l'Ouest (quelque 35 % ) , 
le chômage croissant caractérisant l'Allemagne de l'Est et des niveaux de vie 
très différents, a engendré une migration "intragermanique" d'environ 256.000 
personnes pendant l'année 1989 et de 238.000 personnes durant la première 
moitié de 1990. Durant la période 1989-1990, la majeure partie des nombreux 
migrants est-allemands quittaient les régions du sud (Sachsen a perdu près de 
3 % de sa population durant les années 1989 et 1990). La migration se poursuit 
à un rythme élevé; au début de 1991, 10.000 personnes par mois quittaient 
Sachsen. 
En Pologne, on a estimé que près de 12 millions de personnes constituent 
des "migrants potentiels". S'il est peu probable qu'un tel nombre de personnes 
migrent effectivement, des mouvements migratoires importants pourraient 
néanmoins intervenir - notamment à partir de la région de Haute Silésie (et 
zones environnantes) - si la restructuration industrielle engendre un taux de 
chômage élevé et si les dégâts causés à l'environnement ne sont pas réparés. 
Plus de 1,3 million de personnes de toute l'Europe centrale et orientale (y 
compris les citoyens d'Union soviétique) ont migré vers l'Ouest depuis les 
événements politiques de 1989. Les taux de chômage élevés existant dans ces 
pays pourraient entraîner une augmentation de ce phénomène, les migrants étant 
désireux de trouver du travail et des conditions de vie meilleures en Europe 
orientale. 
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(6) La pollution environnementale du sol, de l'eau et de l'air est la 
conséquence d'un processus d'industrialisation intense, combiné à 
l'utilisation d'une technologie inadéquate et à un phénomène de 
sous-investissement dans le secteur du traitement des déchets. 
Certaines régions se ressentent encore plus durement de la dégradation 
environnementale, bien que les effets les plus désastreux y soient 
relativement localisés. 
L'ampleur et la nature des problèmes environnementaux frappant l'Europe 
centrale et orientale tirent leur origine d'une industrialisation rapide et 
d'une exploitation massive des matières premières, avec des contrôles 
inadéquats en matière d'environnement ou une prise en considération 
insuffisante de l'impact environnemental. L'utilisation de lignite de qualité 
inférieure, un tissu industriel et un réseau de transports inefficaces ainsi 
que des investissements déficitaires concernant les stations d'épuration ont 
causé de graves problèmes de pollution de l'air et des eaux ainsi qu'une 
dégradation des forêts et du paysage. La Pologne, la Tchécoslovaquie et 
l'Allemagne de l'Est semblent être confrontées aux problèmes environnementaux 
les plus graves et les plus étendus, notamment dans les régions où sont 
concentrées un grand nombre d'entreprises extractives et de transformation. 
Les niveaux de pollution atteints dans une grande partie de ces régions 
sont largement supérieurs à ceux d'Europe occidentale. Les effets de ce 
phénomène se manifestent au niveau de la santé de la population : maladies 
liées à la pollution, taux élevé de mortalité infantile et espérance de vie 
plus courte. Néanmoins, les cas de pollution extrême (liés à de très fortes 
émissions de dioxyde de soufre ou à des concentrations de métaux lourds dans 
des cours d'eau ou dans le sol) ont tendance à se cantonner dans des zones 
limitées. Celles-ci comprennent la Haute Silésie (Pologne), le nord de la 
Bohême et le nord de la Moravie (Tchécoslovaquie), Halle et Cottbus (Allemagne 
de l'Est); la région de Sofia (Bulgarie); Jesenica en Slovénie (Yougoslavie); 
et Resita et Copsa Mica (Roumanie). Il est incontestable que les politiques 
concentreront leurs efforts sur ces cas graves de dégâts environnementaux, 
mais les niveaux de pollution devraient baisser, vu la diminution de la 
production des industries lourdes. 
(7) Avec une liberté politique et sociale accrue, les tensions entre les 
minorités territoriales et les populations d'accueil pourraient 
s'accentuer dans certaines régions. 
Parmi les problèmes régionaux affectant les pays d'Europe centrale et 
orientale, figure celui des régions abritant des minorités. Les différences 
culturelles et sociales s'y sont traduites par de l'hostilité, en particulier 
là où les minorités ont fait l'objet d'actes de chauvinisme et de répression 
sous le régime communiste (par exemple la minorité turque en Bulgarie ou les 
Hongrois en Roumanie). Des libertés politiques et individuelles accrues, 
combinées à l'effondrement de l'économie, peuvent, dans ce cas également, être 
à l'origine de tensions sociales et de mouvements migratoires. En Pologne, par 
exemple, de nombreuses personnes en haute Silésie ont déclaré appartenir à 
l'ethnie allemande; de tels faits perturbent inévitablement les relations 
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entre la population majoritaire et la minorité. De manière générale, les 
multiples pressions politiques régionales et locales, que les anciens régimes 
maintenaient sous leur coupe, sont maintenant libérées. 
Les problèmes atteignent une intensité maximale en Tchécoslovaquie, en 
Yougoslavie et en Roumanie et sont moins aigus en Allemagne de l'Est et en 
Hongrie. Le potentiel de tensions sociales en Yougoslavie est particulièrement 
élevé, ainsi que l'ont montré les troubles et les conflits militaires survenus 
en 1991. Hormis les différences ethniques existant à l'intérieur des diverses 
républiques, la population (24 millions) compte des minorités importantes 
d'Albanais, de Hongrois, de Turcs et de Roumains. Même les pays qui sont 
épargnés par ce genre de problèmes en subissent les conséquences : arrivée de 
réfugiés et croissance de l'économie "souterraine" et du marché noir (la 
Hongrie compte quelque 100.000 migrants, provenant principalement de 
Roumanie). 
(8) Les disparités régionales et les problèmes régionaux vont probablement 
subir des mutations considérables, même à court terme, à la suite de la 
restructuration politique et économique. 
L'analyse des disparités régionales et l'identification des problèmes 
régionaux, dans le présent rapport, ont reposé, en grande partie, sur des 
données illustrant la situation existant dans les pays d'Europe centrale et 
orientale à la fin des années 80, c'est-à-dire avant que d'importants 
processus de libéralisation politique et économique ne soient engagés. Comme 
on l'a déjà signalé plus haut, l'ensemble des pays d'Europe centrale et 
orientale sont à l'heure actuelle en proie à une grave récession (chute de la 
production, taux élevé d'inflation et croissance du chômage). A la suite des 
processus de restructuration, qui produiront des effets négatifs à l'échelon 
national et régional, les contrastes régionaux risquent de subir des 
modifications considérables, même à court et à moyen terme, au fur et à mesure 
de l'introduction des réformes. Trois séries de tendances peuvent être 
dégagées. 
En premier lieu, la restructuration économique pourrait modifier 
sensiblement les structures d'emploi régionales, se répercutant sur les trois 
secteurs. La rationalisation de l'agriculture porte en elle le germe d'une 
régression considérable de la part du secteur agricole dans l'emploi 
(notamment à l'est du pays), tendance qui s'est déjà manifestée dans les 
parties septentrionales de l'Allemagne de l'Est. La fermeture d'usines, de 
mines et de centrales électriques non rentables ou polluantes est en train 
d'engendrer un taux de chômage élevé (en particulier dans les régions 
présentant peu de possibilités de diversification). Ces tendances accentueront 
la mobilité de la main-dOeuvre (abandon des zones rurales au profit des zones 
urbaines et mouvements interrégionaux), modifiant à la fois les structures de 
la population et de l'emploi régionaux et les besoins en infrastructures 
socio-économiques régionales (bien que le degré de mobilité de la 
main-d'oeuvre puisse être entravé par le manque d'offres d'emploi). 
L'assouplissement des restrictions en matière de voyages internationaux 
offrira la possibilité aux habitants de migrer et de se déplacer à l'intérieur 
de leur pays. 
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En deuxième lieu, le développement de zones urbaines, notamment de 
centres secondaires, va probablement prendre de l'ampleur. Le secteur des 
services dans les pays d'Europe centrale et orientale, et en particulier les 
services aux consommateurs et aux producteurs dans les zones urbaines 
présentent un potentiel de développement très élevé. La réforme des structures 
territoriales, avec un degré d'autonomie et de responsabilités accru à 
l'échelon régional, accentuera également le développement de centres 
administratifs locaux et régionaux, notamment les chefs-lieux de régions. Une 
nouvelle législation sur la propriété entraînera l'accroissement des demandes 
de logements privés, favorisant le développement de la banlieue et de petites 
et moyennes villes. 
En troisième lieu, certaines zones périphériques et rurales profiteront 
de l'ouverture des frontières et des perspectives ouvertes par le commerce 
transfrontalier et le développement. L'accroissement du tourisme international 
peut également entraîner l'essor de certaines régions. 
(9) Au-delà des disparités territoriales à l'intérieur des différents pays, 
l'Europe centrale et orientale présente, dans son intégralité, un 
potentiel de développement hautement différencié en matière de 
restructuration. L'évolution des réformes économiques et les 
différences territoriales dans le domaine socio-économique révèlent que 
les conditions de développement sont plus favorables dans les parties 
occidentales de la région. 
Dans l'ensemble des pays d'Europe centrale et orientale, des différences 
ouest—est et nord—sud risquent de surgir, ces pays subissant un processus de 
passage à l'économie de marché à des rythmes différents. L'Allemagne de l'Est 
a été réunie avec l'Allemagne de l'Ouest et intégrée à la CE; la Pologne, la 
Tchécoslovaquie et la Hongrie ont réalisé des progrès considérables en matière 
de réforme économique; en Bulgarie, en Yougoslavie et en Roumanie, l'issue des 
réformes politiques est encore incertaine. 
Situées au-delà des zones examinées dans le présent rapport, les 
républiques occidentales de l'Union Soviétique (pays baltes, Ukraine et 
Biélorussie) manifestent des velléités de séparation avec l'URSS en pleine 
crise économique. 
Des critères fondamentaux d'ordre socio-économique indiquent également 
que les conditions de développement régional sont plus favorables dans la 
partie occidentale de l'Europe centrale et orientale. Les contrastes régionaux 
les plus patents ont trait à l'évolution démographique et aux structures de 
1'emploi. 
D'après les données démographiques, la croissance démographique pendant 
les années 80 s'est avérée élevée dans bien des régions de l'Europe centrale 
et orientale, par rapport aux moyennes communautaires. Néanmoins, les taux de 
natalité et le pourcentage d'enfants dans la population sont 
exceptionnellement élevés dans les parties occidentales de la région 
considérée, à savoir dans une grande partie de la Pologne orientale, dans les 
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régions orientales de Slovaquie, dans les régions nord-est de Roumanie ainsi 
que dans les républiques du sud de la Yougoslavie. 
La croissance démographique va de pair, dans une certaine mesure, avec 
le degré de (sous-)développement économique. Le rôle de l'agriculture, des 
forêts et de la pêche en tant que source d'emploi (très important par rapport 
aux pays de la Communauté) se révèle plus important dans les zones 
périphériques des pays en cause et, surtout, dans les parties orientales 
d'Europe centrale et orientale. L'essentiel des zones industrialisées se 
trouve plutôt concentré à l'ouest de la région : les districts méridionaux de 
l'Allemagne de l'Est, la Pologne occidentale, la Tchécoslovaquie centrale, la 
Yougoslavie septentrionale, le nord-ouest de la Hongrie et les régions 
occidentales de Bulgarie. 
La dotation des régions en infrastructures décline également à mesure 
que l'on s'aproche de l'est. La même tendance apparaît en ce qui concerne la 
densité et la qualité des réseaux routiers, ferroviaires et de 
télécommunications, si l'on en croit les données restreintes disponibles. 
Enfin, il convient de mettre en lumière l'importance que revêt 
l'orientation des liens commerciaux passés et présents. Des régions à l'est 
de l'Europe centrale et orientale, tournées vers l'Union soviétique, sont en 
train de perdre un important partenaire commercial, en raison de la 
dissolution du COMECON et de la chute des échanges avec l'Union soviétique. 
Les régions à l'ouest se trouvent en revanche dans une situation extrêmement 
favorable aux échanges, aux investissements étrangers, au développement des 
infrastructures et aux associations transfrontalières avec l'Europe 
occidentale. 
Par conséquent, si tous les pays et toutes les régions concernés auront 
à affronter de graves bouleversements socio-économiques, certains sont mieux 
placés que d'autres. Il se peut que même le consensus actuel sur les objectifs 
de restructuration ne soit pas de nature à empêcher qu'un climat 
d'insatisfaction et de démoralisation au sein de la population n'entrave les 
réformes politiques et économiques. Les contrastes géographiques concernant 
le degré de transition économique et de développement régional risquent 
d'avoir une incidence négative sur les relations entre pays et régions. Cela 
aggravera les problèmes liés à l'histoire de la région (instabilité politique, 
hostilités nationales et régionales et différences socio-culturelles). 
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Β. POLITIQUES 
La partie II du présent rapport examine les réformes structurelles et 
le développement régional des pays de l'Europe centrale et orientale, sous 
l'angle des principales composantes des politiques macro-économiques, des 
stratégies de développement régional passées et des perspectives de politiques 
régionales. 
(1) Le potentiel de développement de politiques régionales dans l'avenir 
immédiat pourrait s'avérer limité. Les politiques régionales passées 
concernaient principalement la distribution à 1'échelon régional des 
ressources de développement planifiées à l'échelon central. Le 
développement de politiques régionales nouvelles pourrait être entravé 
par la priorité donnée aux politiques économiques nationales et par 
l'évolution rapide de la situation économique des régions. 
Il existe d'importants obstacles au développement de politiques 
régionales axées sur le marché. En premier lieu, dans la phase actuelle du 
processus de réforme, des pays tels que la Pologne, la Hongrie et la 
Tchécoslovaquie jugent prématuré de concevoir des stratégies de développement 
régional, l'objectif initial étant de développer des politiques à l'échelon 
national. La restructuration économique en cours met l'accent sur des mesures 
fondamentales telles que la réforme des prix, la privatisation, l'amélioration 
des conditions en matière d'investissement étranger, les échanges et relations 
internationales ainsi que les politiques sociales. 
En deuxième lieu, l'identification de disparités régionales en tant que 
base à l'élaboration de politiques pose des difficultés. Dans une situation 
de mutation rapide et dans un climat d'incertitudes, le "problème régional" 
reste à dégager et à définir. Il est probable que les hypothèses actuelles 
deviennent erronées au fur et à mesure de la définition de nouvelles options 
de développement. Il est donc extrêmement difficile d'établir des pronostics 
des besoins de développement régionaux. 
En troisième lieu, l'expérience de politiques régionales basées sur le 
marché s'avère limitée. Dans le passé, les stratégies de développement 
régional portaient en général sur la planification régionale et la mise en 
oeuvre à l'échelon régional de plans sectoriels. La procédure décentralisée 
de prise de décision en matière de développement économique était réduite, 
strictement contrôlée par le centre et pouvait être annulée en période de 
crise. 
Enfin, plusieurs pays connaissent actuellement une procédure de réforme 
de leurs structures territoriales. La structure des unités territoriales et 
les rapports entre les instances centrales, régionales et locales font l'objet 
d'une réorganisation afin de créer des systèmes plus appropriés aux économies 
de marché. L'accent est mis sur la régionalisation plutôt que sur la politique 
régionale. 
Exceptionnellement, l'Allemagne de l'Est n'a pas tardé à mettre en 
oeuvre des politiques régionales. En vertu de l'unification, le système 
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ouest-allemand d'aide économique (Gemeinschaftsaufgabe) a été étendu, 
parallèlement aux crédits budgétaires alloués dans le cadre du Fonds spécial 
ERP et d'autres programmes régionaux spécifiques. Initialement, les aides 
régionales concernaient l'ensemble du pays. L'ampleur des problèmes de 
développement économique, la nécessité de dégager des disparités régionales 
et la non-application de critères de détermination précis rendaient la 
différenciation régionale impossible. Néanmoins, en 1991, un programme 
régional spécial a été introduit en vue de fournir une assistance aux régions 
est-allemandes les plus touchées par des problèmes de restructuration. 
(2) A court terme, il conviendra de promouvoir le développement économique 
des régions présentant un potentiel de développement maximal. 
Néanmoins, les aides régionales d'urgence pourraient être également 
destinées aux zones connaissant un taux de chômage élevé ainsi qu'aux 
zones les plus endommagées du point de vue écologique. 
Eu égard aux impératifs inhérents à la survie de l'économie nationale 
pendant la phase de transition, il se peut que de faibles ressources soient 
affectées à la réduction des contrastes régionaux. A l'échelon régional, les 
politiques de développement économique devront viser le développement de zones 
dotées d'un potentiel de croissance et les plus aptes à devenir le fer de 
lance du processus de restructuration. Ces régions sont principalement des 
régions industrielles diversifiées, bénéficiant d'une structure matérielle et 
technique relativement bonne, de personnel expérimenté, de bonnes 
infrastructures et de liaisons internationales. Les autres zones à potentiel 
de développement sont les régions agricoles fertiles, les pôles 
d'investissements étrangers, les régions limitrophes de pays à économie de 
marché développée, ainsi que les zones touristiques présentant un attrait pour 
le tourisme international. 
Néanmoins, l'ampleur du processus de restructuration industrielle et les 
conséquences sociales qui y sont liées (chômage important, mouvements 
migratoires) pourraient nécessiter l'octroi d'aides régionales d'urgence à 
caractère sélectif en vue de pallier les effets les plus préjudiciables 
produits par les licenciements. Le lancement d'actions immédiates pour 
remédier aux problèmes environnementaux les plus graves peut également 
s'avérer nécessaire afin de préserver la santé humaine et les écosystèmes 
saturés. 
(3) A moyen terme, le développement de politiques régionales nouvelles 
pourrait englober un large éventail de mesures. Par priorité, il 
convient d'encourager les investissements d'infrastructure et l'appui 
à la restructuration locale et régionale. 
Après la mise en place des principales réformes macro-économiques en 
Europe centrale et orientale dans un nouveau contexte de développement 
économique national, il sera nécessaire d'examiner les questions de 
développement régional à plus long terme. Outre les opérations générales de 
restructuration industrielle et de dépollution, il conviendra d'examiner en 
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priorité les problèmes de surpeuplement et de surdéveloppement dans les 
grandes agglomérations urbaines/industrielles, le manque d'investissements et 
d'infrastructures dans les zones périphériques, ainsi que la nécessité d'une 
répartition plus équilibrée des logements et des industries. 
Parmi les mesures de politiques régionales à envisager, le premier axe 
prioritaire réside dans le développement des infrastructures nécessaires, en 
particulier la mise en place de réseaux routiers et ferroviaires nationaux et 
internationaux, d'aéroports internationaux et de centres de transit régionaux 
ultra-perfectionnés. Le développement d'infrastructures de télécommunications 
régionales s'impose également, principalement pour pallier les déficiences des 
systèmes de commutation et des centraux téléphoniques locaux ainsi que pour 
faciliter l'accès aux réseaux de téléphone, de fax et de télex. Le deuxième 
objectif de taille est représenté par la restructuration locale et régionale 
visant principalement à maintenir la compétitivité de régions industrielles 
diversifiées, tout en pratiquant une politique de diversification dans les 
zones monostructurelles, avec des appuis aux PME. Il importe d'assurer la 
privatisation et la réorganisation des entreprises publiques, en procédant par 
exemple à la reconversion d'entreprises et à l'octroi d'aides. Les zones les 
plus arriérées devraient faire l'objet de programmes de restructuration 
globaux, concentrés et coordonnés, prévoyant des aides aux PME, des mesures 
d'amélioration environnementale, le développement des infrastructures locales 
et régionales, des installations sociales et de formation. 
Parmi les objectifs de la politique régionale figurent l'amélioration 
et la protection de l'environnement, la restructuration agricole et le 
développement de zones rurales, la suppression des contrastes urbains et 
régionaux ainsi que la coopération internationale et le développement 
transfrontalier. 
(4) La mise en oeuvre d'une politique régionale beaucoup plus efficace et 
plus performante en Europe centrale et orientale passe par le transfert 
d'informations et de connaissances à partir de l'Europe occidentale et 
par la mise sur pied de réseaux ouest-est d'échange d'expertise et 
d'expérience. 
Les pays d'Europe occidentale ont acquis une expérience et des 
connaissances considérables en matière de développement régional dans le cadre 
des économies de marché. Les stratégies mises en oeuvre au cours des 40 
dernières années ont abordé un éventail de problèmes régionaux à divers 
échelons du territoire. Un grand nombre de politiques et d'instruments 
régionaux ont été éprouvés, et les connaissances acquises en ce qui concerne 
l'efficacité des différents mécanismes - aussi bien au niveau de chacun des 
pays qu'au niveau de la Communauté européenne. 
Ces connaissances pourraient être très utiles aux décideurs régionaux 
des pays d'Europe centrale et orientale dans le domaine des disparités 
régionales. Il importe, par conséquent, de mettre sur pied des structures et 
des réseaux susceptibles de promouvoir et d'organiser le transfert et les 
échanges d'informations, d'idées et d'expertise entre l'Europe de l'Ouest et 
l'Europe de l'Est. 
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(5) L'Allemagne de l'Est connaît un processus de passage à l'économie de 
marché beaucoup plus rapide que les autres parties d'Europe centrale et 
orientale. Bien que l'on puisse tirer-pour les pays voisins-des 
enseignements des processus et des politiques de restructuration 
concernant l'Allemagne de l'Est, les comparaisons et le transfert des 
expériences de développement se heurtent néanmoins à des restrictions 
considérables. 
Aux fins de la présente étude, l'Allemagne de l'Est a été considérée, 
en général, comme un "pays", dans l'examen comparatif de la situation 
économique et sociale des diverses régions d'Europe centrale et orientale. La 
raison en est qu'une grande partie des données socio-économiques concernent 
la période antérieure à l'année 1990 (époque où la RDA existait). En outre, 
la vitesse â laquelle l'Allemagne de l'Est doit s'adapter à l'économie de 
marché fournit des données appréciables sur les effets des réformes 
économiques; d'autres pays d'Europe centrale et orientale ont entrepris des 
mesures de réforme et subissent les effets de la restructuration économique 
sur des périodes plus longues. En conséquence, les problèmes se sont 
manifestés plus rapidement en Allemagne de l'Est et avec une intensité accrue 
: croissance et effets plus apparents du chômage, d'abord dans le secteur 
agricole, ensuite dans les zones urbaines/industrielles, notamment dans les 
villes et régions monostructurelles; inefficacité des équipements et 
sous-investissement; infrastructures déficitaires; aménagement de l'industrie 
pour satisfaire aux normes environnementales de l'Europe orientale. 
Les difficultés auxquelles est confrontée la population est-allemande 
en raison du passage à l'économie de marché sont également révélatrices à cet 
égard. Une grande partie de la population de 1'ex-RDA connaît des difficultés 
liées à l'adaptation à la concurrence, à la suppression des aides et à la 
perte de certains services sociaux ainsi qu'aux critères occidentaux en 
matière d'entreprise, en dépit de l'aide considérable fournie par les 
organisations ouest-allemandes. Les autres pays d'Europe centrale et orientale 
connaissent ces problèmes d'une manière atténuée mais pourraient, à terme, en 
être affectés plus gravement. On pense, en effet, que si 1 ' ex-RDA - qui était 
jadis la "vitrine du socialisme" se heurte à des problèmes de transition aussi 
épineux, cela augure mal des autres pays d'Europe centrale et orientale (qui 
ne bénéficient pas de l'octroi de ressources substantielles par l'Allemagne 
de 1'Ouest). 
Néanmoins, la comparaison entre les problèmes et les perspectives de 
développement de 1'ex-RDA avec ceux des autres pays d'Europe centrale et 
orientale doit être considérablement restreinte. La dissolution de la RDA a 
entraîné la suppression d'un certain nombre d'options importantes de politique 
nationale, notamment liées au commerce et à la politique monétaire (taux des 
changes, taux d'intérêt, prix, taxation, contrôle des importations etc.), qui 
auraient pu être utilisées pour assurer un processus de restructuration plus 
progressif et plus maîtrisé. En outre, alors que 1'ex-RDA avait une économie 
relativement bien développée par rapport aux autres pays d'Europe centrale et 
orientale, elle est maintenant la seule région à être confrontée à la 
concurrence directe des pays occidentaux. Elle est donc en proie à certains 
problèmes de restructuration très spécifiques par rapport à ses anciens 
partenaires du COMECON. 
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Il en résulte qu'en dépit des enseignements intéressants tirés de 
l'analyse des problèmes et des politiques de développement régionaux de 
1'ex-RDA, le transfert d'expertise et en particulier des politiques doit 
s'effectuer avec prudence. 

CHAPTER 1 : 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Project background 
During late 1989 and early 1990, the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe began to initiate far-reaching processes of political liberalisation 
and economic restructuring. A major concern for the European Commission 
was the appropriate form of EC response, including the level and sharing 
out of structural assistance to be provided in the regions of the GDR and 
other East European countries. In the short term, decisions were required 
regarding the eligibility of GDR regions for aid under the different 
objectives of the Structural Funds after German unification, and the 
priorities for Community assistance. In the longer term, it was envisaged 
that EC regional policies would have to consider how Central and East 
European political and economic reforms would affect the regions of the 
Community. 
In support of the preparation and implementation of these decisions, 
the Commission required a statistical and analytical information base 
describing the processes, patterns and prospects of regional economic 
growth and development in Central and Eastern Europe. This information 
base needed to consider developments under the highly centralised 
state-controlled economies of the past as well as current restructuring as 
these economies moved towards a free-market system. 
This project was initiated, at short notice, to provide an initial 
information base for the short-term decisions to be taken during 1990 and 
1991 (relating, in particular, to the GDR) and to guide the longer term 
assessment of the effects of reforms in Central and Eastern Europe on 
regional development in the European Community. 
The following sections of the Introduction describe the terms of 
reference and methodology of the project, the researchers involved, and the 
structure of the Final Report. 
1.2 Terms of reference 
The aim of the project was to provide a review of regional 
socio-economic conditions and trends, at national and regional levels, in 
Central and East European countries and regions. The project had the 
following specific objectives: 
(i) to provide a bibliography and review of recent empirical research, 
publications and institutions dealing with socio-economic conditions 
and trends in Central and East European countries and regions; 
(ii) to collect essential statistics describing the socio-economic 
conditions in the specified countries and regions; 
(iii) to evaluate alternative forms of Community structural assistance to 
the regions and countries of Central and Eastern Europe; and 
(iv) to describe the relative position of the specified countries and 
regions among themselves and in comparison with the Community 
regions, and to consider the prospects for development and EC policy 
options for structural aid. 
The above information was to be provided for the regions in the 
following countries of Central and Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, the German 
Democratic Republic (integrated into the Federal Republic of Germany in 
October 1990), Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia. 
As far as possible the regional breakdown was to correspond to those used 
for national administrative purposes. 
1 .3 Project methodology 
The project was organised in four stages: a bibliographic review; 
the construction of a statistical database; a comprehensive report of 
regional disparities in Central and Eastern Europe; and a review of past 
regional development strategies and future regional policy options. 
The first part of the project involved the compilation of a 
bibliographic review covering recent empirical research on socio-economic 
development. The review comprised a listing of recent publications, a list 
of researchers and institutions active in Central and Eastern Europe, and a 
research report. 
The bibliography included work on: territorial subdivisions used for 
macro-economic and spatial planning; the description and interpretation of 
East European statistics on productivity and income; regional and national 
economic growth and development; industrial structure; technical 
infrastructure and capital investment; social infrastructure, 
environmental problems; and the national and regional impact of the move 
from state-controlled planning towards a free-market economy. In addition, 
a list with short descriptions of Central and East European researchers and 
institutions involved in regional analysis was compiled. 
Bibliographic software, based on the package PCFILE+, was used to 
collate the data and permit retrieval of publications, institutions and 
researchers. The retrieval system was based on key characteristics of the 
data eg. author name, subject, keywords etc. The data file consists of 
C.700 references, c.250 researchers and c.95 institutions. The most 
important publications were reviewed in an accompanying research report. 
The second stage of the project involved the compilation of a 
statistical database on regional socio-economic development in Central and 
Eastern Europe. Insofar as statistics are available, time series data were 
collated, at national and regional levels, on: population, age structure, 
total employment and employment by main sectors; comprehensive economic 
output, income generation and productivity; the main components of income 
utilisation; and national and regional investment in infrastructure. 
The statistical information was derived from four sources: the 
specialist research institutes from Central and Eastern Europe 
participating in the project; the computer database of the Vienna 
Institute for comparative Economic Studies; national statistical offices 
in Central and Eastern Europe; and COMECON data. The data was collated on 
MS-DOS diskettes using the statistical software package, AS-EASY-AS. 
In the third stage of the project, a comprehensive report was 
prepared, highlighting major socio-economic disparities and relative stages 
of development of the countries and regions of Central and Eastern Europe. 
Selected statistical data was analysed and integrated in a series of 
regional reviews relating to population, employment, unemployment, output, 
income and productivity. Regional reviews based on qualitative information 
were also prepared addressing foreign investment trends and environmental 
conditions in Central and Eastern Europe. 
The final stage of the project involved a policy review of structural 
reforms and regional development in Central and Eastern Europe. The review 
comprised an assessment of the main components of macro-economic structural 
reforms, the national reform conditions in each of the countries, past 
regional development strategies and the future prospects for regional 
policies. 
The project began in July 1990. An Interim Report containing profiles 
of territorial structures, economic conditions, and problems and policies 
in the Central and East European countries was provided in September 1990 
along with preliminary bibliographic references and a statistical 
checklist. A summary paper reviewing regional and industrial structures 
and regional development problems in "the Six" countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe was also provided as a contribution to the Fourth Periodic 
Report The Regions in the 1990s. The Policy Review was completed in 
January 1991 following a seminar of the main project participants held at 
the Vienna Institute for Comparative Economic Studies. The regional 
analyses and reviews were completed during February and March 1991, and a 
Draft Final Report was provided in May 1991. The Comprehensive Report was 
completed in June 1991, and a summary Final Report was finalised in October 
1991 . 
1.4 Project researchers 
The project was managed and coordinated by John Bachtler at the 
European Policies Research Centre (EPRC) University of Strathclyde, 
Glasgow. Among other EPRC staff, considerable research and administrative 
support was provided by Ruth Downes particularly with respect to the 
organisation of the bibliography, the bibliographic research report and the 
country profiles. Elaine Barclay and Hassan Tchehrazi developed the 
software for the bibliographic and statistical databases. Other research 
assistance was provided by Elaine Ballantyne, Geraldine McBride, Keith 
Clement, and Douglas Yuill. Reports were typed by Moira Lowe, Rosemarie 
Rey, Jean Rodger and Elizabeth Davison. 
At the Vienna Institute for Comparative Economic Studies, Peter Havlik 
undertook the macro-economic statistical analyses and, together with Rita 
Kick, contributed substantially to the bibliography and statistical 
database. 
Information, data and analyses for individual Central and East 
European countries were provided by the following researchers: 
Bulgaria: Dr Nikolay Grigorov, Hristo Yakimov, 
Hristo Stanev, Dimiter Kebedjiev, 
Evgeni Popov, A tana Atanasov 
National Centre for Regional Urban 
Development, Sofia 
Doncho Konakchiev 
Institute of Management of the Economy, 
Ministry of Industry, Technology, Trade and 
Services 
Todor Bojinov 
University of National and World Economy 
Stefan Hrelev 
University of Economy, Varna 
Peter Popov 
Institute of Geography 
Czechoslovakia : Dr Alois Andrle, Milos Cerveny, Zdenek Vokoun 
TERPLAN - Czechoslovak Institute for Regional 
Planning, Prague 
East Germany: Dr Hans-Ulrich Jung, Dr Ulrike Hardt 
Niedersachsisches Institut fur 
Wirtschaftsforschung, Hannover 
Dr Scherzinger, Dr Cornielsen 
Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung, 
Berlin 
Hungary : Nora Hoercher, Istran Bartke, Eva Valer 
United Nations Centre for Human Settlement 
(UNCHS) Habitat, Budapest 
Poland : Professor Antoni Kuklinski, 
Dr Grzegorz Gorzelak, Dr Miroslav Grochowski, 
R. Szul 
European Institute for Regional and Local 
Development, University of Warsaw 
Professor Leszek Zienkowkski 
Regional Centre of the Central Statistical 
Office, Warsaw 
Romania: Dr loan Ianos, Dr Dan Balteanu, 
Claudia Popescu 
Institute of Geography, University of 
Bucharest 
Yugoslavia: Peter Dukan, Vladimirt Skendrovic, Ivan Sabo, 
Ζ lat an Froehlich, Dubravka Jurlina 
Civil Engineering Institute, Zagreb 
All members of the research team contributed to the drafting and 
editing of the final report. 
1 .5 Retxart structure 
Following this introduction, the report is divided into 13 further 
chapters which are grouped into two parts. Part I, covering Chapters 2-10, 
comprises the analysis of regional socio-economic conditions in Central and 
Eastern Europe. In Chapter 2, the analysis begins with an outline of the 
historical development and current reforms of territorial structures in the 
six countries and East Germany together with a description of the 
territorial sub-divisions used for the regional analysis. 
Chapter 3 examines population and demographic trends relating to the 
distribution of population in the region, the components of population 
change, age-sex structures, future trends, and the population patterns 
within individual countries. Chapter 4 analyses employment patterns and 
regional disparities, followed by a review of preliminary information on 
unemployment in Chapter 5. 
Chapter 6 addresses the complex issue of output, income and 
productivity data in Central and Eastern Europe. The chapter provides a 
detailed critique of various methods of defining, measuring and comparing 
output statistics, and it assesses national positions, recent trends, 
future prospects and regional differences. 
Chapters 7 and 8 provide a descriptive review of foreign investment 
trends and environmental conditions in Central and Eastern Europe, and the 
regional analysis is concluded with an assessment of disparities in key 
technical and social infrastructure areas - transport, telecommunications, 
educational facilities, healthcare and energy. 
At the end of Part I, Chapter 10 provides a summary of regional 
development in Central and Eastern Europe and identifies the main 
categories of regional problems: industrial restructuring, social 
consequences (unemployment and migration), infrastructure deficits, 
environmental degradation, agricultural underdevelopment and change, 
agglomeration and peripherality, and territorial minorities. 
In Part II, Chapters 11, 12 and 13 provide an evaluation of structural 
reforms and regional development in Central and Eastern Europe. Chapter 11 
constitutes an overview of the main components of macro-economic structural 
reforms in Central and Eastern Europe, relating to price liberalisation, 
privatisation, foreign investment conditions, international trade and 
relations and social measures. 
Chapter 12 reviews regional development policy in Central and Eastern 
Europe with an examination of past regional development strategies in 
centrally planned economies and the contemporary situation, primarily with 
respect to East Germany where strategies are being developed most rapidly. 
Lastly, Chapter 13 speculates on the future prospects for regional 
policy in Central and Eastern Europe. Potential regional development 
objectives are proposed for the short term to strengthen national 
development measures and to provide emergency aid. Strategies for" the 
medium to long term are also suggested, to address the need for 
infrastructure development, local and regional industrial restructuring, 
the equalisation of urban and regional development, cross-border 
development and regional policy research. 
The report is completed with three annexes. Annex I provides a series 
of "country profiles" with a summary of regional socio-economic conditions 
in each of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Annex II comprises 
a bibliographic review of literature on socio-economic development, and 
Annex III contains a list of researchers and institutions specialising in 
regional socio-economic development in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Finally, Annex IV lists the time series data for each country included in 
the statistical database. 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF 
THE REGIONS IN THE NEIGBOURING COUNTRIES OF 
THE COMMUNITY IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 
PART I: 
REGIONAL DISPARITIES AND PROBLEMS 
CHAPTER 2 : 
TERRITORIAL STRUCTURES 
2.1 Introduction 
"Economic structures, the territory they cover and their 
administration are intimately interwoven" (Bennett, 1989, p3). The 
territorial and administrative structures within Central and East European 
countries are, at present, undergoing major changes in response to the 
rapid and fundamental political and economic transformation that has been 
occurring over the past two years. This section reviews first, the 
historical development of the territorial administrative structures in 
Central and Eastern Europe, and describes the principal influences on their 
formation. The need for new reform in response to recent economic and 
political transformation is then outlined, and the section concludes with 
country profiles. 
2.2 Historical development 
The administrative subdivision of the former CMEA countries reflected 
the aims and principles of Communist ideology. Centralised government used 
the territorial units to implement its own aims, including significant 
industrial development and a strategy of regional equality appropriate to 
Socialism. The administrative subdivisions also served political 
objectives by effectively removing any real authority at lower levels, thus 
lessening regional power and aiding central control. 
The administrative subdivision of Central and East European countries 
did not remain static after the establishment of Communist rule. The 
restrictive, centrally-oriented administrative hierarchy, was found to 
constrain economic development and conflict with the demands of economic 
growth. After about 1960, this realisation led to administrative reform, 
often of a quite radical nature: "economic regionalization became the 
dominant objective which, by means of territorial' reform, central powers 
used to make the functional economic regions and administrative boundaries 
coincide" (Maurel, 1989, p112). 
The territorial reforms in the late 1950s and 1960s emulated the 
VOG-reforms, undertaken by Krushchev in the Soviet Union, which aimed to 
give the regions a strong position in economic planning. Bulgaria was the 
first country to initiate territorial reform in 1959, replacing the former 
15 regions with 27 departments (okrag) and abolishing the districts. The 
communes were grouped together and halved in number. However, the 
experiment was not successful from a political viewpoint, and a strongly 
centralised structure was reintroduced until further reform in 1979. 
Another early reform experiment occurred in Czechoslovakia, where, in 1960, 
research was carried out to identify economic nuclei on which to base 
administrative reform. 135 nuclei were distinguished, of which 46 were 
subjected to further economic analysis, and ultimately led to the 
formulation of seven larger economic regions. While this research was not 
fully, applied to the reform, it did exert a significant influence on the 
national territorial structure, and the "network was amended in an attempt 
to create an administrative structure which would conform as closely as 
possible with that of the spatial pattern of economic activity" (Dawson, 
1987, p112). 
Among Central and East European countries, a distinction could be made 
between the countries with a more unitary character (Poland, Hungary, 
Romania, Bulgaria and the former GDR) and those of a federal nature 
(Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia). The latter two countries displayed 
slightly different administrative characteristics from neighbouring states, 
although the general ideology and broad central control were the same, and 
both Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia developed federal constitutional 
systems. The strong and clearly defined ethnic groupings in both countries 
were the basis for these systems, necessitating appropriate territorial 
division to avoid animosity and conflict. Thus, in Yugoslavia, relatively 
autonomous regions were created which mirrored the major ethnic divisions 
(Serbs, Croats, Slovenians, Bosnians, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Hungarians 
and Albanians), and in Czechoslovakia the main divide was between the Czech 
and Slovak Republics. Yugoslavia took this concept further, reflecting its 
comparatively liberal and decentralised economic system, and vested more 
power at regional and enterprise level than in the other Central and East 
European countries. In many areas the federal level was, in fact, 
relatively weak in relation to the individual republics. 
2.3 The new reforms 
However radical the pre-1989 reforms may have been, they were all 
formulated and implemented within the scope of the Communist system to 
serve, to a greater or lesser extent, the associated ideological and 
political goals. The reforms which are now being designed are of quite a 
different nature. 
The countries of Central and Eastern Europe are adopting a democratic, 
free-market economy as their goal, and the administrative structure of 
their countries is being altered to serve this purpose. The main focus of 
reforms is to decentralise power and functions to lower administrative 
levels. Under the new economic conditions, it is considered necessary to 
create regions (and an administrative structure) that facilitate and 
encourage indigenous economic development. Lower levels of the 
administrative structure require powers which will allow them to attract 
and stimulate economic growth, independent of any national plan or central 
control. For instance, Bulgaria has been attempting to transform the 
communes (the lower level of a two-tier structure) into "self-governing 
communities of the people" - essentially independent economic units, able 
to control individually their economic, social and cultural development -
although the idea does not yet operate in practice. 
There are a number of other objectives involved in the reorganisation 
of administrative structures, apart from the creation of efficient economic 
units - and these may be in conflict. The first objective is also economic 
and involves the need to create regions that are large enough to be 
competitive on a European scale (like, for instance, the German Laender), 
and 'visible' on a map of Europe. The second objective of reorganisation 
is more socially or culturally oriented. It involves the creation or 
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strengthening of a regional identity which can then stimulate individual 
responsibility and collective effort at regional level, although it is 
possible that the fulfilment of this task may conflict with economic goals. 
In many countries, pre-Communist institutions and functions are being 
re-introduced because they are believed to be appropriate for the national 
identity. 
Additional influences are evident in the reforms being undertaken in 
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Confederal structures are allowing 
republics to develop a more autonomous role and a greater regional 
identity. The popular desire within the republics to become 'sovereign' 
and independent of federal control is evident in both countries. The 
Slovak Republic is seeking independence from Czechoslovakia. Yugoslavia 
faces more radical disintegration of the confederation, and the full 
secession of some republics. Political and military events are, at 
present, overshadowing any thought of planned territorial reform. 
The understanding and urgency with which reform in Central and East 
Europe is pursued seems to depend largely on the general level of economic 
and political reform in the individual countries. The greater the progress 
towards' a market economy, the more advanced administrative reform seems to 
be. The exception to this appears to be Bulgaria which, despite being 
relatively unliberalised from a political and economic point of view, has 
implemented quite radical administrative reform. 
Overall, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe can be grouped 
into four categories according to the stage of administrative reform: East 
Germany; Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria; Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia; 
and Romania. The following country profiles outline in more detail the 
administrative structure in each country and the reform process that is 
being implemented. 
2.4 East Germany 
East Germany has completed the adminstrative reform of its territory 
significantly more quickly than elsewhere in Central and East Europe. This 
reflects the availability of West German experience and expertise in the 
creation of new institutional structures, and also the existence of the 
historical Laender. 
The land area of the GDR was structured, until 1 October 1990, into 
15 districts {Bezirke) (including the capital Berlin), 26 municipalities 
(kreis-freie Staedte), 189 counties {Kreise) and 7,563 communes (1988 
position). This was the outcome of an administrative reform implemented in 
1952 which had the declared aim of destroying the traditional Laender 
structure. Fourteen districts were formed out of the original five 
Laender. The eastern part of Berlin was later considered as the fifteenth 
district when it became the capital city (and its urban districts became a 
county). 
The Laender were instructed to adapt to this new structure and to 
transfer their responsibilities to the departments of the districts. The 
states {Laender) de facto subsequently ceased to exist but de jure were 
never actually dissolved. The constitutions of the Laender were also never 
annulled. The new administrative structure was aligned to the 
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parliamentary structures (district council - district parliament, county 
council - county parliament etc). This territorial structure, formulated 
in 1952, remained virtually unaltered for more than 37 years, apart from: 
changes at commune level and small boundary alterations; the creation or 
dissolution of a few municipalities; the dissolution at different times of 
four counties (in agrarian areas of the Magdeburg district); and the 
partial new organisation of the urban area of Berlin (from eight to eleven 
urban counties). 
For regional planning purposes, different groupings were formulated on 
the basis of the existing regional structure, (eg. northern districts 
Rostock, Schwerin and Neubrandenburg; central districts - Potsdam, 
Frankfurt/O., Magdeburg and Cottbus; southern districts - Dresden, 
Karl-Marx-Stadt, Leipzig and Halle; south-western districts - Gera, Erfurt 
and Suhl; and separately categorised - Berlin) or through the delimitation 
of the central regions. These groupings, however, had no effect on the 
administrative and spatial structure and were only used as (unofficial) 
planning regions. 
The structure of 1952 was brought to an end by the Laender 
Introduction Law of 22 July 1990. With the setting-up of five Laender and 
the city state of Berlin (in which the western and eastern parts of the 
city are unified), the reconstruction of the federal system corresponds to 
the model of West Germany. The city state of Berlin maintains both 
communal and regional authority like its West German counterparts, Hamburg 
and Bremen. 
In general, the new structure involves the combination of several 
districts to form a Land although, in achieving this, some boundary 
alterations have taken place. The previous district boundaries do not 
correspond exactly with the new Land borders. Prior to reorganisation, the 
regional and administrative structure of the former GDR was similar to the 
federal structure of the west German federal territory. This similarity, 
though, was mainly formal. The links between the districts, counties and 
communes were much stronger than in western Germany due to the 
centrally-oriented state organisation. 
2.5 Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland 
East Germany has benefited considerably from being incorporated into 
the Federal Republic of Germany and the corresponding help and ready-made 
structure available to it. The other Central and East European countries 
do not have such assistance available to them and, therefore, are faced 
with the much harder task of constructing a suitable administrative 
structure with little previous experience. Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland 
have so far formulated the most advanced reforms. Bulgaria and Poland, in 
particular, had already begun quite far-reaching decentralisation prior to 
the political transformation in 1989-1990. 
In Bulgaria, a new administrative system came into force on 1 January 
1988. Although the former two-tier character was retained, the 28 
districts (okrag) were replaced by nine regions {oblast), which now form 
the largest administrative units. They are essentially identical with the 
existing economic units, and it is expected that they will help to reduce 
administrative procedures and promote the country's less-developed regions. 
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The creation of these regions was associated with the establishment of 
their administrative centres, but these are not always identical with the 
centres of economic activity. Hence, some of the centres were considerably 
upgraded. The regions are subdivided into communes {obstina). In the city 
of Sofia region (Grad Sofija), the administrative reform dissolved the then 
12 urban districts {rajon), introducing instead 24 communes which hold the 
same rank as all other Bulgarian communes. 
Concomitantly, the communes were transformed into "self-governing 
communities of the people" (samoupravljavsti se obstnosti na naselenieto). 
This has put them in a position where they can decide independently about 
their economic, social and cultural development. As a result, the communes 
have authority over all controlling and planning activity within their 
territories. Moreover, they are responsible for supplying the population 
with goods and services, for housing construction, for the provision of 
infrastructure, for such sectors as public health, education and culture as 
well as for the promotion of sports and tourism. The communes are 
independent economic units. The regions, on the other hand, have mainly 
coordinating and supervisory powers. Within this scope, they also 
cooperate with other regions and with governmental and economic agencies 
and help to further self-government in the communes. 
The administrative structure in Hungary is currently in the process of 
being reorganised. The following designation outlines the position prior 
to 1990, and the reforms which were proposed, and introduced in the course 
of 1990. 
Hungary was subdivided from 1 January 1984 (in accordance with the 
1983 revised version of the 1972 constitution) into the national capital 
{favaros), the countries {megve), the cities {varos), and the communes 
{kozseg). The largest administrative units were the counties, of which a 
total of 19 were designated. The national capital was of equal rank with 
the counties, and was subdivided into 22 metropolitan districts {favorosi 
kerulet), although these were not included as administrative territories. 
Both the cities and the communes were directly subordinate to the counties, 
and the five largest cities were assigned county status {magyei varos). 
These city counties enjoyed budgetary prerogatives, although they were no 
longer directly subordinate to the central government (as had been the case 
prior to 1971). They were also subdivided into metroipolitan districts in 
the same way as the national capital. 
The above-mentioned commune/county hierarchy was only partly 
implemented as, in practice, only so-called large communes with city status 
{varosi jogu nagykoszegi) were actually directly subordinate to the 
counties. These large communes with city status came into existence on 1 
January 1984, following the abolition of the districts {jaras), to serve as 
intermediary agencies beside cities and cities with county status. As only 
this type of commune was directly subordinate to the counties, all other 
communes (i.e. large communes without city status {nagykozseg) and 
ordinary communes) were subordinate to one of the three other 
administrative units: a city with county status, a city, or a large 
commune with city status. This hierarchy existed within the context of 
administrative communities of cities and their surrounding areas (so-called 
suburban communities). There were 139 such communities designated in three 
groups: firstly, communities involving city counties {magyei 
varoskornyek); secondly, those involving ordinary cities {varoskornyek); 
and lastly, those involving large communes with city status 
{nagykozsegkornyek). 
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A transformation of the administrative structures has come about as a 
result of the general social and political changes in Hungary. The Act No. 
LXV of 1990 on local self-governments, and the subsequent election of local 
representatives (on 30 September and 14 October 1990) highlights this 
change in administrative thinking. The preamble to the Act comments on the 
progressive Hungarian traditions and the relevant requirements laid down in 
the European Charter on Seif-Government. It thus recognises and protects 
the self-governmental rights of local communities and their independence in 
self-organisation, and advocates democratic decentralisation of public 
power. 
The Act vests local self-governmental rights in the elective citizens 
of communes, towns, the national capital, its districts and counties. A 
municipal (town) government may be given the tasks and authorities of a 
county government subject to parliamentary approval. County governments, 
therefore, are responsible for carrying out those tasks which cannot be 
imposed on communal or municipal governments - i.e. public tasks which do 
not lie within the exclusive authority of others and do not hurt the 
interests of the represented communes or towns. It is also possible for 
the county to enter into a partnership with another county or with the 
government of any commune or town. 
There are now five types of local self government in Hungary: 
self-government of villages (of which there are 3,089) 
self-government of towns (166) 
self-government of countries (19) 
self-government of the capital (1) 
self-government of the capital districts (22) 
As local governments now have full rights to initiate both 
amalgamations and separations of communes, and to form district notaries, 
the spatial administrative division of Hungary is likely to change 
following local elections where such decisions are made. Although some 
tasks have been allocated to specific levels of government, others are 
still being determined and await legislation. 
Poland has experienced several historic changes to its adminstrative 
structure. From 1950 until 1973 Poland's territorial divisions were as 
follows: 17 voivodships, over 300 districts {powiaty), and over 4,000 
communes {gromady). During the period 1950-1973 the territorial division 
of the state did not change greatly. Only the number of the lowest tier 
units increased constantly, reaching over 8,000 in 1973. 
Over the period 1973-1975, a reform of the territorial organisation of 
the state was introduced. A two-tier system replaced the old three-tiers. 
The number of voivodships was increased from 17 to 49; the intermediary 
level of the districts {powiat) was abolished; and the number of the basic 
units was drastically reduced to around 2,500 "gmina" (communes). 
The reform of the 1970s shaped the present pattern of two-tier spatial 
organisation of the Polish state. In 1990 there were 49 voivodships, 2,121 
rural communes and 830 towns (a "town" denominates a basic-level 
administrative unit of urban character). Some towns and adjacent rural 
communes form a joint unit (town-commune) - there are 541 such cases. 
Warsaw is divided into seven districts which have commune status. 
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Altogether there are 2,AM basic units of the spatial administrative 
division of the state. 
New legislation (June 1990) introduced another quasi-level of this 
division, called "rejon". This unit, of which there are around 250, is a 
subdivision of the regional (voivodship) administration. It does not_have 
any tasks and responsibilities of its own, and it only serves as the 
territorial déconcentration of the regional state administration for purely 
technical and organisational purposes. Introduction of this new tier (of 
purely administrative character) begins the process of another reform of 
the spatial organisation of the Polish state. It is envisaged that a 
three-tier system will be restored, but the number of voivodships will be 
dramatically reduced to 10-12. The "rejons" will be the nuclei of the 
reintroduced districts {powiaty). The number of communes (rural and urban) 
will not be seriously changed. Studies of these problems have just begun, 
and it is too early to specify any final conclusions; the new division 
will not be introduced before 1992. 
2.6 Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia 
The confederal structure of these two countries has meant a different 
basis for administrative reform. Yugoslavia, as previously noted, is 
struggling to retain coherence as a country and is not primarily concerned 
at the present time with any internal administrative reform. 
Czechoslovakia has planned a reform in which regional identities are 
playing an important role, and the authority of the lower levels is likely 
to be increased. 
The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic {Ceska a Slovenska federativnii 
republika) is a federation of two constituent republics of equal rank: the 
Czech Republic {Ceska republika) and the Slovak Republic {Slovenska 
republika). Until 31 December 1990, both republics had a three-tier 
administrative structure, subdivided into regions {kraj), districts (okres) 
as well as municipalities and communities (obec). The largest 
administrative units were the regions. The capital of the Czech and Slovak 
Federal Republic, Prague, (which is also the capital of the Czech Republic) 
and the capital of the Slovak republic, Bratislava, held the status of a 
region. Both Prague and Bratislava were organised into urban districts 
{mestsky obvod). The regions were subdivided into districts which in turn 
consisted of towns {mesto) and communities, which constituted the smallest 
administrative units. The cities of Brno, Ostrava, Plzen and Kosice 
enjoyed a special status (equal at least to a district level) and were 
subordinated to regions. 
After the abandonment of regions as special administrative units at 
the end of 1990, their responsibilities are being transferred to districts, 
or even to towns and communities; in exceptional cases, they may be 
transferred to ministries. In the Czech Republic a re-establishment of the 
historical lands (Bohemia and Moravia) is under consideration. The part of 
Silesia belonging to Czechoslovakia may also be re-introduced as a land, or 
be administratively bound with Moravia, as it was in the pre-war period. 
The capital, Prague, may also be granted the same status as a land and be 
directly subordinated to the Czech government. The final decision will be 
incorporated into the future constitution of the Czech Republic. 
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The distribution of powers between the federation and the republics 
will also be solved in the new constitutions of the federal, as well as of 
the national republics. Nevertheless, several ministries, which previously 
existed only at the federal level (ministries of several manufacturing 
sectors) or on both levels (eg. for agriculture), were abandoned at the 
federal level, and their responsibilities were fully transferred to. the 
national level. The federal authorities (Federal Assembly and the federal 
government) currently have the sole responsibility for foreign policy and 
international agreements, defence, currency and federal legislation, and 
partial responsibility, together with national republics, for other 
activities e.g. security, finance, foreign trade, labour and social 
affairs, strategic planning and economic development, transportation, 
communications, environment and control. Corresponding ministries exist 
for these activities in most cases at the federal as well as at national 
level. On the other hand, ministries for industry, construction, 
agriculture, education, culture, health, internal trade, tourist travel and 
justice, exist only as part of the governments of the national republics. 
Before the elections of town and community councils in November 1990, 
a new Act regarding the capital, Prague, and a Towns and Communities Act 
was promulgated, which considerably increases their authority and 
responsibilities. However, districts will have no elected council in the 
future; they will act only as local representatives of the government for 
administrative matters. 
Yugoslavia, in accordance with its 1974 constitution, is a federal 
state. It consists of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina, 
Croatia, Montenegro, Slovenia, Serbia, and the Autonomous Socialist 
Provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina. The two autonomous provinces are 
subordinate to the Republic of Serbia. The republics and autonomous 
provinces are subdivided only into communes {ops tina /opcina /obcina), a type 
of administrative organisation that has been laid down in the constitutions 
of most republics as well as the two autonomous provinces. Many of the 
communes, however, have formed urban or regional communities in order to be 
able to conduct certain matters jointly, but these communities do not 
constitute an administrative level to which the communes are subordinate. 
In the Republic of Croatia, all communes have become part of such regional 
communities {zajednica opcina), and so have communes in those parts of the 
republic of Serbia which do not belong to the autonomous provinces 
(meduopstinska zajednica). Similarly, the large cities are organised into 
urban communities, which consist not only of municipalities but also 
include adjacent communes (Grad Beograd, Grad Ljubljana, Grad Novi Sad, 
Grad Sarajevo, Grad Skopje, Gradska zajednica opcina Split, Gradska 
zajednica Zagreb, Obcina Maribor). Among these, the city of Belgrade (Grad 
Beograd) holds a special status in that it is concurrently the capital and 
administrative centre of the federation. 
Article 281 of the constitution vests far-reaching powers in the 
federation. In reality, however, they are limited to national defence, 
foreign affairs, matters relating to citizenship, the control of external 
trade and service transactions as well as national security in general. It 
also has authority to safeguard uniform economic and social welfare 
policies as well as a uniform legal system, to regulate the national 
currency, to control the legal tender as well as the issue of money. In 
many areas, the federation draws up the basic guidelines only. Thus, its 
legal position is relatively weak vis-a-vis the republics and autonomous 
provinces, since they have authority in economic and social policies, in 
education, science, cultural affairs, sports, public health and welfare. 
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Moreover, the republics and autonomous provinces are responsible for 
conservation and environmental protection, territorial and civil defence, 
and the implementation of foreign policies. They give consent to the 
conclusion of international agreements, implement federal laws and 
safeguard the uniformity of rules of law. Since the republics and 
autonomous provinces have been endowed with such a multitude of 
responsibilities of their own, a harmonization in certain spheres can be 
brought about only if the republics and autonomous provinces enact the same 
laws or if they conclude agreements or reach an understanding. 
In accordance with the constitution of Serbia, adopted on 25 February 
1974, the two autonomous Serbian provinces had held practically the same 
authority as the republic itself, ie. they were free to change their 
constitution, and even the Republic of Serbia could not modify its 
constitution without the consent of the provinces. A constitutional 
amendment, however, adopted by Serbia on 28 March 1989, limited the powers 
of Kosovo and Vojvodina. 
The communes occupy a special place because the federal constitution 
defines them as self-governing and basic socio-political entities. They 
are grounded in the power and self-government of the working class and all 
working people. They form independent economic units, control local 
defence as well as all communal affairs and housing matters. Within the 
legal fiscal framework, the communes can introduce additional taxes and 
duties and use these funds independently. 
2.7 Romania 
Among the Central and East European countries, Romania remains the 
most backward in terms of economic and political liberalisation and reform. 
This is reflected in its administrative structure, which continues to be 
highly centralised. There are, at time of writing, no plans for any reform 
of this structure. 
In accordance with the 1986 constitution, the territory of Romania is 
divided into counties {judet), cities {oras) and communes {comuna). The 
administrative system has two levels, with the counties constituting the 
largest territorial units. There are 40 such counties at the moment, and 
they comprise cities and communes, the basic subdivisions of the country's 
administrative system. The Romanian capital, the municipality of Bucharest 
(municipiu Bucuresti), is the 41st county, and consists of six urban 
sectors (sector). In addition, it has jurisdiction over the agricultural 
sector of Ilfov {sector agricol Ilfov). Cities with a larger population 
and greater importance in economic, socio-political and cultural matters 
are organised as municipalities {municipiu). Therefore, all county seats 
are municipalities of which thre are currently 56. Cities and communes 
may, moreover, be administratively part of a municipality or a major city 
in the immediate vicinity, in which case they are referred to as suburban 
communities {comuna suburbana). 
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2.8 Territorial sub-divisions used for regional analysis 
The comparison of territorial sub-divisions between countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe is complex given the differing administrative 
systems, historical conditions and reform processes currently underway. 
However, insofar as possible, a comparative sub-division of territories has 
been produced (see Table 2.1) based on three levels which may be broadly 
equivalent to the NUTS (Nomenclature of Statistical Territorial Units) 
levels, I, II and III used in the European Community. 
The Level 1 (comparable to NUTS I) designation has been applied to the 
two republics of Czechoslovakia, the five new Laender of East Germany plus 
Berlin, and the eight republics of Yugoslavia (the two Autonomous Provinces 
are a lower-level subdivision). Level 2 (NUTS II) has been applied to 
certain regions, districts, counties and provinces, ranging in number from 
9 to 50. In Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Romania, this level forms the 
highest order territorial sub-division. In addition, it applies to the 
districts in East Germany and the regions of Czechoslovakia; the two 
Automous Provinces in Yugoslavia also fall into this category of 
territorial unit. 
Level 3 (NUTS III) applies to lower order districts, regions and 
counties, but only in Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Hungary. Elsewhere, 
there is no significant territorial unit above the level of commune, 
community or mayorship. 
For the purposes of the regional analysis and review in the following 
sections, Level 2 (NUTS II) regions have been used insofar as possible. 
The main exception is Yugoslavia where data is only available at the 
republic level and not for the two Autonomous provinces. The types and 
number of regions, together totalling 154, are as follows: 
Total 
Region type regions 
Bulgaria 8 provincial regions plus Sofia 9 
Czechoslovakia 10 provincial regions plus two 
republic capitals, Prague and Bratislava 12 
East Germany 15 districts 15 
Hungary 19 counties plus Budapest 20 
Poland 49 provinces 49 
Romania 40 counties plus Bucharest 41 
Yugoslavia 8 republics 8 
Central and Eastern Europe 154 
The regional names are listed by country in Table 2.2, and maps of the 
countries and regions are provided in Figures 2.1 - 2.8. 
TABLE 2.1 : TERRITORIAL SUB-DIVISIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE 
LEVEL 1 
(NUTS I) 
Name (No.) 
LEVEL 2 
(NUTS II) 
Name (No.) 
LEVEL 3 
(NUTS III) 
Name (No.) 
BULGARIA Oblast 
(region) 
(1) 
9 
CZECHOSLOVAKIA Republ1c 
- CSR 
- SSR 
Kras 
(region) 
(2) 
12 
8 
4 
Okres (district) 107 
+ maesto (city) 71 
36 
EAST GERMANY Land 
(State) 
(3) 
6 Bezirk 15 
(district) 
Kreis (county) 189 
Kre1s-fre1e Stadt 
(municipality) 26 
CO 
HUNGARY Megye 
(county) 
(4) 
20 Town -
region 
139 
POLAND Wojewodztwo (5) 
(Province) 49 
ROMANIA Judet (6) 
(county) 41 
YUGOSLAVIA Region 
(7) 
8 
Table 2.1: (continued) 
Notes: 
1) There are eight provincial regions with a total of 253 municipalities/communes plus the city region of Sofia (which has regional 
status) with 24 communes. 
2) In addition to the 10 provincial regions with 107 districts, the two republic capitals, Prague and Bratislava, have the status of a 
region. There are also four cities (3 1n the CSR, 1 1n the SSR) which have a 'special status' and are subordinate to the regions. 
Both the two capitals and the four cities are sub-divided into 39 urban districts (29 in the CSR and 10 1n the SSR). 
3) The five original Laender (states) were dissolved from 1952 to 1990. During this period the highest administrative authority was the 
Bezirk (district). In the course of reunification, the five Laender were reinstated (with some modifications to their boundaries and 
those of the constituent districts). Berlin has land (city status) on the same basis as Hamburg and Bremen. 
4) In addition to the 19 counties and the capital Bucharest, there are five cities (Debrecen, Gyor, Miskolc, Pecs, Szeged) with county 
status. The 139 town-regions, which have taken over the responsibilities of former districts, include 34 large villages with town 
rank. In 1988, four counties abolished the town-region level as part of a national experiment to create a two-tier (county/commune) 
administration. 
5) The reform of the Polish territorial structure 1s currently under discussion with the objective of grouping the 49 voivodships into 
larger regions. 
6) In addition to the 40 counties, the capital of Romania, Bucharest, has county status and is sub-d1v1ded Into six urban sectors. At 
the lower level there are 56 cities with the designation of municipality (municipiu). 
7) The eight regions comprise six republics and two autonomous provinces (Kosovo and Vojvodina) which are subordinate to the Republic of 
Serbia. The regions are divided Into communes, many of which have formed urban and regional communities, e.g. the eight large 
cities, for certain purposes. 
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Table 2.2: Regions of Central and Eastern Europe 
Bulgaria (Regions) 
Grad Sofija 
Burgas 
Varna 
Lovec 
Mihajlovgrad 
Plovdiv 
Razgrad 
Sofija 
Haskovo 
Czechoslovakia (Republics and Regions) 
Praha 
Stredocesky kraj 
Jihocesky kraj 
Zapadocesky kraj 
Severocesky kraj 
Vychodocesky kraj 
Jihomoravsky kraj 
Severomoravsky kraj 
Bratislava 
Zapadoslovensky kraj 
Vychosdoslovensky kraj 
Stredoslovensky kraj 
East Germany (Bezirk) East Germany (Laender) 
Berlin (East) Berlin 
Neubrandenburg Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 
Rostock Sachsen-Anhalt 
Schwerin Brandenburg 
Cottbus Thueringen 
Frankfurt Sachsen 
Postdam 
Halle 
Magdeburg 
Dresden 
Chemnitz 
Leipzig 
Gera 
Erfurt 
Suhl 
21 
Table 2.2: (continued) 
Hungary (Countries) 
Bacs-Kiskun 
Baranya 
Bekes 
Borsod-Abauj-Zemplen 
Csongrad 
Fejer 
Gyor Sopron 
Hajdu-Bihar 
Heves 
Komarom 
Nograd 
Pest 
Somogy 
Szabolcs-Szatmar 
Szolnok 
Tolna 
Vas 
Veszprem 
Zala 
Poland (Provinces) 
Warszawskie 
Bialskopodlaskie 
Bialostockie 
Bielski 
Bygoskie 
Chelmskie 
Ciechanowskie 
Chestochowskie 
Elblaskie 
Gdanskie 
Grozowskie 
Jeleniogorskie 
Kaliskie 
Katowickie 
Kieleckie 
Koninskie 
Koszalinskie 
Krakowskie 
Kroanienskie 
Legnickie 
Leszczynskie 
Lubelskie 
Lomzynskie 
Lodzkie 
Nowosadeckie 
Olsztynskie 
Opolskie 
Ostroieckie 
Pilskie 
Piotrkowskie 
Plockie 
Poznanskie 
Przemyskie 
Radomskie 
Rzeszowskie 
Siedleckie 
Sieradzkie 
Skierniewickie 
Slupskie 
Suwalskie 
Szczechinskie 
Tarnobrzeskie 
Tarnowskie 
Torunskie 
Walbrzyskie 
Wloclawskie 
Wroclawskie 
Zamojskie 
Zielonogroskie 
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Table 2.2: (continued) 
Romania (Countries) 
Alba 
Arad 
Arges 
Bacau 
Bihor 
Bistrita-Nasaud 
Botosani 
Brasov 
Braila 
Buzau 
Caras-Severin 
Calarasi 
Cluj 
Constanta 
Covasna 
Dimbovita 
Dolj 
Galati 
Giurgiu 
Gorj 
Harghita 
Hunedoara 
Ialomita 
lasi 
Maramures 
Mehedinti 
Mures 
Neamt 
Olt 
Prahova 
Satu Mare 
Salaj 
Sibiu 
Suceava 
Teleorman 
Tirais 
Tulcea 
Vaslui 
Vilcea 
Vrancea 
Municipiul Bucuresti 
Yugoslavia (Republics and (*) Autonomous Provinces) 
Bosnia i Hercegovina 
Crna Gora 
Hrvatska 
Makedonia 
Slovenija 
Srbija 
Kosovo/Kosove (*) 
Vojvodina (*) 
Figure 2.1: BULGARIA: REGIONS 
K) 
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Figurje 2.2: CZECHOSLOVAKIA: REPUBLICS AND REGIONS 
Seyerocesky kraj 
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vZapadocesky kraj J Stredocesky kraj 
vYychodocesky kraf 
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Jihomoravsky kraj 
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Zapadoslovensky kraj 
itislava 
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Figure 2.3: GDR: DISTRICTS (BEZIRKE) AND SUB-DISTRICTS 
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Figure 2.4: EAST GERMANY: NEW STATE (LAENDER) BOUNDARIES 
Figure 2.5: HUNGARY: COUNTIES 
ro 
Figure 2 . 6 : POLAND: PROVINCES 1. Szczecinskie 
2. Koszalinskie 
3. Slupskie 
4. Gdanskie 
5. Elblaskie 
6. Olsztynskie 
7. Suwalskie 
8. Grozowskie 
9. Pilskie 
10. Bydgoskie 
11. Torunskie 
12. Wloclawskie 
13. Ciechanowskie 
14. Ostroieckie 
15. Lomzynskie 
16. Bialostockie 
17. Zielonogroskie 
18. Poznanskie 
19. Koninskie 
20. Plockie 
21. Skierniewickie 
22. Warszawskie 
23. Siedleckie 
24. Bialskopodlaskie 
25. Jeleniogorskie 
26. Legnickie 
27. Leszczynskie 
28. Wroclawskie 
29. Kaliskie 
30. Sieradzkie 
31. Lodzkie 
32. Piotrkowskie 
33. Radomskie 
34. Lubelskie 
35. Chelmskie 
36. Walbrzyskie 
37. Opolskie 
38. Chestochowskie 
39. Kieleckie 
40. Tarnobrzeskie 
41. Zamojskie 
42. Katowickie 
43. Bielskie 
44. Krakowskie 
45. Tarnowskie 
46. .Rzeszowskie 
47. Przemyskie 
48. Nowosadeckie 
49. Kroanienskie 
ro 
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Figure 2.7: ROMANIA: COUNTIES 
ro co 
Figure 2.8: YUGOSLAVIA: REPUBLICS AND AUTONOMOUS PROVINCES 
ω o 
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CHAPTER 3 : 
POPULATION AND DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS 
3.1 Introduction 
The distribution, growth and composition of the population is 
fundamental to any analysis of socio-economic development. This section 
analyses the distribution of population and demographic trends in Central 
and Eastern Europe. It begins with an outline of the general distribution 
of population in the region as a whole and within individual countries. 
The section then examines regional population trends in terms of the 
components of change: natural increase (birth and death rates) and 
migration. The age and sex structure of Central and East European regions 
is also analysed. 
Two points relating to the demographic analysis presented here should 
be noted at the outset. First, the demographic data provided in this 
section is more comprehensive and comparable than the other parts of the 
regional statistical analysis. The definitions used for population data 
are much more straightforward (and directly comparable with EC data) than 
for employment and, in particular, income and output statistics. Second, 
in line with the requirements of the project, the analysis provides more 
comprehensive information on East Germany (which is now a region of the EC) 
than for other Central and East European countries in the study. 
3.2 Distribution of population 
The population of Central and East European countries covered in the 
study amounts to almost 140 million (see Table 3.1). Ranked according to 
the number of inhabitants, the most populous country is Poland (38 mn) 
followed by Romania and Yugoslavia (each about 24 mn), East Germany and 
Czechoslovakia (about 16 mn), Hungary (11 mn) and Bulgaria (9 mn). The 
total population of the region compares with a total population of 324 
million in the European Community (ie. the Central and East European 
region has c.40 percent of the EC total). 
Population density in Central and Eastern Europe is relatively low 
compared to the European Community. The figure for the Central and East 
European region is three-quarters of the density in the EC, and only in 
East Germany is population density comparable to the Community level. 
Within Central and Eastern Europe, population density ranges from 81 
people per sq.km. in Bulgaria to almost double the density in East 
Germany (154 people per sq. km). 
By the end of the 1980s, all Central and East European countries had 
reached a relatively high level of urbanization. East Germany and 
Czechoslovakia led with more than 75 percent of the population living in 
urban areas; elsewhere the proportions ranged between 50 and 70 percent. 
(However, since there is no standard definition of urban population in any 
of the Central and East European countries, these figures should be treated 
with caution). 
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Bulgaria 
Czechoslovakia 
East Germany 
Hungary 
Poland 
Romania 
Yugoslavia 
Total 
population 
(mill) 
9.0 
15.6 
16.7 
10.6 
37.8 
23.1 
23.6 
Urban 
population 
(mill) 
6.0 
11.8 
12.8 
6.3 
23.1 
12.6 
11.0 
(%) 
(67.0) 
(75.6) 
(76.8) 
(59.4) 
(61.2)* 
(54.3)+ 
(46.5) 
Area 
('000 
sq.km) 
110.9 
127.9 
108.3 
93.0 
312.7 
237.5 
255.8 
Population 
density 
(per sq.km.) 
81.0 
122.2 
154.0 
113.9 
120.8 
97.3 
92.1 
CEE total 
EC total 
136.4 
323.6 
83.6 
-
(61.2)$ 
(53.3)@ 
1246.1 
2350.0 
109.5 
144.0 
Source: COMECON DATA; CEC Fourth Periodic Report 
* Estimated data for 1987; + Estimated data for 1986 
@ Third Periodic Report, CEC: Functional Urban Regions with population of 
at least 200,000. 
$ There is no standard definition of urban population in Central and Eastern Europe. In 
East Germany and Hungary, urban population covers settlements with more than 2,000 
inhabitants; in Poland and Romania, the definition includes settlements with 5,000 and 
3,000 inhabitants respectively. National statistical yearbooks, from which the tabulated 
figures originate, do not provide definitions for Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and East Germany. 
The figures In the table may be exaggerated; for example, an alternative estimate for the 
urban population in Czechoslovakia 1s 10.3 million (66.3 percent). 
The regional distribution of population varies greatly between 
countries. In Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania the capital city dominates the 
population map. In Bulgaria, 40 percent of the population is concentrated 
in the south-west of the country in the capital Sofia, the surrounding 
region and the neighbouring region of Plovdiv; Sofia city and region alone 
account for one- quarter of Bulgaria's population. Elsewhere, the regional 
distribution is more uniform, each of the remaining six regions containing 
between 7 and 11 percent of the Bulgarian population. 
The population distribution in Hungary is also dominated by the 
capital city, Budapest, which contains one-fifth of the country's 
population; a further ten percent is located in the surrounding county of 
Pest. The other counties have a relatively even distribution of 
population, with proportions of 3-7 percent of the national population. 
The exceptions are the peripheral border counties such as Vas, Zalá and 
Nograd. Population density varies between 58.0 and 152.0 people per sq. 
km. among the counties; in Budapest, the density reaches 4,026 per sq.km. 
To a certain extent, a north-east/south-west axis divides the country, 
above which the counties are more industrialized and the population density 
is generally above-average, while below the axis the situation is reversed. 
(A west-east divide, along the line of the Danube, relating to 
infrastructure provision is also relevant - the western part of Hungary 
having better infrastructure than eastern areas. 
In Romania, Bucharest and the south-east region of the country account 
for almost 40 percent of the national population. In comparison, the 
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central and western parts of the country have a relatively low population 
density, apart from major urban centres in Cluj and Brasov. As in Hungary, 
the peripheral border counties have some of the smallest populations, 
especially those in the north-west (eg. Satu Mare and Salaj ). 
The population pattern in Poland is dominated by individual areas, 
although not by the capital city. The population is generally evenly 
distributed across the national territory, with the important exception of 
the Upper Silesia region. The Katowice voivodship (two percent of the 
country's area) is inhabited by 10 percent of Poland's population - c. 4 
million people - which makes it almost twice as large as the capital city 
region, Warsaw (2.4 million) and nearly four times the size of the next 
voivodships, Gdansk (1.4 m), Poznan (1.3 m) and Lodz (1.1 m) . In regional 
terms, the highest population densities are in the central and southern 
parts of the country. Warsaw, Lodz and Katowic e have densities in excess 
of 400 people per sq.km., whereas the north-western and north-eastern areas 
of Poland generally have densities of less than 75 people per sq.km. 
In contrast to Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Poland, the distribution 
of population in East Germany features inter-regional contrasts rather than 
domination by a single or few centres. The population map is characterised 
by a marked regional, north-south divide. The conurbations in the 
districts of Sachsen (Dresden, Chemnitz and Leipzig), in the south of East 
Germany, have a population density far above the regional average. The 
neighbouring Laender of Sachsen-Anhalt (Halle and Magdeburg districts) and 
Thueringen (mainly in Gera and Erfurt) are also relatively densely 
populated. In contrast, Mecklenburg- Vorpommern and Brandenburg contain 
less than 30 percent of East Germany's population between them. 
The regional distribution of population in Czechoslovakia is 
relatively equitable among the provinces, much more so than in other 
Central and East European countries . The regional capitals, Prague and 
Bratislava, with nine and three percent of the national population 
respectively, do not dominate the country in population terms. The central 
and eastern provinces are larger in both area and population, notably South 
Moravia. Of importance from a constitutional/political perspective is the 
much larger size of the Czech Republic (which accounts for 66.3 percent of 
the population) relative to the Slovak Republic. If the proposal (among 
others) to reconstitute the historical regions of Bohemia, Moravia-Silesia 
and Slovakia were to be implemented, a still more balanced map of major 
regions would be created. 
Finally, Yugoslavia also has a relatively dispersed map of population. 
The majority of the population is located in the republics of Serbia (40 
percent of the national population) and Croatia (20 percent). With a 
national population density of 92 people per sq.km., only in the Autonomous 
Province of Kosovo (in Serbia) does density exceed 100 people per sq.km. 
In Macedonia and Bosnia & Hercegovina, population density is less than 74 
people per sq.km. and in Montenegro under 50. 
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3.3 Population trends in Central and Eastern Europe 
3.3.1 Population change 
Population growth in Central and Eastern Europe has been substantial 
throughout the post-war period. Particularly during the 1970s, the growth 
rate in the region exceeded the rate for the European Community, although 
the difference has narrowed during the 1980s (partly due to the accession 
of Spain and Portugal to the EC). Among the Central and East European 
countries, there are some north-south differences: the population of the 
Balkan states in southern Europe has grown faster than the northern 
countries, with the exception of Poland (see Table 3.2). Romania, 
Yugoslavia and Poland had population growth rates approaching ten percent 
between 1970 and 1980, and 4-6 percent over the period 1981-88. In 
contrast, East Germany has experienced continuous decline, due to 
outmigration to Western Europe, over of 
Hungary has also fallen during the 1980s. 
Table 3.2: Population change in Central and Eastern Europe ('000) 
Bulgaria 
Czechoslovakia 
East Germany 
Hungary 
Poland 
Romania 
Yugoslavia 
1970 
8,515 
14,350 
17,068 
10,352 
32,658 
20,253 
20,371 
1980 
8,877 
15,289 
16,739 
10,713 
35,735 
22,201 
22,304 
1985 
8,950 
15,519 
16,655 
10,640 
37,341 
22,725 
23,124 
1987 
8,976 
15,587 
16,661 
10,604 
37,764 
22,940 
23,417 
1988 
8,986 
15,625 
16,675 
10,589 
37,775 
23,112 
23,559 
1970-
1980 
+ 4.3 
+ 6.5 
- 2.0 
+ 3.5 
+ 9.4 
+ 9.6 
+ 9.5 
1980-
1988 
+ 1.2 
+ 2.2 
- 0.3 
- 1.1 
+ 5.7 
+ 4.1 
+ 5.6 
CEE total 123,567 131,858 134,954 135,949 136,321 + 6.7 + 3.4 
EC* 303,118 317,906 321,922 323,634 324,646 + 4.9 + 2.1 
Source: COMECON DATA 
(*) Data provided by the European Commission 
Although the national growth rates of Central and East European 
countries may have slowed considerably over the past 20 years, there are 
substantial regional variations within individual countries (see Figure 
3.1). In certain regions, notably within Czechoslovakia, East Germany, 
Poland and Yugoslavia, a high rate of population growth (10-16 percent) has 
been maintained over the 1980-88 period (see Table 3.3). The disparities 
(calculated by subtracting the regional minimum from the regional maximum) 
between regions are significant: over 21 percentage points for Central and 
Eastern Europe as a whole, and up to 19 percentage points in Czechoslovakia 
alone. This reflects the fact that most countries are not only 
experiencing strong regional population growth, but that they also have 
regions with declining populations. Limited population growth is 
particularly evident in Hungary where the fastest growing region over the 
1980-88 period (2.7 percent) had a growth rate considerably lower than the 
average for Central and Eastern Europe as a whole. The disparities are 
magnified in the case of Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Bulgaria and Hungary 
by the influence of city-regions - Prague, Berlin, Sofia and Budapest -
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which tend to have extreme population change values that are untypical of 
the surrounding region). 
Table 3.3: Population change - regional variation (1980-88) (*) 
Bulgaria 
Czechoslovakia 
East Germany 
Hungary 
Poland© 
Romania 
Yugoslavia* 
National 
average 
+ 1 .2 
+2.2 
-0.3 
-1.1 
+6.6 
+ 4.1 
+5.6 
Regional 
maximum 
6.5 
16.1 
11.4 
2.7 
11.5 
-
10.6 
Regional 
minimum 
-5.2 
-2.9 
-3.5 
-4.7 
1 .3 
-
1.8 
Regional 
difference 
11.7 
19.0 
14.9 
7.4 
10.2 
-
8.8 
CEE region* 
EC regibn$ 
+3.4 
+2.1 
16.1 
9.9 
-5.2 
-5.4 
21 .3 
15.3 
* Figures for 1985-89; @ Figures for 1980-89 
+ Regional figures exclude Romania 
$ Data provided by the European Commission 
3.3.2 Components of population change - natural increase and decrease 
The substantial natural increases in Central and Eastern Europe during 
the post-war period have slowed down over the past 20 years. Birth rates 
have fallen rapidly, and death rates also fell until 1980 after which small 
increases were recorded. Even so, in comparison with much of Western 
Europe, the rates of natural increase over the past decade have been high. 
This is especially true of Poland, Yugoslavia and Romania where the 
population increase has been 5-6 per thousand inhabitants; in the case of 
Romania this is partly attributable to the peculiarities of birth control 
policies under the Ceausescu regime. Birth rates were affected by 
traditional factors such as economic development levels (Bulgaria, Romania, 
Yugoslavia), religion (Poland, Yugoslavia) or national composition of the 
population (eg. higher birth rates of Slovaks and Romas in Czechoslovakia, 
Turks in Bulgaria, Moslems in Yugoslavia). 
Birth rates average 14 per thousand population across the Central and 
East European region, ranging from 15-16 in Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia 
to less than 12 in Hungary (see Table 3.4). The international regional 
disparity across Central and Eastern Europe is substantial (15.1 percentage 
points), extending from 9.1 per thousand in Hungary to 19.5 per thousand in 
Poland. (This is similar to the international differences in the EC during 
the 1980s eg. between Ireland and West Germany). The national regional 
disparities are also greatest within Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary 
reflecting the existence of both economically well-developed regions (eg. 
Warsaw, Lodz, Prague and Budapest) and backward rural regions such as 
eastern Poland, East Slovakia and north-east Hungary. Over the period 
1970-1988, birth rates have fallen in Central and Eastern Europe by around 
one-sixth, particularly in Romania and Hungary, and disparities between 
regions have also narrowed, although by relatively small amounts: in East 
Germany the disparity has remained almost unchanged. The fall in birth 
36 
rates could have been considerably greater but for official policies which 
attempted to increase the birth rate and the size of the workforce. The 
liberal approach taken to abortion in Central and Eastern Europe prior to 
the 1970s was reversed, first in Bulgaria (1966) and Romania (1967) 
followed by Czechoslovakia (1973), Hungary (1974) and Poland (1981) 
(Turnock, 1989a). Abortion became very strictly controlled during^ the 
1970s and 1980s, combined with "parenthood education" and cash incentives 
such as child allowances (Turnock, 1989b). More extreme practices were 
implemented in Romania where a ban on contraception and abortion was 
combined with checks on married women to ensure that the required number of 
children was being produced, resulting in a high level of "backstreet" 
abortions, abandoned children and female deaths. The infant mortality rate 
in Romania was also the highest in Central and Eastern Europe: 31.2 per 
thousand live births in 1977 compared to Bulgaria (21), Czechoslovakia 
(19.6) and the former GDR (13.1). 
Death rates average 11.3 per thousand population in Central and 
Eastern Europe. The main international contrasts are again between the 
group containing Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia (9-11 per thousand) and 
Hungary (13.2), a difference that is somewhat greater than in the EC. 
Regional disparity is also significant, ranging from almost 17 per thousand 
in Bulgaria to 6 per thousand in Czechoslovakia. The differences between 
regions are broadly similar in magnitude to those for birth rates. 
However, the more developed economies, for example East Germany and 
Hungary, have more uniform levels of death rates across the country, 
although the national averages are relatively high. 
During the 18-year period from 1970 to 1988, death rates increased in 
all countries by around two percentage points, with the exception of 
Czechoslovakia. Apart from East Germany and Hungary, the regional 
variation within countries has also grown. The rise in death rates runs 
counter to the longer term post-war trend and reflects inadequate 
healthcare and environmental problems: 
"the low rate of population growth is now comparable with the 
West..[but]...there are disturbing rises in the death rate among 
middle-aged adults and certain categories of children - the 
result mostly of heavy smoking in the first case and 
environmental pollution in the second. The health services are 
badly funded and inefficiently run, so that the death rate is 
likely to increase rather than decrease" (Wallace, 1990). 
The rise in the death rate also reflects the changing structure of 
the population. As the birth rate falls and the age structure of the 
population shifts towards greater numbers of older people, the death rate 
also increases in relative terms. 
The implications of the rapidly falling birth rate and the rising 
death rate suggests that there may be considerable problems of labour 
shortage, which is already evident, as populations age. 
"the shortage of labour is partly artificial, with enterprises 
storing up labour reserves in case of need....[but] there 
is..almost bound to be a growing labour shortage that will not 
be eased until the East European economies are much more highly 
mechanized and East European labour is much better trained" 
(Wallace,1990). 
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Table 3.4: Birth rates - regional variation M970 & 19BBÌ (per 1.000) 
Bulgaria 
Czechoslovakia 
East Germany 
Hungary 
Poland 
Romania 
Yugoslavia 
CEE region 
Nat. 
average 
13.0 
13.6 
13.3 
11 .7 
15.6$ 
15.8* 
15.2 
14.0 
IQQQ 
Reg. 
max. 
14.4 
18.0 
14.8 
14.8 
18.5 
-
18.1 
16.4 
Reg. 
min. 
11.3 
10.9 
11.3 
9.1 
10.1 
-
12.5 
10.9 
Reg. 
diff. 
3.1 
7.1 
3.5 
5.7 
8.4 
-
5.6 
5.6 
Nat. 
average 
16.3 
15.5 
14.0 
14.7 
13.1(1 
21.1* 
19.8 
16.2 
Reg. 
max. 
18.3 
20.1 
15.3 
18.5 
56.6 
-
22.9 
25.2 
Reg. 
min. 
13.4 
11.4 
12.5 
12.0 
4.5 
-
14.6 
11.4 
Reg. 
diff. 
4!9 
8.7 
2.8 
6.5 
52.1 
-
8.3 
13.9 
* 1985 figure; @ 1975 figures; $ 1989 figure; & 1971 figures; 
+ CEE regional max., min., and diff. exclude Romania. 
Table 3.5: Death rates - regional variation (1970 & 1988) (per 1.000) 
Nat. 
average 
- 1988 — 
Reg. Reg. 
max. min. 
Reg. 
diff. 
1970 -
Nat. Reg. Reg. 
average max. min. 
Reg. 
diff. 
Bulgaria 12.2 16.9 9.5 7.4 9.1 11.4 7.3 4.1 
Czechoslovakia 11.5 13.8 8.7 5.1 11.4 15.0 8.2 6.8 
East Germany 12.8 14.9 11.1 3.8 14.1 16.1 12.4 3.7 
Hungary 13.2 14.4 11.7 2.7 11.6 13.3 9.9 3.4 
Poland 9.5Λ 12.7 7.5 5.2 7.1@ 36.9 2.5 34.4 
Romania 10.9* - - - 9.5 
Yugoslavia 8.4 11.3 5.8 5.5 8.2$ 10.1 6.1 4.0 
CEE region+ 11.2 14.0 9.1 5.0 10.1 17.1 7.7 9.4 
* 1985 figure; @ 1975 figures; Λ 1989 figures; $ 1971 figure; 
+ CEE regional max., min., and diff. exclude Romania. 
Table 3.6: Natural increase - regional variation (1970-1988) (per 1.000) 
Bulgaria 
Czechoslovakia 
East Germany 
Hungary 
Poland 
Romania 
Yugoslavia 
CEE region 
1970 
7.2 
4.3 
- 0.1 
3.1 
6.0@ 
11.6 
8.2& 
5.8 
1980 
3.4 
4.1 
0.4 
0.3 
7.0 
7.6 
8.4$ 
4.5 
1988 
1.2 
2.4 
0.1 
- 1.5 
6.1Λ 
4.9* 
6.8 
2.9 
Reg. 
max. 
3.9 
8.7 
3.6 
2.3 
10.4 
-
11.1 
11.1 
- 1988 
Reg. 
min. 
-5.6 
-2.7 
-3.6 
-4.7 
-1.1 
-
1.2 
-5.6 
Reg. 
diff. 
9.5 
11.4 
7.2 
7.0 
11.5 
-
9.9 
16.7 
* 1985 figure; @ 1975 figures; + CEE regional max., min., and diff. 
figures exclude Romania. Λ 1989 figure; & 1971 figure; $1981 figure. 
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The national trends for the natural increase of the population (see 
Tables 3.6) indicate that the birth and death rates are close to cancelling 
each other out in several cases, particularly in East Germany and Bulgaria; 
in Hungary, deaths already exceed births. By contrast, Poland, Romania and 
Yugoslavia maintain a substantial positive natural increase in population. 
Poland is remarkable for the fact that only in two of the country's 49 
voivodships (Warsaw and Lodz) is the regional natural increase negative. 
However, the regional figures for Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia indicate 
that, in some regions, the growth of the natural population is also very 
marginal. Elsewhere, in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and 
Hungary, there are substantial regional deficits in population change. 
The regional disparities are wide: across Central and Eastern Europe, 
the rate of natural increase varies by almost 15 percentage points. 
Regional disparities are greatest in Poland and Czechoslovakia (>11), but 
range between 7 and 10 percentage points in other regions also. 
3.3.3 Components of population change - migration 
In the past, the controlled movement of people in Central and Eastern 
Europe has been an important instrument of economic development policies: 
"The movement of people is always regulated through registration 
formalities but migration may well be positively stimulated or 
constrained. Population movement is encouraged when it is 
necessary to fulfil the policies of governments, but discouraged 
when conflicts arise" (Turnock, 1989a). 
However, migration in Central and Eastern Europe has, in general, only 
been inter-regional within countries. The exceptions relate to the 
repatriatiation of ethnic minorities such as Jews and ethnic Germans or 
temporary industrial and cultural assignments. In addition, there has been 
steady migration to the West with significant numbers of people moving 
after political upheavals eg. 1956 in Hungary, 1968 in Czechoslovakia and 
1980/81 in Poland. Organized exchanges or transfers of labour between 
Central and East European countries have been primarily to the economically 
more developed countries: to the former GDR (mainly from Poland), to 
Czechoslovakia (particularly from Poland and Bulgaria) and, to a limited 
extent, to Hungary (again mainly from Poland). 
Only in Yugoslavia has there been significant uncontrolled 
international movement of people. The estimated 870,000 Yugoslav economic 
migrants working abroad contrasts with the situation in Bulgaria where, 
according to official figures, fewer than 1,000 people left the country 
between 1980 and 1988, (although substantial numbers of Turkish people are 
known to have left in the late 1980s). Over the past two years, 
out-migration from East Germany (primarily to West Germany) has also become 
significant; around 1.5 percent of the population of the former GDR 
emigrated in 1989 alone. The flows slowed during 1990, but almost 240,000 
East Germans emigrated to the western part of the country during the first 
six months of the year. It is anticipated that international migration is 
likely to become a serious problem for other Central and East European 
countries as travel restrictions are eased. Hungary is already 
experiencing significant problems through an influx of large numbers of 
immigrants from Romania, mainly of Hungarian nationality, as well as the 
temporary accomodation of migrants in transit. 
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Internal migration within Central and East European countries has been 
substantial. The available inter-regional migration data indicates that 
regional gains and losses have reached +/- 10 percent during the period 
1980-88. Exceptionally, in East Germany, regional losses have been as high 
as -23 percent. Migration movement is dominated by two trends: (i) 
movement from backward to advanced regions; and (ii) movement from rural 
to urban areas. 
"The number of people moving from the rural areas to the towns 
has been so great that the proportion of the population living 
there has grown substantially in all the countries, while that 
in the rural area has been stationary or falling" (Dawson, 
1987). 
In Bulgaria, for example, the national population grew from 6.9 
million in 1945 to almost 9 million in the mid-1980s. In parallel, there 
was a significant rural-urban shift with a reduction in the rural 
population from 75 to 38 percent of the national population. Between 1965 
and 1975 alone, the urban population increased by 1.3 million, 700,000 of 
whom were rural migrants (Carter, 1987). The experience of the Central and 
East European countries is that the population of regions adjacent to major 
industrial centres - particularly village-dwellers - is more likely to 
migrate to these centres, and the volume of people migrating is increased 
in regions with a well developed transportation system. 
A significant part of the trend is attributable to official government 
policies which promoted the growth of large towns and cities to provide the 
labour force for major plants and enterprises. As with other aspects of 
central planning, the development of settlements was planned and 
controlled, insofar as possible, in detail. In Hungary and Romania, for 
example, settlement strategies were developed involving the designation of 
hierarchies of settlements with population targets. Generally, emphasis 
was placed on increasing the size of selected towns and villages. An 
important feature of settlement planning has also been the creation of new 
towns and cities or the merging of settlements to form new "structural 
units" eg. in Hungary and Bulgaria. The consequence was migration up the 
settlement hierarchy from smaller to larger villages and smaller to larger 
towns. 
Part of the rationale for these strategies was to divert development 
away from the capital cities and the largest cities where population growth 
was most rapid in the immediate post-war period. To relieve the 
over-concentration of population at the top of the urban hierarchy, lower 
tiers of settlements were promoted - with some success: 
"the dominance of the capital cities, as measured by their 
proportions of the urban population, has been 
weakened.. .although in some cases the decline has been very 
small; and secondly, the proportion of the urban population in 
the largest settlements has also tended to fall, except in East 
Germany, thus indicating that in general urban growth has been 
successfully dispersed to the smaller and middle-sized towns" 
(Dawson, 1987). 
The scale, source and destination of migration has significant 
implications for the demographic structure of regions. Active migration 
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causes disproportionate regional birth rates as it leads to a concentration 
of large masses of people at industrial centres or wide-spread depopulation 
of large regions. A high percentage of the resettling migrants in Central 
and Eastern Europe are aged between 16 and 29 years, which seriously 
affects the age structure of· the regions. 
3.4 Age-sex structure 
The balance of males and females is similar among Central and East 
European economies (see Table 3.7). Reflecting the greater life expectancy 
of women, females account for approximately 51 percent of national 
populations. The highest proportion of women is in East Germany where the 
the decimation of significant numbers of men during World War II still has 
some effect. Regional disparity is relatively small, although there are 
examples - in Romania, Poland and Yugoslavia - of the regional male 
population exceeding the number of females. The situation is particularly 
unbalanced in small areas of north-east Poland where the male-female ratio 
reaches 7:1. 
Table 3.7: Population by sex - regional variation (1988) (percentage 
of total population) 
Males 
Nat. Reg. Reg. Reg. 
average max. min. diff. 
Females 
Nat. Reg. 
average max. 
Reg. Reg. 
min. diff. 
Bulgaria 49.4 49.9 48.3 1.6 50.6 51.7 50.1 1.6 
Czechoslovakia 48.7 49.2 47.0 2.2 51.3 53.0 50.8 2.2 
East Germany 47.9 48.9 47.0 1.9 52.1 53.0 51.1 1.9 
Hungary 48.2 49.3 46.6 2.7 51.8 53.4 50.7 2.7 
Poland 49.0 49.9 46.4 3.5 51.0 53.6 50.1 3.5 
Romania 49.3 50.5 47.9 2.6 50.7 52.1 49.5 2.6 
Yugoslavia* 49.4 50.7 48.4 2.3 50.6 51.6 49.3 2.3 
CEE region 
EC+ 
48.8 
48.7 
50.7 
50.3 
46.4 
46.7 
4.3 
3.6 
51.2 
51.3 
53.6 
53.3 
49.3 
49.7 
4.3 
3.6 
* 1985 figures 
+ Data provided by the European Commission. 
Comparisons between population age groups in different Central and 
East European countries are problematic due to the differences in 
definition employed for assessing the working population. In East Germany 
and Yugoslavia, for example, the working population consists of men aged 
15-64 and women aged 15-59; in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, however, the 
respective age ranges are 15-59 and 15-54. 
In general, the child population comprises between one-fifth and 
one-quarter of the national population (see Figure 3.2). The figures are 
very high for Romania, reflecting the birth rate promotion policies of the 
1970s and 1980s; this is also evident from the regional figures where the 
maximum regional child population in Romania is 30 percent. Elsewhere in 
Central and Eastern Europe, regional differences are relatively small. 
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Table 3.8: Child population - regional variation M988) 
of total population) 
(Percentage 
Nat. 
average 
Reg. 
max. 
Reg. 
min. 
Reg. 
difference 
Bulgaria 
Czechoslovakia 
East Germany 
Hungary 
Poland 
Romania 
Yugoslavia 
21, 
23, 
19, 
n. 
30, 
23, 
25, 
22.8 
27.3 
22.3 
n.a. 
34.4 
30.0 
29.1 
18.1 
19.3 
17.6 
n.a. 
23.5 
15.1 
21.0 
4.7 
8.0 
4.7 
n.a. 
10.9 
14.1 
8.1 
CEE region* 
EC+ 18.4 28.3 11.7 16.6 
* Average excluding Hungary. + Data provided by the European Commission. 
Table 3.9: Aged population - regional variation (1988) (percentage 
of 
Bulgaria 
Czechoslovakia 
East Germany 
Hungary 
Poland 
Romania 
Yugoslavia 
CEE region* 
EC+ 
total population) 
Nat. 
average 
21.9 
19.4 
16.2 
n.a. 
12.8 
13.0 
10.2 
14.2 
Reg. 
max. 
30.2 
21.7 
19.6 
n.a. 
16.2 
18.9 
13.1 
20.1 
Reg. 
min. 
16.4 
15.9 
12.7 
n.a. 
9.1 
9.0 
7.2 
7.6 
Reg. 
difference 
13.8 
5.8 
6.9 
n.a. 
7.1 
9.9 
5.9 
12.5 
* Average excluding Hungary. + Data provided by the European Commission. 
Table 3.10: Working age population population - regional variation (1988) 
Bulgaria 
(Percentage of 
Czechoslovakia 
East Germany 
Hungary 
Poland 
Romania 
Yugoslavia 
CEE region* 
EC+ 
Nat. 
average 
57.1 
57.6 
64.4 
57.3 
56.6 
63.3 
64.2 
67.2 
total population) 
Reg. 
max. 
61.7 
61.5 
67.1 
59.0 
61.0 
69.5 
65.7 
71.2 
Reg. 
min. 
49.5 
56.8 
62.3 
55.0 
53.1 
56.8 
62.7 
60.7 
Reg. 
diff. 
11.8 
4.7 
4.8 
4.0 
7.9 
12.7 
3.0 
10.5 
Defini 
Males 
16-59 
15-59 
15-64 
15-59 
15-64 
15-64 
15-14 
.tions 
Females 
16-54 
15-54 
15-59 
15-54 
15-60 
15-59 
15-14 
* Average excluding Hungary + Data provided by the European Commission 
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The aged population accounts for c. one-fifth of the national 
population in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. Lower figures in East Germany 
and Romania are attributable, in the first case, to the considerable 
numbers of older people allowed to emigrate from the former GDR. In 
Romania, the figure indicates the lower life expectancy; in one region, 
the proportion of older people is less than 10 percent. However, as noted 
earlier, the proportion of older people also has to be seen in context ie. 
it is affected by the proportion of young people. 
Overall, the working population of Central and Eastern Europe numbers 
85 million, approximately 61 percent of the total population (see Figure 
3.3). The figures are highest in Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia where 
birth rates are consistently high. 
It is anticipated that the relative proportion of the productive age 
groups will expand temporarily as the birth rates continue to decrease. 
However, as noted earlier, the ageing of the population is likely to 
produce age structures similar to those being experienced in West European 
countries. 
3.5 Future population trends 
Estimates in the late 1980s suggested a seven percent increase in the 
population of Central and Eastern Europe to bring the population of the 
region up to c.146 million by the year 2000 (see Table 3.12). However, it 
is likely that this is an overestimate, taking no account of the economic 
and political liberalisation process leading to the emigration of 
substantial numbers of East Germans and the abandonment of the Ceausescu 
birth rate promotion policies in Romania. For example, the current 
projection for Czechoslovakia is 16.1 million for the year 2000 and 16.9 
million for 2030. 
Table 3.11: Population projections 
Bulgaria 
Czechoslovakia 
East Germany 
Hungary 
Poland 
Romania 
Yugoslavia 
CEE region 
National 
1988 
(mill) 
9.0 
15.6 
16.7 
10.6 
37.8 
23.1 
23.6 
136.4 
population 
2000* 
(mill) 
9.7 
16.8 
16.6 
10.9 
41.4 
25.6 
25.2 
146.2 
Projected 
No. 
(mill) 
0.7 
1.2 
- 0.1 
0.3 
3.6 
2.5 
1.6 
9.8 
increase 
(%) 
7.8 
7.7 
■ 0.6 
2.8 
9.5 
10.8 
6.8 
7.2 
*Projections from Turnock (1989) based on US forecasts 
Currently, population growth in Central and East European countries is 
projected as being under one percent a year - considerably less than in 
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past years. The ageing of the population is likely to be an important 
characteristic of demographic trends, though much less so than in some EC 
countries. The proportion of people aged over 64 is forecast as increasing 
from the current level of 11 percent to 16 percent in 2025, with a similar 
decline in the proportion of children. 
Perhaps the biggest population problem for the Central and 'East 
European countries is the anticipated loss of people. Birth rates are 
likely to continue . to fall, especially if improved contraception and 
abortion facilities become available, and death rates should also decline 
again with better diet and improved hygiene and medical care. Economic 
growth and urbanisation should continue to encourage smaller families and 
relatively low marital fertility, as has already occurred in Hungary and 
East Germany. However, greater freedom to travel is the most immediate 
significant influence in the distribution of population. The European 
Community and other West European countries such as Austria are likely to 
increase border security and tighten immigration laws, but economic 
migration from Central and Eastern Europe may still be very significant. 
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Figure 3.1: POPULATION CHANGE 1980/89 
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Figure 3.2: CHILD POPULATION 1988/89 
κεγ m 
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Figure 3.3: WORKING AGE POPULATION 1988/89 
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CHAPTER 4 : 
EMPLOYMENT 
4.1 Introduction 
The structure of economic activity in Central and Eastern Europe is 
distinguished by the high shares of primary and secondary employment. This 
section examines regional differences in employment structure among the 
countries and regions of Central and Eastern Europe. The section is 
divided into three parts. First, a review of national employment patterns 
is provided in terms of the main employment indicators and a comparison of 
employment sectors and industrial and service subsectors. Regional 
disparities in the main employment sectors are then discussed followed by 
country-specific details of the main employment characteristics and 
regional differences within individual countries. 
4.2 National employment patterns 
All countries in Central and Eastern Europe have relatively high 
labour participation ratios (the share of employed persons in the total 
population). The ratios range from 53.5 percent in the former GDR; 49 
percent in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia; 45-47 percent in Poland and 
Romania; 41 percent in Hungary; and 29 percent in Yugoslavia (but for the 
socialist sector only). In addition, the labour participation of the 
female population has been extremely high in virtually all the countries of 
the region. 
The share of industrial employment exceeds 35 percent in all countries 
except Poland (see Table 4.1). The highest shares (39 percent) are to be 
found in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. However, a viable comparison is 
biased by different definitions of employed persons; in general, only the 
employees of state enterprises are included. The exclusion of the private 
sector from official statistical reporting did not play a major role until 
very recently (with the exception of Yugoslavia and countries with a large 
share of private agriculture such as Poland), but this will be an important 
issue to be addressed by statistical authorities as the transition to a 
market economy proceeds. 
Taking into account these (and other) methodological deficiencies of 
available employment data, a more appropriate picture regarding the 
employment structure is provided by an analysis of data on economically 
active persons, although such data are also not free from bias. Comparison 
is hampered by the different age coverage of "active" persons, and also by 
different numbers of non-active persons (pensioners) who are still working 
- mainly in agriculture. In Czechoslovakia, for example, employed 
non-active persons represented almost 10 percent of total employment at the 
end of the 1980s; in addition, economically active persons include women 
on maternity leave and army conscripts. 
According to the economic activity data (see Table 4.2), the 
48 
employment structure of Central and East European countries has at least 30 
percent of economically-active persons employed in industry. Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Romania all have 37-38 percent of the 
economically active in the industrial category. Hungary, Poland and 
Yugoslavia have lower industrial shares (29 and 24 percent respectively) 
mainly because of the greater importance of agriculture, in employment 
terms, in these countries. 
Table 4.1: 
Bulgaria 
Main employment characteristics 
Total 
employment 
('000s) 
4,370 
Czechoslovakia 7,674 
East Germany 
Hungary 
Poland 
Romania 
Yugoslavia* 
8,886 
4,338 
17,130 
10,946 
6,876 
Total employment 
as total share of 
population 
(%) 
49.3 
49.0 
53.3 
41.0 
45.0 
47.2 
29.0 
(1988-89) 
Industrial employment 
as share of total 
population 
(%) 
35.2 
38.5 
37.3 
32.5 
28.6 
38.1 
39.5 
Source: WIIW (*) socialist sector only 
Table 4.2: Economically-active persons by economic sectors (1989) -
sub-sectors as 
Total 
employment 
COOOs) 
Bulgaria$ 4,468 
Czechoslovakia 8,199 
East Germany 8,547 
Hungary 4,823 
Poland 16,854 
Romania 10,946 
Yugoslavia!? 9,359 
percentage of 
Ind. 
(%) 
38.0 
37.3 
37.3 
30.4 
29.0 
38.1 
23.6 
Con. 
(%) 
8.3 
9.9 
6.6 
7.0 
7.8 
7.4+ 
7.3 
total employment 
A.F.F. Trans. 
(%) (%) 
19.3 6.7 
11.4 6.4 
10.8 7.5 
20.0* 8.3 
27.7 5.8 
28.9+ 6.8+ 
28.7 4.7 
Comm. 
(%) 
8.7 
9.9 
10.3 
10.8 
8.7 
5.8+ 
8.9 
Non-prod. 
sectors 
(%) 
18.1 
21.4 
21.6 
22.5 
18.5 
12.5+ 
26.7 
Source: WIIW 
(*) Includes water management; (+) Percentages based on 1985 data. 
($) 1988 data; (@) 1981 data. 
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Table 4.3: Economically-active persons by economic sectors -
percentage change (1980-89) in total Employment and sub-sectors 
Total 
employment Ind. Con. A.F.F. Trans. Comm. Services 
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
Bulgaria$ 2.4 10.4 -4.0 -18.6 -1.7 10.0 12.2 
Czechoslovakia 5.5. 3.7 9.3 -12.8 4.8 10.7 17.2 
East Germany 3.9 1.9 -3.9 5.1 4.2 3.2 11.6 
Hungary -4.9 -13.6 -16.1 -13.4 -1.7 6.4 13.0 
Poland -2.7 -6.7 -1.4 -11.8 -12.5 -11.8 17.0 
Romania 5.8 13.3+ 8.2+ -0.9+ 1.5+ -0.5+ 4.2+ 
Yugoslavia - _ _ _ _ _ _ 
Source: WIIW ($) 1988 data 
(*) Includes water management; (+) Percentages based on 1980-1985 changes. 
Key: 
Ind = Industry Trans = Transport & communication 
Con = Construction Comm = Trade & commerce 
AFF = Agriculture, forestry & fishing 
To analyse the importance of industrial sub-sectors, economic activity 
data is not available, and figures for "employed persons" have to be used 
instead. Clearly, there are differences between the total industrial 
employment figures given in Table 4.4 and those presented in Table 4.2 
above. The relative orders of magnitude are, however, the same. According 
to the data in Table 4.4, the industrial employment structures are similar 
between Central and East European countries. The major difference is the 
high concentration of industrial employment in the engineering sector in 
Romania and Czechoslovakia, and there is a high level of energy employment 
in East Germany (one-third of Central and East European energy employment), 
mostly located in the south-east of the region on the Polish and Czech 
borders. 
With respect to the employment share of agriculture, forestry and 
fishing in Central and Eastern Europe, the countries of the region can be 
divided into three categories. East Germany and Czechoslovakia have the 
smallest agricultural sectors, with only 10-11 percent of the economically 
active employed in this sphere. Occupying a "median position" with 19-20 
percent are Bulgaria and Hungary. The largest agricultural employment 
shares are in Poland, Yugoslavia and Romania with percentages of 28-29 
percent. 
The relatively high share of employment in the so-called "productive 
sectors" of the economy (agriculture, industry, construction, part of 
transport, communications and trade) contrasts with low employment shares 
in services (see Table 4.5). These so-called "non-productive" sectors 
include passenger transport and communications, the housing sector, 
education, health, culture, financial services and state administration. 
The non-productive employment shares are generally in the range 18-23 
percent of total employment. The exceptions are Yugoslavia where the 
figure is 27 percent and Romania, where the service sector is extremely 
small (13 percent). 
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Table 4.4: Employed persons by economic sectors - industrial snh-sectors 
(1989) as a percentage of total employment 
Total 
employ. 
No. 
Total 
industry 
(%) 
Energy 
(%) 
Ferrous 
metal 
(%) 
Eng. 
(%) 
Chem. 
(%) 
Text. 
(%) 
Food 
(%) 
Bulgaria 4,061 
Czechoslovakia* 7,033 
East Germany 
Hungary 
Poland 
Romania* 
Yugoslavia 
7,544 
3,940 
11,196 
7,661 
6,876 
38.4 
40.0 
42.7 
34.4 
36.2 
46.8 
39.5 
0.9 
1.0 
3.0 
1.1 
1.1 
0.7 
1.3 
1.0 
2.5 
1.8 
1.8 
1.3 
1.9 
1.1 
8.4 
16.7 
12.8 
11.2 
11.6 
17.2 
11.9 
2.4 
2.4 
4.4 
2.8 
2.5 
3.3 
3.0 
2.9 
3.0 
2.8 
2.3 
2.9 
5.3 
6.9 
2.9 
4.0 
Source: WIIW. (*) 1988 figures. (+) 1985 figures. 
Key: Eng = Engineering 
Text = Textiles 
Chem = Chemicals 
Table 4.5: Economically-active persons by economic sectors -
non-productive sectors (1989) as percentage of total employment 
Total Housing Health State 
non-prod, local Science Arts social admin, 
sectors admin research Educ. welfare finance 
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
Bulgaria 
Czechoslovakia 
East Germany 
Hungary 
Poland 
Romania* 
Yugoslavia* 
18.1 
21.4 
21.6 
22.5 
18.5 
12.5 
26.7 
2.3 
4.1 
-
-
3.8 
4.1 
-
2.0 
2.3 
-
-
0.6 
1.3 
-
7.2 
7.8 
-
-
6.1 
3.9 
-
4.7 
5.3 
-
-
5.4 
2.7 
-
1.9 
1.9 
-
-
2.6 
0.5 
-
Source: WIIW 
(+) Percentages based on 1985 data. (*) 1981 data. 
Redefining the "services sector" to include transport and 
communications as well as trade and commerce along with the non- productive 
sectors produces rather larger shares of service employment. Thus, 
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary and Yugoslavia have service 
employment shares of around 40 percent; Bulgaria and Poland have c.33 
percent; and Romania has service employment of 25 percent. However, 
allowing for differences in data definition, the employment shares for 
services are still extemely low in Central and Eastern Europe, reflecting 
the underdevelopment of the service sector in all countries of the region. 
A recent OECD study on services in Central and East European countries 
(Zienkowski, 1990) stresses the low share of employment in the service 
sector (and low share of gross value added) when compared with developed 
and developing economies. This is particularly true of market services. 
Whereas the employment share of government services is about the same in 
Central and East European states and OECD countries, the share of 
employment in market services is considerably higher in OECD countries. 
The underdevelopment of the service sector is perceived to constitute a 
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substantial bottleneck to the efficient functioning of the economy and the 
development of the private sector, although it also creates a considerable 
potential for future growth and the absorption of workers laid off by the 
over-staffed industry. 
The employment structure has remained relatively stable over the.past 
decade (see Table 4.3). Although there has been a general trend in most 
countries for economic activity in industry to increase or, at least, be 
maintained at a high level, there are "north-south" differences across the 
region. Over the period 1980-89, among the Balkan states, the share of 
industrial employment increased by between two and three percent - in 
Yugoslavia (37 to 39 percent), Bulgaria (35 to 38 percent) and Romania (36 
to 38 percent). By contrast, in the north of the region, the industrial 
share remained almost static (38 to 37 percent in the former GDR and 
Czechoslovakia) or declined - in Hungary (34 to 30 percent) and Poland (30 
to 29 percent). 
Over the same period, the share of economically active persons in 
agriculture (including forestry) declined almost everywhere. Apart from 
Czechoslovakia, where the agriculture share remained constant (10.8 
percent), agricultural employment fell by 2-3 percent, especially in 
Bulgaria and Romania. 
4.3 Regional disparities 
The regional disparities in the employed population for the three 
main sectors are presented in Tables 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8. These relate to 
industrial employment (comprising industry and construction), the share of 
agriculture, forestry and fishing, and service employment incorporating 
the non-productive sector as well as transport and communications and 
trade and commerce. 
The regional industrial employment shares (see Table 4.6 and Figure 
4.1) average 41 percent for Central and Eastern Europe as a whole but with 
an extremely wide regional disparity (of almost 50 percent) ranging from 12 
percent in Poland to 61 percent in Poland and Romania {Brasov). The very 
wide range is mostly attributable to the regional differences within Poland 
where there are several regions with very low industrial employment shares; 
seven voivodships have an industrial employment .share of less than 20 
percent (eg. Bielskie, Chelmskie, Ciechan, Lomzyn) all of which are in the 
eastern part of the country. At the other end of the scale, Poland also 
has heavily industrialised big city regions, such as Katowice and Lodz with 
in excess of half of the employed labour force engaged in industry and 
construction. 
In Romania, the very low industrial employment share of 26 percent (in 
Ialomita) is more exceptional. As the national average indicates, there is 
a high industrial employment share across the country. Over half of the 
Romanian counties have an industrial employment share greater than 40 
percent, and six (Brasov, Harghita, Hunedoara, Prahova, Sibiu and 
Bucharest) have more than 50 percent of employees in industry and 
construction. 
Regional disparities in industrial employment are more limited in 
Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, partly because of the small number and relatively 
large size of the regions for which data is available. Regional 
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differences in employment in industry and construction are, therefore, only 
10-15 percent. For Czechoslovakia and Hungary, industrial employment 
disparities are somewhat higher (20 percent). In Czechoslovakia this is 
primarily due to the low industrial employment shares of Prague (36 
percent) and Bratislava (35 percent) both of which have significant service 
sectors; excluding these regional capitals reduces the regional 
disparities to the level of Bulgaria. In Hungary, the capital city has a 
significant industrial employment share (40 percent), and the country's 
regional disparity is a consequence of the bias of industrial development 
towards the northern parts of the country - especially the contrast between 
regions like Fejer and Borsod-Abauj-Zemplen (where more than 45 percent of 
employees are engaged in in industry and construction) and the southern 
counties of Somogy, Szabolcs and Bacs-Kiskun, where industrial employment 
is around 30 percent or less. 
For East Germany, the north-south divide that has been referred to in 
other sections is again evident in regional industrial employment shares. 
All of the districts (with the exception of Magdeburg) in the southern 
Laender have industrial employment shares in excess of 50 percent - in 
Chemnitz as high as 59 percent. By contrast, many northern districts have 
an industrial employment share of 35 percent or less, mainly in the Land of 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. 
Table 4.6: Regional disparities in employment - industrial 
employment share 
Bulgaria 
Czechoslovakia 
East Germany 
Hungary 
Poland 
Romania 
Yugoslavia 
CEE region 
National 
average 
(%) 
46.3 
46.1 
47.0 
38.6 
36.4 
40.2 
33.1 
41.1 
of total employment* 
Regional 
maximura 
(%) 
51.8 
55.0 
58.5 
47.8 
60.9 
61.4 
43.1 
61.4 
Regional 
minimura 
(%) 
41 .6 
35.3 
30.1 
28.2 
12.0 
25.8 
28.8 
12.0 
Regional 
difference 
(%) 
10.2 
19.7 
28.4 
19.6 
48.9 
35.6 
14.3 
49.4 
(*) Includes construction. 
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Table 4.7: Regional disparities in employment - agricultural 
employment share* 
Bulgaria 
Czechoslovakia 
East Germany 
Hungary 
Poland 
Romania 
Yugoslavia 
CEE region 
National 
average 
(%) 
19.3 
13.7 
10.8 
16.0 
28.9 
27.9 
30.7 
21.0 
of total 
Regional 
maximum 
(%) 
26.2 
21 .1 
26.8 
32.3 
61.3 
48.1 
38.4 
61.3 
employment 
Regional 
minimum 
(%) 
1.8 
2.0 
1.1 
0.7 
6.0 
3.8 
14.6 
0.7 
(18.1) 
(8.8) 
(8.1) 
(15.0) 
(15.6) 
(11.4) 
(@) 
(8.8) 
Reg: .onal 
difference 
(%) 
24.4 
19.1 
25.7 
31.6 
55.3 
44.3 
23.8 
60.6 
(8.1) 
(12.3) 
(16.7) 
(17.3) 
(45.7) 
(36.7) 
(@) 
(52.5) 
(*) Figures in brackets are the regional minima excluding the capital 
city region. (@) No city region. 
Table 4.8: Regional disparities in employment - services employment 
Bulgaria 
share* of total 
National 
average 
(%) 
34.9 
Czechoslovakia 40.2 
East Germany 
Hungary 
Poland 
Romania 
Yugoslavia 
CEE region 
42.3 
45.5 
34.2 
27.0 
35.1 
37.0 
employment 
Regional 
maximum 
(%) 
53.0 
62.1 
63.9 
83.6 
46.6 
43.1 
49.1 
83.6 
Regional 
minimum 
(%) 
28.2 
35.3 
35.3 
37.8 
22.7 
16.8 
31.2 
16.8 
Regional 
difference 
(%) 
24.8 
17.1 
28.6 
45.8 
23.9 
20.1 
17.9 
66.8 
(*) Includes transport & communications and trade & commerce. 
Note: In the above tables, data relates to: 1989 for Bulgaria, East 
Germany and Czechoslovakia; 1988 for Hungary; 1990 for Romania; 1986 
for Poland; and 1981 for Yugoslavia. 
To a certain extent, regional disparities in agricultural and service 
employment in Central and Eastern Europe mirror those of industrial 
employment (see Figure 4.2). With respect to agriculture, extremely low 
regional minima are recorded for agricultural employment in the capital 
cities or major secondary cities (Bratislava in Czechoslovakia and Katowice 
and Lodz in Poland). Thus, in Table 4.7 the regional minima have also been 
calculated excluding the major urban area regions (figures in parentheses). 
Across Central and Eastern Europe, the national average for 
agricultural employment is high - almost one-quarter of all employees are 
engaged in agriculture, forestry and fishing, and in both Poland and 
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Romania the share exceeds one third. Regional disparities are relatively 
limited in most countries (once major city regions are excluded). The most 
striking exception is Poland where the maximum regional agricultural 
employment share exceeds 60 percent (in Zamojskie), and eight further 
voivodships have more than half of all employees working in the 
agricultural sector. The scale of agricultural employment in Poland, and 
the potential consequences of restructuring, are evident from the fact that 
more than half of the country's voivodships have an agricultural employment 
share of more than one third of total employed persons. 
In Romania, agricultural employment is also very significant. Over 
one-third of Romanian counties have agricultural employment shares greater 
than 33 percent, and several counties (Botosani, Giurgiu and Ialomita) have 
almost half of all employees in agriculture. However, elsewhere in Central 
and Eastern Europe, the areas with higher levels of agricultural employment 
are more limited: Macedonia and Serbia in Yugoslavia, and Bacs-Kiskun in 
Hungary. 
Lastly, it was noted earlier that the service sector is relatively 
small in Central and Eastern Europe; the average for the region as a whole 
is 34 percent (see Table 4.8 and Figure 4.3). The higher shares (of around 
50 percent or more) are in the capital city regions - Sofia, Prague, 
Bratislava, Berlin, Budapest and Warsaw. Outside these cities, the 
regional service employment shares are considerably smaller - less than 40 
percent in Hungary, East Germany and Yugoslavia, and less than 35 percent 
in Bulgaria, Romania and Poland. 
4.4 Employment patterns and trends : national conditions 
The preceding discussion has been based on international comparative 
data provided by the Vienna Institute for Comparative Economic Studies 
(WIIW). The following review of national conditions is based on 
country-specific data and information; consequently the definitions and 
figures may differ. 
4.4.1 Bulgaria 
Employment in the state sector amounted to 4.96 million in August 
1989, approximately 88 percent of the economically active population. 
Within the state sector, 36.9 percent of employees worked in industry, 18 
percent in agriculture, 7.8 percent in construction, 8.9 percent in trade 
and 12.4 percent in education, health, social services and tourism. The 
number of working females was slightly higher than that of males, 
especially in communications, trade, education, health and social service 
sectors. 
During the post-war period, employment has increased as a result of 
the extensive development of the economy and the increase in the 
economically active population up to and including 1985. However, the rate 
of increase has been slowing down since the mid-1960s and, due to the 
deteriorating age structure of the population, 1988 was the first year to 
register a lower employment level than the previous year. Demographic 
projections indicate that the Bulgarian labour force will decline until 
2010, a trend which has been aggravated further by the exodus of the 
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country's Turkish minority. 
The recent decline is most apparent in the productive sphere (ie. 
mainly the primary and secondary sectors), although the industrial 
component has continued to maintain employment growth. The decrease is 
most evident in the districts of Lovech, Mihaylovgrad and Bourgas and, more 
recently, in the districts of Razgrad and Sofia as well. 
In contrast to the productive sector, the numbers employed in the 
non-productive sphere has increased two-fold over the last two decades, and 
the relative share of the non-productive sector rose from 12.6 percent in 
1965 to 18.5 percent in 1988. This trend has affected all the regions of 
the country, with the largest increases in employment in science, health, 
social security, sports, tourism, education and culture. Sofia has seen 
the most significant gains in all these sub-sectors. 
4.4.2 Czechoslovakia 
Total employment was 7.67 million in 1989, of which over two-thirds 
(68 percent) was in the Czech Republic and just under one-third (32 
percent) in the Slovak Republic. The level of industrialisation has 
historically been higher in the Czech than in the Slovak Republic. Thus, 
in 1989 the share of industrial employment, including coal raining, oil 
extraction and electricity and gas production, amounted to 38.4 percent on 
average, but was much greater (40.4 percent) in the Czech Republic than in 
the Slovak Republic (34.4 percent). However, this difference has narrowed 
considerable during the post-war period: in 1948, the respective 
industrial employment shares were 34.9 percent (Czech Republic) and 14.8 
percent (Slovak Republic). 
The converse situation applies to agricultural employment. The 
national employment share in agriculture and forestry was 13.7 percent in 
1989, with figures of 12.4 percent for the Czech Republic and 16.3 percent 
for the Slovak Republic. The former, extremely high dependency of the 
Slovak Republic on agriculture is evident from the 1948 employment 
situation, when 60 percent of employment was accounted for by agriculture 
(33.1 percent in the Czech Republic). 
Among other sectors, the non-productive sector accounted for 33 
percent of employment in 1989 with little difference between the two 
republics. 
Disaggregating the available industrial employment data according to 
the ISIC classification shows the following employment structure (1988) for 
the manufacturing sector: among the 1.84 million blue-collar workers in 
national industries, the largest employment share is accounted for by 
machinery (18 percent) followed by textiles and clothing (11 percent), 
transport equipment (9 percent), food, beverages and tobacco (9 percent), 
chemicals (7 percent), metallurgy and mining (each with 8 percent) and 
electrical machinery (6 percent). 
The highest concentration of industrial employment is in North Moravia 
(49.4 percent), principally in heavy industries which account for more than 
half of Czechoslovakia's employees in hard coking coal and ferrous 
metallurgy. North Bohemia has the second largest concentration (45.2 
percent) with the largest brown coal deposits, the highest concentration of 
coal power stations, important chemical plants in its western area, and 
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textile factories in its eastern area. In Slovakia, the highest share of 
industrial employment is in Central Slovakia (40.8 percent) where there is 
a large concentration of the armament industry which is now affected by 
conversion to civil production, and non-ferrous metallurgy. The South 
Moravian province, centred on Brno, has 41.1 percent of its workforce 
engaged in industry, mainly in the engineering sector - 159,500 employees, 
representing 20 percent of the entire Czechoslovak engineering industry. 
(Engineering does not include electrical machinery, electronics and "metal 
working" industries). The textile industry is concentrated in East 
Bohemia, particularly in the mountainous districts along the Polish border. 
In the capital, Prague, 52.6 percent of all employees work in 
non-productive sectors such as government administration and services of 
various kinds, but there is also a considerable share of industrial 
employment (24.5 percent, of which almost half is in engineering). 
4.4.3 East Germany 
The share of economically active people in the working age population 
has traditionally been high in East Germany - c.80 percent during the 
1980s. Regionally, there is a .slight north-south tendency towards a higher 
labour participation ratio, which is partly a consequence of differences in 
female employment (especially high in Dresden, Chemnitz and Suhl). 
A notable feature of the East German employment structure is the high 
- and until 1989 even growing - share of industrial employment (1989: 37.4 
percent). A further 17 percent was accounted for by non-productive 
sectors, 13 percent in agriculture and forestry, and 11 percent in trade. 
Among industrial sub-sectors, the most important was machinery and 
transport equipment, with 30 percent of all industrial employees; together 
with light industry (15 percent), the electrotechnical industry (14 
percent) and chemicals (10 percent), it accounted for almost 70 percent of 
industrial employment. 
The regional structure is characterized by a high share of industrial 
employment in the south, especially Sachsen, by the importance of 
agriculture in the northern part of the region, and by the concentration of 
the tertiary sector in Berlin. 
Among the southern states, Sachsen has the highest concentration of 
industry (44 percent of employment in 1989) and a heterogenuous industrial 
structure - machinery, light industry and textiles. The share of 
industrial employment in Thueringen was only slightly lower (43 percent), 
the most important sectors being the electrotechnical industry, electronics 
and instruments as well as light industry. Neighbouring Sachsen-Anhalt 
also had a high concentration of industry (39 percent), especially in the 
chemicals sub-sector in the Halle district, where 40 percent of all 
employees in the East German chemicals industry was based. 
Elsewhere in East Germany, industry was less important. 
Mecklenburg-Vorponnen in the north of the region, had an industrial 
employment share of only 23 percent in 1989, concentrated in shipbuilding 
and the food and beverages industries. The notable feature of the area's 
employment structure was the continued high share of agricultural 
employment (20.2 percent of employees - rising to over 50 percent in some 
districts). In Brandenburg, the share of industrial employment is also 
lower, but primary sector employment in mining (brown coal) and energy is 
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high. Lastly, in Berlin, industry plays only a minor role (25 percent of 
employment) with the predominance of administrative, trade and service 
employment. 
4.4.4 Hungary 
Total employment in Hungary was 4.82 million at the end of 1989, of 
which three-quarters was in the productive sector. Industry accounted for 
37.5 percent of employment, agriculture and forestry for 18.4 percent, and 
transport, communications and trade for 22.4 percent. Employment in the 
non-productive sector (1.04 million) was mainly in education (7 percent of 
total employment), health (5 percent) and personal services (4 percent). 
With respect to the regional employment patterns, in absolute terms 
the greatest number of industrial employees was in Budapest (300,000 
employees) which historically has dominated the industrial structure of the 
country. Since natural resources available for use as industrial raw 
materials were located in a concentrated area in the centre-north of 
Hungary, an uneven regional industrial development pattern emerged - for 
instance, in 1920, around 48 percent of industrial employees worked in 
Budapest. The capital's dominance was increased by the break-up of the 
country. Although a dispersal of industrial employment occurred during the 
post-war period, the highest concentration of industry has remained in the 
north of the country, in and around the capital and particularly in the 
districts of Borsod-Abauj-Zemplen (with an industrial employment share of 
41 percent of total employment at end-1988), Fejer (42 percent) and Komarom 
(40 percent). 
Disaggregating the industrial structure, the highest share of employed 
persons in Hungary was in engineering (33 percent of industrial employees), 
followed by light industry (23 percent) and the food industry (14 percent) 
- together comprising 70 percent of all industrial employment. The 
engineering sector is important in Budapest and Pest, in particular (46 
percent of industrial employees) and in Szolnok (39 percent). The 
metallurgical sector is based mainly in Fejer and Borsod-Abauj- Zemplen (23 
percent of industrial employment in each county, and mining is concentrated 
in Baranya (31 percent), Komarom (30 percent) and Veszprem (21 percent). 
Prevalently agricultural counties were in the southern and central 
parts of the country, notably Bacs-Kiskum (32 percent of total employment 
were in agriculture and forestry at end-1988), Pest (28 percent) and Bekes 
(26 percent). 
4.4.5 Poland 
The number of economically-active persons amounted to 17.8 million in 
1988, according to national sources (17.1 million according to CMEA 
figures). The level has fluctuated considerably during the 1980s due to 
the sharp fall of more than 400,000 between 1981 and 1982 (probably related 
to the general economic crisis, changes in social legislation and the 
imposition of martial law) mainly affecting employment in state industry. 
Considerable shifts towards non-productive-service-sectors occurred also 
during the 1980s. 
In 1988, the share of economically-active persons in industry (28.6 
percent) was about the same as in agriculture (28.5 percent). This is a 
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unique phenomenon in the whole Central and East European region (except for 
Yugoslavia) and relates to the traditional importance of private 
agriculture in Poland. Thus, the figures for the employment structure in 
the state sector differ considerably: the share of industry amounts to 36 
percent, and the share of agriculture only 8 percent. Among other sectors, 
trade accounted for 11 percent of employed persons, construction.- 9 
percent, education and culture - 9 percent, and health and social welfare -
8 percent. 
Within the (state) industrial sector, the highest employment share was 
in engineering which had one-third of industrial employment, followed by 
food processing (10 percent) and textiles (8 percent). 
The regional variation in employment structure in Poland reflects the 
spatial differences in development. Thus, industrial employment shares are 
higher in the western part of the country where there is a higher level of 
income and economic development, especially in the belt between Katowice 
and Szczecin. Also, there are significantly higher industrial employment 
shares in the larger city regions based on Krakow, Lodz, Poznan, Warsaw, 
Katowice and Wroclaw. 
4.4.6 Romania 
The number of economically active persons reached 10.9 million in 1989 
and, as in other southern countries of the region, the share of industrial 
employment has been increasing. During the 1980s, the share of 
economically active persons rose from 36 percent (1980) to 38 percent 
(1989). At the same time, agricultural employment remained at a relatively 
high level (28 percent in 1989). There are no recent data regarding the 
industrial composition of employment. In 1985 (latest data available), of 
3.6 million employed in industry, 37 percent worked in engineering, 12 
percent in textiles,and 7 percent in chemicals. 
Data on the regional structure of the economically active population 
(as of the start of 1990) show an extremely high concentration of industry 
(over 50 percent of all economically active) in the districts of Brasov (61 
percent), Sibiu (59 percent), Hunedoara and Prahova (56 percent), and 
Bucharest (53 percent). Prevalently agricultural districts (more than 30 
percent economically active in agriculture) were Botosani and Ialomita (48 
percent), Olt (43 percent), Suceava (38 percent),. Dimbovita (34 percent) 
and Arad (33 percent). 
4.4.7 Yugoslavia 
Census data for 1981 reveal the following structure of the 9.4 million 
economically active persons in Yugoslavia: industry, 24 percent; 
agriculture, 29 percent; commerce, 9 percent; and non-productive sectors, 
27 percent. However, recent economic data on employment are available for 
the state sector only, which in 1988 comprised 45 percent of the working 
age population. Across the country as a whole, 39 percent of employees in 
the state sector worked in industry, 10 percent in trade, 8 percent in 
state administration and finance, 9 percent in construction and 7 percent 
in transport and communication. The share of (state) agricultural 
employment was only five percent, ie. significantly underestimated because 
of the exclusion of the private sector. 
Within state industry (2.7 million employees in 1988), the employment 
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structure was dominated by the engineering sector (31 percent), followed by 
textiles (17 percent) and food (10 percent) industries. Data on the 
individual republics reveal that the highest share of industrial employment 
(1988) was in Slovenia and Bosnia and Hercegovina (each with 45 percent), 
Macedonia (41 percent) and Serbia (40 percent). State agriculture is most 
prevalent in Macedonia (8 percent of total employment) and Serbia (5 
percent). By contrast, in Slovenia and Bosnia and Hercegovina,' the 
respective employment shares are less than two percent. 
In terms of trends, employment has been either increasing at a 
declining rate or even decreasing in individual republics during the second 
half of the 1980s. In 1988, an absolute decrease of employment was 
recorded in Montenegro (-1 percent), Croatia (-0.2 percent), Macedonia 
(-0.4 percent) and Slovenia (- 0.7 percent). 
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Figure 4.1: SHARE OF TOTAL EMPLOYMENT IN INDUSTRY AND CONSTRUCTION 1988/89 
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Figure Α.2: SHARE OF TOTAL EMPLOYMENT IN SERVICES 1988/89 
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Figure Α.3: SHARE OF TOTAL EMPLOYMENT IN AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY AND FISHING 
1988/89 
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CHAPTER 5 : 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
5.1 Introduction 
Unemployment is becoming one of the most serious problems facing 
Central and East European countries. Under socialist control, unemployment 
was never acknowledged, although its existence in some form is almost 
beyond doubt. With the transition to market economies, open unemployment 
is being confronted for the first time, with its associated economic and 
social implications. It has been estimated that unemployment could reach 
12-14 million in Central and Eastern Europe by 1994 {Financial Times 
19.12.90; 27.12.90, based on Eurostrategy analysis by Morgan Stanley). 
This section examines experience of so-called "hidden" unemployment in 
Central and East European countries and the reasons for its existence. The 
appearance of open unemployment, and its effects on economic sectors, 
regions and society are then examined in more detail, including analysis of 
the causes and the particular problems which will be encountered in this 
area. 
5.2 A new phenomenon? 
Unemployment is a feature of Western society but in Central and 
Eastern Europe open unemployment is a relatively recent phenomenon. 
However, there is evidence that "hidden" unemployment existed in these 
countries despite the negligible rates which were officially quoted. The 
phenomenon of hidden unemployment is attributable to a number of factors: 
under-employment; a change of employment with a significant time-lapse 
between the end of one job and the start of the next; people for whom it 
would not be advantageous to register as unemployed; part-time workers; 
and, people in "alternative" employment. In a 1990 study, Euromonitor 
estimated that the underlying unemployment figure for the region as a whole 
could be as high as 10-20 percent (for individual country figures, see 
Table 5.1). 
In the former GDR, individual companies were required by law to look 
after their employees. If jobs were lost, the employees had to be offered 
other jobs in the same or another company. Re-training, if required, also 
had to be arranged by companies. Given this legal basis, there was very 
little unemployment, although full employment was only maintained by very 
inefficient use of labour. However, even in the former GDR, "hidden" 
unemployment is estimated to have been as high as 15 percent of the labour 
force. 
Yugoslavia was the only Central and East European country to admit 
unemployment openly. The country's generally more liberal economic 
approach allowed an open-border policy to encourage greater efficiency in 
the labour-intensive industries of Yugoslavia. This allowed labour 
migration to the West, principally affecting the population in northern 
regions which were geographically closer to West European countries, better 
informed and more prepared to take the risk of leaving. The official 
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national unemployment rate of Yugoslavia in 1984 was 13.5 percent, although 
significant regional variations existed, the rates ranging from 33.3 
percent in Kosovo to 1.9 percent in Slovenia. 
The present transition to a system of market economy being undertaken 
by all the Central and East European countries has led to the first 
appearance of open unemployment. The inefficient, labour-intensive 
industries of the socialist economies, which were deliberately overstaffed 
to absorb some of the labour surplus, will be significantly affected by new 
market forces. Many industries are likely to become non-viable and will be 
shut down. Most others will be rationalised and converted into more 
capital-intensive rather than labour-intensive enterprises. This process 
will have - and has already begun to have - a devastating effect on 
employment. 
The reforms undertaken during 1990 have already had an effect on 
unemployment rates. As Table 5.1 indicates, rates in some countries are 
already estimated to have reached double figures, and the projections for 
1991 indicate further increases. Unemployment will rise significantly in 
those countries where the government is implementing strict reforms, and as 
these reforms really begin to affect the economy. 
Table 5.1: Unemr 
Bulgaria 
Czechoslovakia 
East Germany 
Hungary 
Poland 
Romania 
Yugoslavia 
iloyment rates 
Euromonitor 
(%) 
5.0 
10.0 
25.0 
-
10-12 
-
-
in Centi 
WIIW 
(%) 
<2.0 
0.7 
7.3 
1.7 
6.1 
-
16.0 
:al and East 
Press and 
project 
sources 
(%) 
1.2 
7.0 
2.1 
7.0 
2.8* 
10.5 
ern Europe (199C 
Projection 
(%) 
{ 6.0 
{10.0 
{11.1 
8-10 
17.5 
-
11.7 
-
-
(1991) 
(1992) 
(1993) 
(1991) 
(1991) 
(1991) 
Sources: Euromonitor (which refers to "hidden" unemployment); 
WIIW: Vienna Institute for Comparative Econ. Studies; Jackson 
1990(a), p35; various press and project sources. 
5.3 Sectoral Impact 
The restructuring of economic sectors within Central and Eastern 
European countries is likely to be associated with significant unemployment 
in three main areas: traditional industrial sectors; armament and 
associated industries; and agriculture. 
First, the socialist industrialisation strategy targeted a number of 
principal, heavy industrial sectors and concentrated development in these 
areas, often locating the plants in regions with the appropriate raw 
material base. This centrally planned strategy has led to the development 
65 
of so-called "monostructure" regions in which a significant proportion of 
employment is dependent on one industrial sector, with few other employment 
opportunities. The main sectors in question are coal and metal ore mining, 
heavy engineering, chemicals and textiles. it is primarily these sectors 
which are likely to suffer under economic restructuring, for several 
reasons: they tend to be inefficient and labour-intensive; they are 
expensive to run with low productivity; they are often very heavily 
subsidised, and these subsidies are now being removed; they are 
uncompetitive on a European scale; and, the products are often of a poor 
quality. Frequently, these sectors dominate the industrial employment 
structure, eg. in Czechoslovakia metal-working and machinery industries 
represent 40 percent of all manufacturing employment. 
Second, the break-up of the Warsaw Pact and the removal of Soviet 
control of Central and East European countries will have a "knock-on" 
effect on employment through the loss of certain industries and their 
auxiliaries. The conversion of the armaments industry to civil production 
will cause particular difficulties, as well as in related industries such 
as heavy machinery, chemicals, electronics and metal-working industries. 
Czechoslovakia will be most seriously affected since, until recently, the 
arms trade accounted for half of the country's hard currency earnings, and 
much of the country's other industry was geared to producing subsidiary 
parts eg. rubber, chemicals and steel. The problem is especially severe 
in the Slovak Republic, which recently defied a ban placed by the Czech 
government on the production and export of heavy weapons as it threatened 
over 70,000 Slovak jobs. The abolition of various military bodies and a 
lowering of the number of professional staff in the army will also affect 
employment levels. The inevitable reorientation in trading links away from 
the Soviet Union is estimated to cost certain regions up to 50 percent of 
production, which has obvious implications for employment. 
Third, the restructuring of agriculture is a potential cause of major 
unemployment - a feature that is already making itself apparent as an 
immediate effect of economic reforms eg. in East Germany. In the majority 
of Central and East European countries, the proportion of labour engaged in 
agriculture is very high (by West European standards). Areas in 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern in East Germany still have more than 50 percent of 
the labour force in agriculture, and some Polish regions display similarly 
high levels. The introduction of privatisation, technology and efficiency 
improvements is likely to result in serious job losses for this 
labour-intensive sector. Many agricultural regions are relatively 
backward, and in a free-market situation may become unprofitable. The 
small size of many of the agricultural holdings (eg. in Poland, half of 
the 2.75 million farms are less than five hectares) may also lead to their 
non-viability. This will also have an effect on unemployment. More 
specific analysis is not possible, at this stage, due to the severe lack of 
data concerning this area. 
The pace of economic change, and particularly the rate at which 
different industrial sectors are liberalised, will affect unemployment 
levels and the impact on individual sectors. At present, unemployment 
seems to be having the greatest impact in areas of least industrial/urban 
development, implying that the effects of industrial restructuring have, so 
far, not been substantial. In Poland, for example, the regional 
unemployment rates range from 2-3 percent in Warsaw to 15-18 percent in the 
underdeveloped regions in the east. However, if strict economic reforms 
are adhered to, the effects of restructuring on industrial employment are 
likely to become severe, possibly rising to in excess of 30-50 percent in 
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some industrial areas of Poland. This can already be observed in East 
Germany, the most advanced part of Central and Eastern Europe in terms of 
economic restructuring, where areas dependent on heavy industry such as 
textiles and chemicals are being severely affected by unemployment. 
5.4 Regional Impact 
Unemployment will have differential regional effects in accordance 
with the uneven distribution of economic development across countries and 
regions. As noted in the previous section, the socialist era has led to 
the development of monostructure regions, with a one-sided industrial 
structure concentrated particularly in heavy industry and mining, in a 
limited number of areas within each country. Certain regions are also very 
heavily dependent on agriculture or armaments. These regions will suffer 
disproportionately due to higher levels of employment in "crisis" sectors. 
In East Germany, in the course of unification, it was anticipated that 
the required structural adaptation in East Germany would involve a 
significant level of unemployment, notably in the manufacturing and 
agricultural sectors. In order to reduce the number of job losses, the 
possibility of "short-time working" was introduced in East Germany (as in 
West Germany); enterprises in difficulty may place their employees on 
short-time work. In addition to the short-time work payments, many of the 
wage agreements made after economic union (1 July 1990) contained 
"rationalisation protection" agreements which meant that employees could 
not be made redundant until the end of June 1991. Consequently, the number 
of short-time workers has increased considerably. For the future, it can 
be anticipated that, after the rationalisation protection agreements 
expire, a significant number of short-time workers will be made redundant 
and become unemployed. This is likely to occur even though the regulation 
under "paragraph 63(5)" (introduced during the unification negotiations to 
prevent redundancies for one year after unification) was extended by six 
months. Many enterprises which do not see any improvement in their 
economic or market situation are expected to dismiss unnecessary personnel. 
The under-employment in East Germany, comprising unemployment and 
short-time working, is estimated to have reached 30 percent of the 
economically-active population in February 1991. This involved 787,000 
(8.9 percent of the workforce) and an additional 1.9 million people (21.5 
percent of the civilian labour force) on short-time working. Unemployment 
figures (recorded since January 1990) show a steadily increasing trend for 
all regions. However, many regional differences are evident. Over the 
period May 1990 - July 1991 1990 Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Berlin (East) 
displayed the highest unemployment rates. The new Land of Sachsen 
maintained the lowest unemployment rate for the entire period under review. 
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Table 5.2: Regional unemployment rates in East Germany 
Unemployment Short-time Underutilisation 
rate* working rate+ of labourE 
May Sept Nov. Jan. Nov. Jan. Nov. Jan. 
1990 1990 1990 1991 1990 1991 1990 1991 
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
Meek'burg-Vor. 
Brandenburg 
Sachsen-Anhalt 
Sachsen 
Thueringen 
Belin (East) 
East Germany 
1 .4 
1 .1 
1.1 
-
1 .1 
2.3 
1.1 
6.2 
5.1 
4.7 
4.2 
5.4 
6.1 
5.0 
8.2 
6.8 
6.3 
5.8 
6.8 
8.4 
6.7 
10.9 
8.4 
8.1 
7.6 
8.7 
10.1 
8.6 
16.1 
20.9 
21 .4 
20.6 
21.1 
9.8 
19.4 
18.4 
21 .9 
23.6 
20.9 
23.1 
11.7 
20.9 
16.3 
17.3 
17.0 
16.1 
17.4 
13.3 
16.4 
20.1 
19.4 
19.9 
18.1 
20.3 
16.0 
19.1 
Source: NIW/DIW; European Commission. 
* Registered unemployed as a percentage of the civilian labour force. 
+ On average, working only 50 percent of normal time. 
£ Registered unemployed + 50% of short-time workers as a percentage 
of the civilian labour force. 
In Czechoslovakia the spatial impact of restructuring in heavy 
industry and mining (both coal and metal ore mines) is likely to coincide, 
as the location of heavy industrial plants is often the same as mining 
areas. This will have a singularly great impact on regional unemployment. 
The most major effects will be, firstly, in the Ostrava coal basin 
(northern Moravia) which has coking coal, metal and other heavy industries, 
as well as other minor coal basins where the coal is of considerably poorer 
quality and where mining may be terminated. The following regions may also 
be affected: Kladno (central Bohemia) which is based on metal industries; 
Handlova (central Slovakia) with large power generation and chemical 
industries; and Hodonin (southern Moravia). 
In the north Bohemian coal basin, there is huge extraction of brown 
coal accompanied by power plants, chemical, glass and other industries. In 
this region, the environmental conditions are the worst in the whole 
country. Almost all metal ore mines may be closed also, due to poor 
economic prospects in central Slovakia (districts Banska Bystrica, Ziar nad 
Hronom), and eastern Slovakia (districts Spisska Nova Ves, Rudnany). Other 
areas with heavy industries are Kosice (metal) and Plzen (automobiles -
Skoda works). Serious problems arising from the conversion of the 
armaments industry to civil production will affect central Slovakia (Martin 
and Povazska Bysterica districts) most severely. The effect of the decline 
in armaments production accounts for a significant proportion of the higher 
unemployment in the Slovak Republic relative to the Czech Republic. 
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Table 5.3: Regional unemployment rates in Czechoslovakia 
Unemployment rate 
Region Dec. 1990 Feb.1991 
(%) (%) 
Prague 
C. Bohemia 
S. Bohemia 
W. Bohemia 
N. Bohemia 
E. Bohemia 
S. Moravia 
N. Moravia 
Bratislava 
W. Slovakia 
C. Slovakia 
E. Slovakia 
0.64 
0.66 
0.76 
0.55 
0.65 
0.62 
0.70 
1.18 
0.82 
1.39 
1.35 
2.26 
1.11 
1.34 
1 .41 
1.18 
1.44 
1.22 
1.43 
1.94 
1.78 
3.17 
2.77 
4.28 
Czech Republic 0.75 1.43 
Slovak Republic 1.54 3.18 
Czechoslovakia 1.00 1.99 
Overall, the projected national unemployment rate in Czechoslovakia is 
estimated to be reaching up to ten percent, and the worst situation in the 
country is found in East Slovakia (10,378 unemployed in October 1990 out of 
a national total of 55,900). According to data for December 1990 and 
February 1991 (see Table 5.3), , there is a clear east-west gradient in 
terms of the effect of unemployment from the worst-affected province of 
East Slovakia (where unemployment exceeded four percent) to the Bohemian 
provinces around Prague, where unemployment was around one percent. 
In Hungary, the principal areas of unemployment risk are 
heavy-industry dominated regions on the so-called energy axis running from 
the north-east to the south-west of the country. The North Hungarian heavy 
industrial region is a depressed area, and 'closures and industrial problems 
are expected in certain North and Middle Transdanube regions and in the 
county of Baranya. The counties of Borsod-Abauj-Zemplen, Nograd and 
Komarom Esztergom, previously prosperous areas having a large proportion of 
the mining and metallurgy jobs, have lost their main economic base, with 
corresponding effects on employment. Hungary is making some attempt to 
counteract the effects of unemployment in these sectors, and innovation 
parks have been set up in the capitals of the counties of Csongrad, Hajdu 
and Borsod-Abauj-Zemplen in an attempt to stimulate new industry and 
technology. Budapest, as the capital, is also being promoted as a major 
innovation and R & D centre. 
The national Hungarian unemployment rate is estimated to be about two 
percent, but is increasing steadily. In July 1990 the most serious 
unemployment situation was found in Borsod-Abauj-Zemplen and 
Szabolcs-Szatmar, and unemployment worsened between July and September 1990 
in the counties of Baranya, Bekes, Pest and Szolnok. 
The national unemployment rate in Poland is estimated at around 10-12 
percent. Upper Silesia, the largest industrial- urban agglomeration in 
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Poland (and also in Central and Eastern Europe as a whole), is likely to be 
the worst region affected. The region's industrial employment structure is 
dominated by the high risk sectors of mining and heavy engineering (coal, 
ferrous and non-ferrous metal ores, and engineering). It is considered 
highly inefficient, with a 15-20 year technological lag compared to West 
European counterparts, which creates problems in becoming competitive on a 
European scale. Other problem areas are again within the high risk 
sectors: mining in the Old Polish Basin and in the Sudetes; iron and 
steel mills in Warsaw and Cracow; metal and machine-tool industries in 
large towns in western Poland; and the textile industry in Lodz and 
Bielsko-Biala. 
Yugoslavia and Bulgaria display a more balanced spread of industry, 
and thus the regional impact of industrial closure and restructuring, and 
the consequent effects on unemployment, are likely to be more evenly 
distributed. Bulgaria has an estimated national unemployment rate of about 
five percent. New and expanding centres of industry on the Black Sea Coast 
(Varna-Devnya, Burgas-Kameno and the Dimitrov shipping complex) and in the 
Danube area may, however, provide alternative employment opportunities to 
absorb some of the redundancies from other sectors. Most of the industrial 
potential lies within the central part of the country, and it is, 
therefore, likely that the majority of job losses will be experienced in 
this area; at the same time, it may' hold the greatest potential for the 
redevelopment of industry and thus new employment opportunities. 
The national unemployment rate in Yugoslavia was at least 14 percent 
in 1988 and may now be as high as 16 percent. The dispersed pattern of 
industrial development and the more autonomous nature of the regions, means 
that the regional effect of industrial restructuring and unemployment may 
not be as marked. 
Table 5.4: Regional unemployment rates in Yugoslavia 
Region 
Bosnia-Hercegovina 
Montenegro 
Croatia 
Macedonia 
Slovenia 
Serbia 
- Serbia Proper 
- Kosovo 
- Vojvodina 
Yugoslavia 
Unemployment rate 
(1988) 
19.2 
20.6 
7.7 
20.9 
2.4 
17.0 
14.0 
(%) 
15.2 
36.0 
12.3 
According to 1988 statistics, unemployment is most serious in Kosovo, 
Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia-Hercegovina, with rates at around 20 
percent. In the course of major industrial restructuring, the northern 
industrialised republics may be badly affected, especially Bosnia 
(Zenica-Vares) and Slovenia (Ljubljana), although heavy industrial sectors 
are spread relatively evenly throughout the country at Zenica (Bosnia), 
Sisak and Rijeka (Croatia), Jesenice (Slovenia), Smederevo (Serbia), Niksic 
(Montenegro) and Skopje (Macedonia). There is also a relatively high 
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proportion of skilled unemployment, indicating significant mismatches 
between labour demand and supply on both a geographical.and professional 
basis. 
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CHAPTER 6 : 
OUTPUT, INCOME AND PRODUCTIVITY 
6.1 Introduction 
Of all the issues being examined in this regional statistical 
analysis, output, income and productivity are the most difficult to assess. 
Problems of data availability and comparability are very considerable even 
at the national level. Computational methods and assessments vary between 
the national and CMEA calculations undertaken in Central and Eastern 
Europe, and the methodologies used by Western organisations such as the 
United Nations, research institutes such as the WIIW and DIW, and 
intelligence bodies such as the CIA. At the regional level, the potential 
for meaningful international comparison is still more limited. 
This section examines the available data on output, income and 
productivity in Central and Eastern Europe. It first addresses the 
problems of data comparability, the availability of output data and 
estimates, and the validity of various computational methods. The section 
then assesses the rank order of Central and East European countries 
according to GDP and recent trends in output. Finally, the section reviews 
the availability of data on GNP (or industrial production) at the regional 
level in the various countries and indicates the major regional differences 
in productivity within individual countries. 
6.2 Problems of data comparability 
International comparisons of the level of real incomes have gained an 
importance which extends beyond academic interest. Financial contributions 
to international organizations, preferential customs duties, access to soft 
term credits, and other preferential conditions in international relations 
have traditionally been dependent upon the economic strength of nations. 
Currently, an appropriate assessment of the economic development level of 
the former Eastern Bloc countries is also required for the assessment of 
potential Western help, and for estimating the time period required by 
these countries for closing the gap with the West. This is not a new 
problem. A pioneering study comparing GDP levels in Western Europe and the 
USA was inspired by needs of international organizations (OECD, at that 
time OEEC, coordinating the Marshall Plan - see Gilbert and Kravis (1954)), 
and by practical problems with assessing the contributions of member and 
associated states. The conflicting interests of individual governments are 
not only ideological but also involve substantial sums of money. Given 
this variety in economic and political interests (in addition to 
methodological and conceptual problems) it is not surprising that a 
uniformly accepted comparison approach has, hitherto, been neither 
developed nor applied in East-West comparative economic studies. 
Although there is a fairly standard point of reference today in the 
form of the methodology elaborated within the UN-sponsored International 
Comparison Project (ICP), the unequivocally accepted data on comparative 
economic levels between market economies of the West (MEs) and the 
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centrally planned economies (CPEs) of Central and Eastern Europe and the 
USSR are still lacking. Such levels can only be identified through various 
statistical proxies which approximate, to a degree, the intended measures. 
The lack of reliable information results from a mix of factors - political 
differences, methodological variations, and differences in the coverage 
between statistical systems. The problems are further aggravated by the 
differences in socio-economic systems and in understanding what is 
considered as output. In MEs, everything with a market price, as well as 
various non-market services (eg. government), are treated as output; in 
the CPEs, only the production of tangible goods (and services related to 
the production of goods) enter the national income statistics. Further, 
prices in CPEs are mostly fixed artificially and bear little relation to 
costs and scarcities. 
The statistical information generally published by the CPEs suffers 
from various inadequacies regarding the quantity and reliability of 
available data. Reporting bias may result both from national interests and 
from specific interests of the statistical reporting units. At the 
national level, most CPEs presented incomes which, until very recently, 
tended to exaggerate the true position. However, a desire to obtain 
favourable credit conditions from international financial institutions has 
also led some CPEs to present their real incomes as low as possible. The 
discussions connected with the applications from Hungary, Poland and 
Romania for membership of the World Bank and IMF at the beginning of 1980s 
illustrate this latter point. At the level of statistical reporting units 
(enterprises), it can be observed that CPE enterprises often tended to 
over-report the main plan target (eg. gross output, or net output) in 
order to gain premia for plan-fulfillment. By contrast, in MEs there is a 
tendency to under-report profits in order to avoid taxation. 
6.3 The availability of GDP data (in national currencies) for 
centrally-planned economies (CPEs) 
The commonly used statistical measures of the level of economic 
activity differs between East and West. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
measure (the value of final goods and services produced in a country in a 
certain period) has not been published, until very recently, by CPEs which 
generally used an indicator of Net Material Product (NMP) for similar 
purposes. The NMP concept is based on Marxian perception of value and 
productivity and, as such, is narrowly defined since it includes the value 
of goods and services produced only by the so-called "productive sectors" 
of the economy, ie. a large part of services is excluded from the NMP. 
Moreover, the NMP is net of depreciations. Since parts of the GDP and NMP 
overlap (eg. some "final consumption of non-productive sectors"), the 
conversion of GDP into NMP and vice versa is not straightforward. Such 
methodological differences between GDP and NMP are well documented (eg. 
Comparisons of the System (1981)), and individual attempts to recalculate 
GDP into NMP and vice versa have been undertaken (United Nations (1981), 
Havlik and Levcik (1985)). However, the conversion from NMP to GDP is by 
no means easy since the necessary data are not generally available. 
Experience shows that the GDP may be as much as 10-50 percent higher than 
the corresponding NMP - the difference being greater in countries with 
higher incomes (and with a more developed service sector). The difference 
is also growing over time and may vary depending on the rules for 
establishing the depreciation charges. The diverging coverage of both 
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indicators has, of course, an impact not only on absolute levels but on 
growth rates as well. The available data on GDP/GNP in national currencies 
are listed in the Table 6.1 below. 
Most countries of the former Eastern Bloc - now undergoing a 
transition from command to market economy - plan to switch to the system of 
statistical reporting which would correspond to internationally 
standardized System of National Accounts (SNA). East European participants 
at the recent Conference on Statistics of Central and Eastern European 
Countries (Paris, 10-12 September 1990), organized jointly by the OECD and 
the UN Economic Commission for Europe, declared the switch to the SNA 
system one of their statistical priorities. Clearly, the technical 
prerequisities for such a switch differ in each country of the region: 
Hungary has already probably achieved the standard of OECD countries, 
whereas Bulgaria and Romania have yet to solve numerous conceptual and 
technical problems. The introduction of the SNA in Czechoslovakia could 
proceed without great problems given the substantial amount of conceptual 
work already done. However, the problems of transition, even in the field 
of statistical reporting, cannot be underestimated: in East Germany, it 
will take at least two years before statistical systems are united and 
comparable with those of West Germany. 
6.4 Convertibility problems 
The pure conversion of NMP into GDP in the national currency of an 
individual country unfortunately does not solve the problem of 
international comparisons of real income levels since the conversion of GDP 
(in national currency) into some common unit (eg. US dollars) is a more 
difficult task. The problem of international GDP (productivity, income, 
etc.) comparisons may be reduced to a considerable degree by a proper 
convertor from national currency into some common unit. It can be assumed 
that ordinary exchange rates (ERs) do not serve such purposes well, even in 
MEs, since they do not reflect the real purchasing power parities (PPPs) of 
national currencies. This applies even more to deliberately-set exchange 
rates among countries with non-convertible currencies (ie. all CPEs), and 
with respect to countries with multiple exchange rate systems (until 1990 
all former socialist countries except Hungary and Poland). 
Research into the problems of PPPs shows that, apart from perhaps 
speculative reasons which may have played a role in recent sharp 
fluctuations of the dollar exchange rate with respect to other major 
Western currencies, other "purely economic" factors may have come into play 
as well. Differences in productivity between high- and low-income 
countries in tradeable and non-tradeable goods as well as economic policy 
reasons (eg. interest and budgetary policies, efforts to promote tourism 
or exports, etc) may be just as important. Naturally, in the case of the 
former CPEs, market criteria play a much smaller role in establishing their 
official exchange rates, and such exchange rates are often suited neither 
to securing a balanced current account nor to reflecting purchasing power 
parities: this finds its ultimate appropriate reflection in the 
non-convertibility of the currencies of CPEs (Havlik (1990). The 
establishment of proxy exchange rates for CPE currencies thus forms the 
most serious bottleneck in undertaking East-West GDP comparisons. 
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Table 6.1 : Gross Domestic Product - National Data 
A: Gross Domestic Product 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
25.5 26.9 28.3 29.4 
billion 
677.0 694.7 711.1 740.0 
bill.of 
Bulgaria 
(NMP, at curr.prices, 
in 
CSFR 
(GDP, at market prices, 
in 
GDR 
(GDP, at effective prices, 311.8 321.9 332.8 346.1 
in billion 
Hungary 
(GDP, at curr.prices, 1033.7 1088.8 1226.4 1409.5 
in billion 
Poland 
(GDP, at curr.prices, 10444.8 12953.0 16939.9 29628.7 
in billion 
Romania 
(GNP, at curr. prices, 823.2 854.3 
in billion 
Yugoslavia 
(GDP, at market prices, 11951.3 23399.8 52339.7 158328.3 
in bill. 
30.0 
Leva) 
754.8 
curr.Kcs) 
353.3 
Mark) 
1706.0 
Forint) 
119107.4 
Zloty) 
793.7 
Lei) 
Dinar) 
Β: Population in (thousands persons) 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Bulgaria 
CSFR 
GDR 
Hungary 
Poland 
Romania 
Yugoslavia 
8950 
15519 
16655 
10640 
37341 
22725 
23124 
8967 
15553 
16640 
10621 
37572 
22824 
23274 
8976 
15587 
16661 
10604 
37764 
22940 
23417 
8987 
15625 
16675 
10589 
37775 
23112 
23566 
8993 
15651 
16434 
10568 
37931 
23152 
23690 
1985 
Employed Persons (in thousands) 
1986 1987 1988 1989 
Bulgaria 
CSFR 
GDR 
Hungary 
Poland 
Romania 
Yugoslavia 
4095 
6892 
7552 
3939 
11674 
7661 
6516 
4076 
6962 
7559 
3939 
11769 
7752 
6716 
4108 
7001 
7566 
3963 
11756 
7790 
6866 
4078 
7035 
7587 
3931 
11632 
7843 
6884 
4061 
7022 
7544 
3941 
11446 
7965 
6876 
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Table 6.1 (continued) 
D: Gross Domestic Product per capita 
(thousands of national currency, current prices) 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Bulgaria (NMP) 2.849 3.000 3.153 3.271 3.336 
CSFR 43.624 44.667 45.621 47.360 48.227 
GDR 18.721 19.345 19.975 20.756 21.498 
Hungary 97.152 102.514 115.654 133.110 161.431 
Poland 279.714 344.751 448.573 784.347 3140.107 
Romania (GNP) . . 35.885 36.963 34.282 
Yugoslavia 516.835 1005.405 2235.116 6718.505 
Sources: National statistical yearbooks and the IMF. 
E: Gross Domestic Product per employed Person 
(thousands of national currency, current prices) 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Bulgaria (NMP) 6.227 6.600 6.889 7.209 7.387 
CSFR 
GDR 
Hungary 
Poland 
Romania (GNP) 
Yugoslavia 1834.147 3484.187 7623.027 22999 
Sources: National statistical yearbooks and the IMF. 
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41 
262, 
894 
.230 
.287 
.427 
.706 
. 
99, 
42, 
276, 
1100, 
,785 
.585 
.415 
.603 
, 
101.571 
43.986 
309.463 
1440.958 
105.674 
105, 
45, 
358, 
2547, 
108, 
,188 
,618 
,560 
,172 
,925 
107.491 
46.832 
432.885 
10406.028 
99.648 
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Table.6.2 : GDP of Central and Eastern European countries 
(Relative ranking according to ppp-based GDP per capita 
in current international dollars, geometric averages)*/ 
Country 
USA 
GDP in 
1975 
$ 
6324 
% EC12 
average 
141 
Central and Eastern Europe 
Bulgaria 
Czechoslovakia 
G.D.R. 
Hungary 
Poland 
Romania 
Yugoslavia 
Soviet Union 
3167 
4048 
4258 
3610 
3233 
2739 
2675 
3485 
European Community 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
F.R.G. 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
United Kingdom 
Other OECD 
Australia 
Austria 
Canada 
Finland 
Japan 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Turkey 
Other 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Egypt 
India 
Israel 
South Korea 
5262 
5054 
4732 
4875 
3167 
4100 
3953 
5066 
2889 
3783 
5026 
5552 
4705 
5882 
5085 
4290 
5423 
5021 
5448 
4768 
1684 
3200 
2034 
1343 
709 
3973 
1710 
70 
90 
95 
80 
72 
61 
60 
78 
117 
112 
105 
108 
70 
91 
88 
113 
64 
84 
112 
124 
105 
131 
113 
95 
121 
112 
121 
106 
37 
71 
45 
30 
16 
88 
38 
GDP in '■ 
1980 ¡ 
$ 
10018 
5535 
6588 
7050 
5881 
5241 
4623 
4555 
5847 
8576 
8244 
8065 
8137 
5496 
6830 
6604 
8196 
4910 
6418 
8060 
8990 
7853 
9437 
8289 
7369 
8161 
8346 
8705 
7880 
2693 
5142 
3554 
2266 
1140 
6369 
3429 
ECU 
7202 
3979 
4736 
5068 
4228 
3768 
3324 
3275 
4203 
6165 
5927 
5798 
5850 
3951 
4910 
4748 
5892 
3530 
4614 
5794 
6463 
5646 
6784 
5959 
5298 
5867 
6000 
6258 
5665 
1936 
3697 
2555 
1629 
820 
4579 
2465 
fe EC12 
iver. 
134 
74 
88 
95 
79 
70 
62 
61 
78 
115 
111 
108 
109 
74 
92 
89 
110 
66 
86 
108 
121 
105 
127 
111 
99 
109 
112 
117 
106 
36 
69 
48 
30 
15 
85 
46 
GDP in % 
1985 
$ 
12870 
7474 
8153 
8993 
7431 
6441 
5852 
6022 
7328 
10422 
10585 
10552 
10411 
7332 
8403 
8822 
10443 
6247 
8082 
10312 
11245 
10682 
12006 
11226 
9767 
10405 
11144 
11602 
10641 
3151 
6170 
4398 
2852 
860 
8256 
4919 
EC12 
aver.* 
Ecu 
16890 
9808 
10699 
11802 
9752 
8453 
7680 
7903 
9617 
13677 
13891 
13848 
13663 
9622 
11028 
11577 
13705 
8198 
10606 
13533 
14757 
14018 
15756 
14732 
12818 
13655 
14625 
15226 
13965 
4135 
8097 
5772 
3743 
1129 
10835 
6455 
134 
78 
85 
94 
77 
67 
61 
63 
76 
108 
110 
110 
108 
76 
87 
92 
109 
65 
84 
107 
117 
111 
125 
117 
102 
108 
116 
121 
111 
33 
64 
46 
30 
9 
86 
51 
Source: WIIW 
* Calculated as simple geometric averages from partial estimates of economic 
development based on 27 indicators in 1975, 30 in 1980 and 27 in 1985. 
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6.5 Assessment of national positions 
Taking into account the fact that every comparison of this kind is 
prone to a degree of uncertainty, perhaps the most attractive option for 
assessing internationally comparable income levels is the Physical 
Indicators Global (PIG) method; it involves relatively modest costs and 
can be applied (to all CPEs uniformly) without close cooperation with CPE 
statistical offices. The PIG approach, originally devised by Hungarian 
scholars (Ehrlich, 1966), was based on an intuitive notion of a 
relationship between various physical indicators and the level of per 
capita GDP in MEs. Assuming that the level of income is sufficiently 
represented by the GDP per capita in US dollars, the relationships between 
GDP and selected physical indicators can be established for countries for 
which both sets of data are available. On the basis that the estimated 
functions adequately model the actual relationships between GDPs and 
individual physical indicators within the core sample, aggregate partial 
GDP estimates can be aggregated in order to obtain global GDP estimates for 
the core sample countries. 
However, for the time being, it has to be accepted that there is 
reliable evidence only for the ranking of GDP per capita in Central and 
East European countries. Under this· approach, the former GDR is in the 
leading position, followed by Czechoslovakia, and then by a group 
comprising Hungary and Bulgaria; at the bottom of the list are Yugoslavia 
and Romania. A further conclusion that can be made is that the disparities 
in GDP per capita in Central and East European countries are similar to 
those between the countries of the European Community. The ratio between 
the highest and lowest GDP per capita country in the EC (Luxembourg and 
Greece) was 2.37 in 1989; the same ratio for Central and East European 
countries (East Germany and Romania) amounted to 2.81 (according to the CIA 
estimate) and, according to Havlik estimates to 1.62 (calculated from data 
in Table 6.2). 
The national GDP position for the various Central and East European 
countries is, therefore, impossible to verify with certainty at the present 
time. It has to be accepted that there are no uniformly accepted data 
regarding comparable GDP levels with respect to Western countries. A 
crucial problem is whether, for example, the Polish GDP per capita level 
amounted either to 21 or 45 percent of the US level in 1989. As with many 
similar questions, the truth may be somewhere in between. 
6.6 Recent trends 
As with the national output position, establishing recent trends is 
fraught with difficulties. CMEA figures suggest that the annual average 
growth rate for Central and Eastern Europe was 2.5 percent for the period 
1981-1988, ranging from 4-5 percent in Romania, the GDR and Bulgaria, 1-2 
percent in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and less than one percent in Poland 
and Yugoslavia. However, according to Bulgarian national data, the CMEA 
figure for Bulgaria (3.9 percent) represents a considerable under-estimate 
from the national official statistics (5.3 percent). By contrast, the CHEA 
figure for Czechoslovakia (2 percent) over-estimates the national statistic 
(1.7 percent). 
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Aside from data inconsistencies, the process of economic restructuring 
means that historical output statistics are of limited value. It is 
perhaps useful, therefore, to limit the discussion of recent trends to 
contemporary developments. During 1990, the general picture was one of 
declining output and industrial production; the Central and East European 
countries averaged a decline in output of -12 percent and a fall in 
industrial production of -16 percent (see Table 6.3). The impact was 
greatest in East Germany where the figures for output and industrial 
production were -29 and -22 percent respectively, but Poland, Romania and 
Bulgaria were also affected by severe recession conditions. Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia were least affected, although growth rate figures for both 
countries were also negative. 
The decline appeared to be intensifying in the course of 1990. In the 
third quarter of the year, most Central and East European countries 
reported a stronger decline in industrial production than in the first half 
of 1990. The exceptions are Poland, recording a slight recovery after a 
steep decline in the first part of the year, and Yugoslavia, where 
stagnation was reported. 
Table 6.3: Recent trends in output and industrial production 
estimated 
Bulgaria 
Czechoslovakia 
East Germany 
Hungary 
Poland 
Romania 
Yugoslavia 
annual growth rates 
Industry 
(%) 
- 13 
- 4 
- 29 
- 5 
- 23 
- 20 
- 6 
for 1990 
GDP 
(%) 
- 12 
- 3 
- 22 
- 5 
- 12 
- 10 
- 10 
Source: National statistics; WIIW estimates, 
6.7 Future Prospects 
The prospects for the Central East European economies in 1991 depend 
mainly on the type of recession (a more or less deep recession seems to be 
inevitable during the first stages of transition from the command to a 
market economy). Where there is a recession by "adjustment" the potential 
for growth in a former command economy may recover fastest. Thus, for East 
Germany a slight recovery in industry as early as the second half of 1991 
can be expected, but stagnation on a yearly basis. For Poland, prospects 
depend on the decisions taken by the new government. If economic policies 
promote structural change, a recovery in the second half of 1991 is 
possible, but if policies are limited to bringing inflation under control, 
a further decline of production is likely. 
The other countries, which have yet to launch the transition process, 
have to expect a further strong decline of production in 1991. An 
acceleration of the decline must be anticipated first of all in 
Czechoslovakia, where, for 1991, the CSFR officially expects a 10 percent 
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decrease of GDP and an inflation rate of at least 30 percent, although this 
prognosis may turn out to be too optimistic. Additional sources of decline 
will be created by the collapse of the CMEA, by higher oil prices, the 
slow-down in the world economy, and higher interest rates on international 
financial markets. The recession will diminish the chances to earn cash by 
exports to be utilised for higher interest payments - this will put a 
burden especially on Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria. If there are no 
possibilities of refinancing, higher interest rates and a higher oil price 
will reduce the growth potential. Lastly, the recession will most likely 
deepen unless political and national unrest in some countries (eg. 
Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania) can be contained. 
6.8 Regional trends 
The data problems for establishing output and productivity figures at 
the national level are compounded at the regional level by the absence, 
inadequacy and lack of comparability of data. For this study, little 
regional product data comparable to other Net Material Product or GDP 
indicators are available. Consequently, the regional level of analysis is 
dependent on output or production statistics. 
The difficulties regarding data are well illustrated by the situation 
in Poland. The regional level statistics suffer from the general 
déficiences of the Polish statistical system: greater stress is placed on 
inputs than outputs; much detailed data is expressed in physical units 
with few synthetic measures; data on flows and relativities are limited; 
certain statistical categories appropriate for market economies have 
hitherto been absent; the availability of time-series is limited due to 
frequent changes in classification and the real contents of particular 
variables; and statistical services are poorly computerised, which limits 
retrieval and access. 
Regional statistics suffer from all these déficiences plus some 
additional specific features: the existing sample surveys do not have a 
regional component due to the limited sample sizes; regional statistics 
are not completed in long time series due to frequent changes in the 
administrative divisions (see Chapter 2: Territorial Structures), and the 
statistical information prior to the current territorial structure consists 
of estimates and recomputations; the monetary synthetic categories 
(national income, consumption, productivity etc) are completed in long time 
intervals (traditionally every five years, but for the new administrative 
division, only two surveys were conducted, for 1976 and 1986, and no 
decisions have yet been made for the anticipated survey in 1991); and 
regional statistics are published much later than national statistics eg. 
the regional yearbook with data for 1989 is being published only in 1991. 
These methodological problems are typical of other former CMEA 
countries. Nevertheless, in Poland, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, it has been 
possible to derive output figures by region and for a range of sectors eg. 
industry, construction, agriculture, forestry, transport, communications 
and trade. The regional output figures for Poland are dominated by the big 
agglomerations, notably Upper Silesia - the traditional "heart" of Polish 
industrial output. For the most part, this pattern has remained unchanged 
since the early part of the 20th century; socialist industrialisation has 
tended to strengthen 19th century capitalist spatial investment patterns, 
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despite the creation of many new "counter-balancing" centres in the 1960s 
and 1970s. Thus, the 10 voivodships with the highest industrial output are 
(in descending order): Katowice, Waraw, Lodz, Gdansk, Krakow, Plock, 
Poznan, Wroclaw, Bielska-Biala and Opole. Between them, these centres 
account for 56 percent of Poland's total industrial production (1988, in 
current prices). It is in these areas that the fall in output noted above 
is having the greatest impact. 
The regional distribution of the Polish private sector, which is 
experiencing, a growth in output (according to WIIW figures), is also 
dominated by the bigger cities - mainly in Warsaw but also in Poznan, 
Gdansk, Lodz and, to a lesser extent, in Upper Silesia. The development of 
the private sector is taking place not only within the conurbations 
themselves but also in "rings" around the agglomerations. 
Regional gross social product data for Bulgaria indicates a more even 
distribution of output. Seven of the country's nine regions each has a 
share of national gross product of between 10 and 15 percent, the 
exceptions being Mihaylovgrad (6.4 percent) and Razgrad (8.7 percent). As 
in Poland, the distribution of output is closely associated with 
urban-industrial agglomerations. The city of Sofia and its surrounding 
region, for example, account for more than one-quarter of national gross 
product. During the 1980s the concentration of output appears to have 
increased. Increases of 1-2 percentage points in the share of national 
output were recorded by Sofia, Haskovo and Plovdiv (where high-tech 
industries such as electronic industry facilities are located) at the 
expense of Bourgas in particular. 
The regional disaggregation of output for Yugoslavia is dominated by 
the republics of Serbia and Croatia. With social product shares of 38 and 
26 percent respectively, they account together for almost two-thirds of 
Yugloslav economic output. Slovenia and Bosnia & Hercegovina have a 
further 30 percent, leaving Macedonia and Montenegro with only six and 
eight percent respectively. Serbia dominates in all regional sectors for 
which data is available, with the exception of forestry, catering and 
arts/crafts, where Croatia has greater output shares. The output dominance 
of the Serbian and Croatian republics has been reinforced during the late 
1980s. While other republics have been experiencing significant annual 
reductions in output (eg. -4.4 percent· in Montenegro in 1987; -3.2 
percent in Macedonia in 1988), Serbia and Macedonia have recorded decreases 
of around one percent or less. 
Analysis of regional output trends and patterns in East Germany, 
Hungary and Romania is reliant on data for industrial production. In Kast 
Germany, there has been no regional subdivision of the national accounts of 
the former GDR to district level, nor is it possible to subdivide the 
"model accounts" produced by western research institutes (such as the DIW) 
into districts. Thus, it is only possible to provide a crude outline of 
calculations at the regional level. 
Despite evaluation difficulties, industry was certainly the sector 
with the highest performance. Thus districts with high industrial 
composition were at the top of the national list. Indicators of the 
regional industrial composition showed a north-south divide: the more 
agricultural northern districts against the industrialised southern 
districts. 
Two criteria can be used to determine the industrial composition: the 
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number· of industrially employed and industrial production. Both criteria 
show a similar sequence for the 15 districts; the main difference is the 
position of the district of Frankfurt. According to the number of 
industrially employed this district is at the bottom of the list, while 
holding a position in the middle based on industrial production. 
Using the respective percentage of the population and the total number 
of persons working as a basis, the industrial composition can be explained 
with the deviation of these rates from the total percentage of persons 
working and of total production in industry. The 15 districts can be 
roughly subdivided into three categories: 
- districts with below average industrial strength: 
Berlin, Rostock, Schwerin, Neubrandenburg, Potsdam. 
- districts with average industrial strength: 
Cottbus, Magdeburg, Erfurt, Gera, Suhl, Dresden, 
Leipzig. 
- districts with above average industrial strength: 
Frankfurt, Halle, Chemnitz. 
This gives an approximate picture of certain regional structures in 
East Germany. Districts with an industrial composition or strength below 
average include, firstly, Berlin (East). Although Berlin is a traditional 
industrial location, its role as the capital and seat of many science and 
administration centres has always left its mark on the employment structure 
of this region. The other districts with an industrial composition below 
average are in the north. They are more thinly populated than the average 
with an above average proportion of agriculture. The sectoral structure of 
industry shows some typical features: the chemical industry has below 
average representation, while the food and consumer goods industries are 
strongly represented. Despite a common basis, there are marked deviations 
even in this group of districts. Of particular note is the district of 
Potsdam with a very high proportion of the metal goods industrial sector. 
The districts with average industrial composition are the traditional 
industrial regions in the south, which because of their great weight within 
the entire industry also influence the overall average. Typical of these 
regions is a diverse industrial structure based on mechanical and vehicle 
engineering; in addition Thueringen is the traditional location for 
electrical engineering and the precision engineering and optics sector. 
Some of the regions in this group also have a considerable chemical 
industry. The district of Cottbus is a special case. Its strong 
industrial composition is based exclusively on the concentrated sector of 
energy and fuel (brown coal mining and generation of electricity). Thus, 
this district shows more signs of belonging to the following group of 
regions. 
The districts with an above-average industrial make-up stand out from 
the other groups because of special growth points. These include Halle and 
Chemnitz, as well as Frankfurt. Frankfurt and Halle are centres for the 
chemical industry. Both, especially Frankfurt, also have strong metal 
goods sectors. Judging from its structure, Chemnitz belongs more to the 
traditional industrial districts, but has a very strong focus on light 
industry. 
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The classification of certain types of areas shows that even the 
fifteen former districts were never homogeneous. The same is also true for 
the new East German Laender. The greatest homogeneity is found in 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern; this Land consists of agricultural districts 
(Rostock, Schwerin, Neubrandenburg) with an industrial composition that is 
below average. In Brandenburg, Potsdam is an agriculturally structured 
district, and its other districts are the "special cases" with a strong 
industrial focus (Frankfurt: chemicals and metals; Cottbus: energy). 
Sachsen-Anhalt combines Magdeburg (average industrial composition) and 
Halle (focus on chemicals and metals). In Thueringen, Erfurt, Gera and 
Suhl form part of the traditional industrial locations of the south; this 
is even more true for Sachsen (Dresden, Leipzig, Chemnitz). 
For the new Laender, an approximate estimate of the social product is 
possible. It shows in principle the characteristics outlined above. The 
north has a larger percentage of the population and working persons than of 
gross national product, whereas in the middle and in the south - with the 
exception of Thueringen - the reverse is the case. 
It should be noted that all structural data essentially reflect the 
past in the former GDR. What chances the GDR economy has against 
international competition is so far not even vaguely recognisable. The old 
industrial structure is in many parts only a "symbol" for the policy of 
self-sufficiency pursued in the former GDR. Structural changes have taken 
place on far too small a scale; there are generally too many old, 
inefficient and pollution-causing production growth points. For this 
reason, the sector will be faced with drastic decline and structural 
changes. This will variously affect the large industrial sectors and, to a 
greater extent, the different sub-sectors. Depending on industrial growth 
points and sectors, the ranking of the districts and Laender might change 
in the future. 
In both Hungary and Romania, the regional distribution is 
significantly dominated by the capital cities of both countries. In 
Hungary, Budapest accounted for 24 percent of industrial production in 
1987; this increases to one-third if the surrounding county of Pest is 
included. The industrial production statistics reinforce the significance 
of the north-east/south- west "energy axis" which has been referred to 
elsewhere; a further quarter of industrial production is contained within 
four northern counties - Borsod-Abauj-Zemplen, Fejer, Csongrad, and 
Gyor-Sopron - where there is considerable export-oriented industry such as 
machine-engineering and chemicals. Along with the capital, these are also 
areas where contemporary industrial development and innovation is 
concentrated. By contrast, many of the southern counties eg. Bekes, 
Somogy, Vas and Zala, have less than three percent of national industrial 
production. 
The dominance of the capital city is less marked in Romania -
Bucharest accounts for 13 percent of Romanian industrial product value. 
However, this represents a considerable concentration when compared to the 
shares of the next most important counties: Prahova (seven percent) and 
Galati (5.2 percent). In spatial terms, the regional distribution of 
industrial product value is a core-periphery pattern. A row of counties in 
the centre of the country - Timis-Hunedoara-Sibiu- Brasov-Prahova-Bucharest 
- are historically and currently the most developed zones of the country. 
Although there are several regions, such as Timis and Bacau, which contain 
major industrial areas, the peripheral counties have a relatively weak 
level of industrialisation, especially counties adjoining the northern and 
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southern borders of the country. 
Finally, for Czechoslovakia, the potential for regional analysis is 
extremely limited. Some indication of regional output can be provided by 
using the NMP ratios between the Czech and Slovak republics, but no 
statistical data is available for the regional NMP, and no reliable 
estimates have been obtained for the provinces. In considering" the 
republic ratios, it should be noted that the sum of the totals for the 
Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic is lower than the total for 
Czechoslovakia as a whole. This highlights the situation that the product 
of foreign trade (considered a "material product") is included in the data 
for Czechoslovakia, but not for the national republics. Thus, the share of 
the Czech Republic or the Slovak Republic in the total economic capacity of 
Czechoslovakia cannot be calculated by a simple division of the data 
recorded for the national republics by the data for the country as a whole. 
However, the relative ratio of both republics may be illustrated by a 
comparison of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic in the generated 
NMP and that of their populations. 
Ratio CR : SR 
1948 1960 1970 1980 1988 
NMP 
Population 
NMP : Population 
4.2:1 
2.6:1 
1.6:1 
3.3:1 
2.4:1 
1.4:1 
2.8:1 
2.2:1 
1.17:1 
2.4:1 
2.1:1 
1 .17:1 
2.3:1 
2.0:1 
1.16:1 
The data clearly indicates a considerably higher growth of NMP, and a 
simultaneously higher growth of population, in Slovakia. The per capita 
product was about 60 percent higher in the Czech Republic than in the 
Slovak Republic in 1948, but the difference is declining - to only 16-17 
percent in the 1980s. 
Up to 1988, a dominant part of industrial production was concentrated 
in the centrally-planned so-called "national enterprises" (92.1 percent of 
total employment in manufacturing). A considerably lower part (7.9 percent 
of employment) was represented by "local industries", subordinated to local 
governments of province, district or town, or by cooperative industries. 
The private sector, with very rare exceptions, did not exist. The most 
industrial provinces are Northern Moravia (mining of coking coal, 
metallurgy and related industries) and Northern Bohemia (the dominant coal 
power stations and chemical plants in the western part of the province). 
6.9 Productivity 
In summarising regional patterns of output among the Central and East 
European countries, it is useful to consider the disparities in 
productivity inasfar as the data permits. In Table 6.5 and Figure 6.1, the 
nearest available data for output and employment have been combined to 
produce indices of output per employed person. For each country, the 
national output per employed person equals 100. Therefore disparities 
relate to regional differences within not between countries. Also, the 
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output and employment data are based on different national definitions and 
relate to different years. Consequently, the comparisons of productivity 
have to be approached with caution, although the data provide some 
indication of the relative magnitudes between countries. 
Overall, the most dramatic disparities in productivity are in Romania 
and East Germany with a regional difference of 151 and 130 respectively 
between those regions with the highest and lowest productivity index 
values. Regional differences in index values also exceed 100 in three 
other countries - Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. Only in Bulgaria and 
Yugoslavia are the differences minor, although this is partly determined by 
the small number of regions (six and nine respectively) in these countries 
- compared to 40-50 regions in Poland and Romania. 
In most countries, the highest productivity values are in the capital 
cities or the surrounding regions. This applies to: 
East Germany (where the highest productivity value is in the 
Frankfurt district east of Berlin); 
Czechoslovakia (Bratislava and the region of Central Bohemia 
surrounding Prague); 
Poland (Warsaw and the adjoining voivodships of Plockie and 
Radomskie); 
Hungary (the county of Fejer, west of Budapest); and 
Romania (the regions of Prahova, Brasov and Arges to the north and 
west of Bucharest). 
In Bulgaria, the large size of the regions means that detailed patterns of 
productivity are masked, but the highest productivity values are in the 
capital region, Sofia as well as Lovech and Bourgas. In Yugoslavia, 
Slovenia has the highest productivity value, followed by Croatia. All 
other regions have values lower than the national average. 
In some countries, the output per employee values correspond to the 
level of industrial employment and output. Thus, in Hungary the higher 
productivity regions are the more industrialised, northern parts of the 
country. The same applies to Slovenia in Yugoslavia and, to a certain 
extent, in Bulgaria. However, in other countries, the heavily 
industrialised regions appear to have very low productivity levels; this 
is true of the Leipzig and Dresden districts in East Germany; Upper 
Silesia in Poland; and southern Moravia and western and eastern Bohemia in 
Czechoslovakia. Other regions with low productivity tend to be more 
predictable, notably peripheral and rural regions such as Rostock and Suhl 
in East Germany, northern Poland, southern Hungary, north-east Romania and 
Macedonia in Yugoslavia. 
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Table 6.5: Productivity in Central and 
output per 
Bulgaria 
Czechoslovakia 
East Germany 
Hungary 
Poland 
Romania 
Yugoslavia 
National 
figure 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
employed person 
Regional 
maximum 
128 
185 
195 
158 
185 
196 
134 
Regional 
minimum 
79 
81 
65 
54 
73 
45 
73 
Regional 
difference 
49 
104 
130 
104 
112 
151 
61 
Data 
year 
1988 
1988/9 
1989 
1987/8 
1985/6 
1989/90 
1988 
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Figure 6.1: OUTPUT PER EMPLOYEE 1988/89 
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CHAPTER 7 : 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
7.1 Introduction 
The task of attracting foreign investment into the emerging market 
economies of Central and Eastern Europe is perceived to be one of the most 
important tasks faced by these countries. This section examines 
historical attitudes in Central and Eastern Europe to the possibility of 
foreign investment, the growing recognition of its importance, and the 
legislative moves which have been made accordingly. Finally, this section 
provides a country-by-country outline of the present situation regarding 
foreign investment. 
7.2 Past experience 
An understanding of the need to attract foreign investment for 
economic strength and development is not entirely new to the Central and 
East European countries. Since the early 1970s, Hungary and Romania 
passed legislation allowing the establishment of joint ventures, and 
Poland created so-called "Polonia" firms - private companies owned by 
foreign nationals of Polish ethnic origin, which principally served the 
domestic market. Joint ventures were also technically legal in Bulgaria 
in 1980. These attempts to attract foreign investment, however, were 
generally unsuccessful. 
During the 1980s, efforts to promote joint ventures increased with 
reforms eg. Czechoslovakia in 1988, and Poland, which passed new laws in 
1986 again concentrating on Polonia-type enterprises but with the aim of 
creating hard currency through the production of exports. However, the 
response was still limited. The reluctance of foreign companies to invest 
in Central and East European countries was partly attributable to the 
still quite restrictive nature of the legislation. In Poland, the Polish 
participant in the enterprise had to maintain majority ownership, while in 
Czechoslovakia, only state enterprises could seek foreign partners. Other 
problems included an excessive amount of "red tape", and a common 
requirement that a percentage of hard currency earnings had to be sold to 
the state or a state bank. In general, foreign investment was not fully 
accepted, and national systems were certainly not equipped to cope with 
the needs of private enterprises. 
7.3 New Perspectives 
The transformation of the formerly centrally-controlled economies of 
Central and Eastern Europe to a system of market economy has led to a new 
perspective on foreign investment. Joint ventures are now seen to be an 
effective way of stimulating economic growth, creating much-needed hard 
currency earnings, and introducing new technology and working methods into 
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the changing industrial and economic climate. 
This new attitude towards foreign investment is leading, in most 
Central and East European countries, to amendments of relevant laws and 
legislation, which aim to create a more attractive investment environment 
for foreign companies. Restrictions on the sectors and activities in 
which foreign investment is permissible are being lifted. Joint ventures 
are being encouraged where this was not previously the case, and foreign 
companies are being allowed to hold the majority stake. Restrictions on 
reinvestment or profit repatriation are being eased, although not always 
fully lifted. Companies established solely by foreigners who own 100 
percent of the capital are also being licensed in many countries, 
including Romania. 
With the easing of previous restrictions, the number of joint 
ventures and the level of foreign investment is now growing. Many foreign 
companies perceive Central and Eastern Europe as an expanding new market 
and a production base for supplying Western Europe, with the advantage of 
cheap labour. "Eastern Europe is an unsatisfied market, a source of 
inexpensive labour, and a reservoir of European skills" (Wallace 1990, 
p459). 
Reliable statistics on foreign "investment are difficult to obtain. 
According to the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), in 
January 1990 there had been 2,090 new joint ventures involving Central and 
East European former CMEA members and Yugoslavia during 1989. The i.w.d. 
estimates the growth to be somewhat greater (see Table 7.1), reporting a 
total of 3,790 joint ventures in January 1990 (compared to 930 in January 
1989), rising to 6,520 by July 1990. Based on national statistics, the 
WIIW considers the growth to be greater still; the total number of 
authorised joint ventures in Central and Eastern Europe was put at almost 
15,000 in late 1990. Despite the variation in numbers, the common message 
is clear: foreign investment in Central and Eastern Europe is rising very 
rapidly. 
Table 7.1: Growth in Joint Ventures in Central and Eastern Europe 
Number of 
Year joint ventures 
1987 (January) 
1988 (January) 
1989 (January) 
1990 (January) 
(March) 
(May) 
(July) 
100 
400 
930 
3,790 
4,700 
5,700 
6,520 
Source: iwd, 23.8.90 
Similar data problems occur in trying to assess the trends within 
individual countries. In Table 7.2, it is clear that the basis for 
assessing joint ventures differs greatly between the i.w.d. and WIIW, 
notably for Hungary and Czechoslovakia. However, both data sets agree 
that the greatest number of joint ventures are operating (or have at least 
registered) in Hungary, Yugoslavia and Poland. By contrast, foreign 
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investment in Romania and Bulgaria is limited. specifically, Poland 
experienced the fastest growth, the number of joint ventures rising from 
13 in January 1988 to 400 in October 1989 and to more than 2,600 by the 
end of 1990. However, not all firms are operating: out of 2,615 
registered Polish joint ventures in December 1990, 1,645 (two-thirds) were 
operating in Poland in December 1990). 
Hungary witnessed a growth in joint ventures from 102 to 600 over the 
1988-89 period and, according to Hungarian authorities, to more than 5,000 
by late 1990. The number of joint ventures has also been rising rapidly 
in Czechoslovakia - to 1,200 by the end of 1990 according to the WIIW. 
Table 7.2: Joint ventures in Central and Eastern Europe 
Bulgaria 
Czechoslovakia 
East Germany 
Hungary 
Poland 
Romania 
Yugoslavia 
1989 
30 
50 
-
600 
400 
5 
386 
(Oct.) 1990 (July) 
(i.w.d.) 
30 
85 
-
1,600 
1,550 
5 
1,450 
1990 (Dec) 
(WIIW) 
110 
1,200 
-
>5,000 (*) 
2,615 (+) 
570 
3,521 
Sources: WIIW, UN, OECD, Stefanowski (1990) 
(*) Figure relates to permits issued; not all firms are yet 
operating. (+) Figures relate to operational firms 
While the amount of foreign investment is increasing, there are still 
many problems involved for foreign companies in establishing joint 
ventures, particularly in the countries which are less advanced in terms 
of economic reform. As noted above, Romania and Bulgaria, lag behind in 
terms of foreign investment. As in some other countries, bureaucracy and 
"red tape" continue to be a major hindrance, and, despite recent reforms, 
the establishment of joint ventures still involves negotiations with a 
number of different ministries and institutions. Another major problem, 
from the viewpoint of investors in all the Central and East European 
countries, is the difficulty in securing a return in hard currency. The 
plunging, and often greatly fluctuating, value of most of the Central and 
East European currencies (particularly the Polish zloty and the Yugoslav 
dinar) has been a severe deterrent to most investment strategies. 
7.4 The main investment sectors 
Foreign investment has tended to centre on certain industrial sectors 
which have particular advantages for the investor, but which are not 
necessarily of greatest value for individual Central and East European 
countries. Consequently, many countries are emphasising the attraction of 
investment in industrial manufacturing, particularly in small and medium 
sized enterprises. This trend is reflected in the legislation of many of 
the countries, which offers the greatest flexibility to companies 
employing 50 or fewer employees. 
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Tourism has, so far, been the principal recipient of foreign 
investment. Central and Eastern Europe has been "opened up" for tourism 
over the last few years, becoming an increasingly popular holiday region. 
Foreign investment in tourism has brought advantages for the recipient 
country in terms of infrastructure improvement, either as a natural side 
effect or, as in the case of Yugoslavia, undertaken by the investor as 
part of the foreign investment agreement. Among others, Czechoslovakia is 
now trying to deflect foreign investment away from tourism and encourage 
it in other areas, particularly industrial manufacturing. 
The automobile industry has also benefited from a high degree of 
foreign investment. A considerable consumer market exists for cars, and 
foreign companies have been quick to recognise the potential. The main 
Japanese investments have been the $150 million Suzuki car assembly plant 
near Budapest and the $750 million Daihatsu plant in Poland. Other major 
car manufacturers have also invested heavily in joint ventures in Central 
and Eastern Europe. Volkswagen completed a DM 9.5 billion deal with Skoda 
in Czechoslovakia at the end of 1990, and plans other investment in East 
Germany. General Motors already has facilities in Eastern Europe 
including an Opel Vectra assembly line under construction in East Germany, 
and an engine and passenger car assembly plant due to open in Hungary in 
1992, although recent negotiations with Bratislava Automobile Association 
(BAZ) in Czechoslovakia for investment of at least DM 600 million have not 
been successful. Poland is attempting to obtain the latest car technology 
in order to export strongly in this sector after 1991, and Fiat have 
offered a $2 billion investment in exchange for exclusive manufacturing 
rights in Poland. Other sectors which at present seem to have attracted 
investment include glass, food processing and finance. 
Among other industrial sectors of relevance to foreign investors, 
major market potential appears to exist for foreign investment in 
agricultural machinery, pharmaceuticals, and computer equipment 
(particularly mainframes and minicomputers). There is also a large market 
for consumer goods such as video recorders, televisions and 
telecommunication equipment. These may, therefore, be sectors which will 
attract future investment as they serve a virtually guaranteed market. 
7.5 National experience and regional concentration 
Foreign investment levels have not been uniform throughout Central 
and Eastern Europe. Hungary, Poland, and East Germany appear to have 
progressed furthest in terms of legislation allowing foreign investment, 
and actually attracting foreign companies. Currently, most of the data 
regarding the location of investment is at the national level. 
Foreign investment in East Germany appears to be extremely limited to 
date. According to a recent analysis completed by the five major economic 
research institutes in Germany, total investment in East Germany in 1990 
amounted to DM 48.2 billion, of which 3.95 billion (eight percent) is 
attributable to foreign direct investment. The following discussion of 
trends and patterns, therefore, has to be considered in this context. 
Of the limited foreign investment that has taken place, the majority 
is accounted for by west German firms. Between March and December 1990, 
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the press reported over 1,000 investment ventures, of which 90 percent 
were west German initiatives. Foreign investors have been reluctant to 
invest mainly due to uncertainty over property rights and concern about 
the level of risk. Aside from investment by west German firms, around 
two-thirds of all foreign (non-German) investment has been undertaken 
through subsidiaries in west Germany; 40 percent of foreign investment 
has come from other EC member states, notably France (18 percent) and'the 
UK (11 percent). 
Regional data on joint ventures is limited. However, most foreign 
investment is known to have been made in the regions of Sachsen and 
Thueringen. 
Joint ventures with Western companies have been permitted in Bulgaria 
since 1980, but legislation in January 1989 opened up possibilities by 
allowing companies to establish joint ventures in their own right or to 
set up wholly-owned subsidiaries. There are, however, a number of major 
deterrents to foreign investors including a taxation rate of 40 percent, 
the need for government approval to establish foreign shareholdings of 
more than 49 percent, and a quite unstable political situation. No 
information is available on the regional distribution of joint ventures, 
but the main beneficiary is assumed to be Sofia. 
A number of new bills have been passed in Czechoslovakia to encourage 
foreign investment. The Joint Venture Act which came into force in 
January 1989 extended the scope of possible investment targets to industry 
and certain services; amendments in May 1990 allowed foreign 
participation to represent 100 percent. Further legislation in March 1990 
allowed foreign investors to open or take over small businesses. However, 
the lack of effective currency legislation discourages many prospective 
investors, as it is still illegal to export koruna-dominated earnings, 
except in the instance of prearranged bilateral agreements. Other 
impediments are the proviso that 30 percent of hard currency profits must 
be offered for sale to Czechoslovak banks, and the continuing constraints 
on profit repatriation. The tax rate is also very high. Despite these 
restrictions, Czechoslovakia has attracted some large investment projects 
and joint ventures (see Table 7.3), particularly in the sectors of tourism 
and cars. Further changes occurred at the start of 1991 related to the 
introduction of "internal convertibility" and the ability of foreign 
enterprises to participate in the "big" privatisation. 
Table 7.3 Joint Ventures in Czechoslovakia (January 1991) 
Country Number of joint ventures 
Austria 463 
West Germany 453 
Switzerland 124 
USA 74 
Italy 63 
Great Britain 46 
France 38 
Canada 32 
Total 1,586 
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Hungary is generally considered to have the best investment prospects 
of the Central and East European countries, partly due to its greater 
experience with market economic conditions (joint ventures have been legal 
in Hungary since 1972) and its stage of economic reform. After recent 
reforms, Hungary now offers favourable tax holidays and the 100 percent 
purchase of local enterprises, as well as the repatriation of profits. 
This has led to a very rapid growth in the number of joint ventures (see 
Table 7.4); according to the government, there are now over 5,000 joint 
ventures operating with a total capital investment of over US$ 1 billion. 
The non-convertibility of the forint until 1992-93 may be the main 
obstacle to Western investors, and it is likely that in 1990-91 any 
foreign investment will principally involve the creation of export 
products. 
Table 7.4: Joint Ventures in Hungary (August 1990) 
Country Number of joint ventures 
West Germany 1,117 
Austria 960 
USA 264 
Switzerland 230 
Italy 176 
Great Britain 149 
Sweden 147 
Other 1,386 
Total 4,429 
Poland has allowed joint ventures since 1976, but legislation passed 
in December 1988 was designed to liberalise properly laws governing 
foreign investment. The key feature of this legislation was that it now 
allowed the investor to hold a majority share in the enterprise. Further 
legislation in December 1989 was intended to encourage investors through 
the provision of greater security, more benefits, and the easing of some 
previous restrictions on profit repatriation. The limited convertibility 
of the zloty is also a hindrance to investment. Despite these new laws, 
investment has not been substantial in Poland. While there are more than 
2,600 registered joint ventures in Poland, only around two-thirds of these 
are actually operational. Poland's geographical location means that the 
country has a tradition of foreign trade and international contact, but 
the largely superficial laws enacted so far, and the still notable degree 
of state intervention, has meant that this tradition has not been fully 
utilised. 
With respect to the regional location of foreign investment, data is 
available for September 1990 relating to the distribution of 747 joint 
ventures in Poland. The location of foreign enterprises is dominated by 
the agglomerations; almost 52 percent of joint ventures are located in 
five cities - Warsaw (containing 23 percent alone), Poznan, Lodz, Gdansk, 
Krakow and Katowice. A further 20 percent is located in seven other large 
towns. 
In Romania, two types of joint venture are technically possible: 
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joint-stock or limited-liability companies; and, companies established 
solely by foreigners, holding 100 percent of the capital. Both types may 
be founded in any economic sector, and the government can approve joint 
ventures in other areas (eg. education, health care) on request. Certain 
tax exemptions are also available. While taxes are comparatively low, 
there are strict limits on the repatriation of profits amde in local 
currency. Only four joint ventures were known to be already in place at 
the start of 1990 under the terms of the old regulations. Although the 
number of joint ventures has increased rapidly in the course of 1990 (to 
C.570 joint ventures), the present political climate is perhaps the most 
serious setback to increasing foreign investment in Romania. 
Direct foreign investment has been permitted in Yugoslavia since 
1968, but new legislation in 1988 extended the scope for investment and 
allowed 100 percent ownership for foreign companies. British and West 
German companies have shown particular interest in Yugoslavia, but the USA 
and Japan have remained very reserved. Export oriented goods and tourism 
(a very large source of foreign investment) are the only really viable 
sectors due to the extreme instability of the dinar. Again, the political 
situation is, at present, the main deterrent for foreign investors. The 
uncertainty about the future of the Yugoslav federation, and the 
likelihood of secession by at least two republics, is bound to lead to 
reluctance by foreign companies to invest in the country. 
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CHAPTER 8: ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS 
8.1 Introduction 
The scale of the environmental problems in Central and Eastern Europe 
is vast. Rapid industrial development, the large-scale, crude 
exploitation of raw materials, obsolete technology and few environmental 
controls have all contributed to serious environmental degradation in 
certain areas. Pollution is affecting not only the atmosphere, water and 
land area, but also the health and living conditions of the population. 
This section outlines why the problem is so severe, the different areas of 
environmental pollution, and finally examines which countries and regions 
are worst affected. 
8.2 The socialist inheritance 
Economic development in the socialist era concentrated predominately 
on rapid industrialisation and the exploitation of raw materials to use in 
the expanding industrial sector. The environmental impact of such a 
strategy was given comparatively little consideration. The functioning of 
a planned economy could, in fact, have had a number of advantages in 
containing environmental pollution - central control of the economy could 
have led to a mix of industries being developed which would have the least 
adverse environmental impact; consumer disposable goods and private cars, 
the cause of much environmental damage in the West, were less generally 
available; surplus labour could have been utilised in the collection of 
waste and environmental projects. 
In fact, the degree of environmental damage appears to be worse than 
in capitalist nations. "A primary factor...comes from the socialist 
decision-makers who regard the environment in terms of potential 
productivity rather than potential habitability" (Rugg 1985, p318). The 
importance of economic and industrial development, and the attempts to 
achieve regional equity, were placed above the social costs of 
environmental degredation. Obsolete and environmentally damaging 
technology was often used, and particularly harmful raw materials such as 
lignite and brown coal were the principal sources of energy. There was a 
lack of investment in purification plants and waste processing facilities. 
The largest industrial agglomerations, with a concentration of heavy 
industrial plants and urban development, have suffered the worst 
environmental problems. In Central and Eastern Europe as a whole, the 
following regions are particularly affected: Sofia (Bulgaria); North 
Bohemia and North Moravia (Czechoslovakia); Halle and Cottbus (East 
Germany); Miskolc area (Hungary); Upper Silesia (Poland); Resita and 
Copsa Mica (Romania); and Jesenica in Slovenia (Yugoslavia). 
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8.3 Types of environmental degradation 
Atmospheric and water pollution are the two types of environmental 
problem which are particularly serious in Central and Eastern Europe, 
although the damage to agricultural land, countryside, and forestry is 
also an area of great concern eg. 64 percent of the Polish forest area is 
affected by industrial pollution. 
Atmospheric pollution is primarily a result of the use of low-grade 
brown coal as a principal source of energy in power stations and 
industrial plants. Inefficient and poorly designed cars and vehicles also 
contribute to this form of pollution. The problem is particularly serious 
in the industrial axis running from the southern regions of the former GDR 
to Upper Silesia and the Krakow area in Poland, and including Ostrava, 
Prague and North Bohemia in Czechoslovakia. 
Very high levels of pollution have also been recorded in other 
relatively localised and contained areas. This is the case in some of the 
Balkan countries, which have a generally lower level of pollution, but 
with certain areas suffering particularly badly. These areas include: 
Sofia, Burgas, Devnya, Dimitrovgrad, Kardzinali and Pirdop (Bulgaria); 
Bicaz and Copsa Mica (Romania); and, Bor, Trepca and Zenica (Yugoslavia). 
The prevailing winds also carry much of the atmospheric pollution from the 
source country to neighbouring states. Thus, for example, the 
environmental situation in southern Poland is exacerbated by pollution 
from Czechoslovakia and the former GDR, while the majority of Hungary's 
pollution originates in neighbouring countries. 
Water pollution is a particular problem in several areas of Central 
and Eastern Europe. The lack of purification facilities in all countries 
has led to much untreated sewage and industrial waste being dumped 
directly into waterways, causing serious environmental harm. It is 
estimated that up to 40 percent of Poland's waterways fall below any 
environmental standard and are unusable for any economic purpose. The 
cause of water pollution is not always industrial - in Hungary, Lake 
Balaton faces a serious threat from tourist development, and the same 
situation is found on the Adriatic coast of Yugoslavia and on the Baltic 
coast in Poland. In Romania, the Danube delta also suffers from severe 
ecological damage. 
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CHAPTER 9" 
INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines some of the key indicators of infrastructure 
development in Central and Eastern Europe. Although a considerable amount 
of data is available on infrastructure conditions in the various 
countries, the regional information is highly country-specific. This 
chapter provides a relatively brief overview of the infrastructure 
situation in five main areas - transport, telecommunications, education 
and healthcare and energy. 
9.2 Transport infrastructure 
The transport infrastructure in Central and East European countries 
is characterised by five main features. First, the infrastructure in the 
region is generally of poor quality and over-loaded. For example, rail 
networks are extensive but significant parts are one-track (in Hungary 
only 14 percent is double-track), the load-bearing capacity is low, and 
many sections are not capable of high-speed travel. Electrification is 
limited, and the rolling stock suffers from under-investment. In East 
Germany, it has been estimated that at least 50 percent of the rail 
network (total length 14,000 km) will have to be modernized, especially 
with respect to electrification and high-speed rail. 
Road networks are also dense but again are in need of upgrading. In 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the proportion of express highways and main 
roads is comparable to some European Community countries, but the 
condition of road surfaces (especially on secondary roads) is of poor 
quality, and many rural roads are not metalled. The transport system is 
particularly poor in Romania and Yugoslavia. 
Second, infrastructure development relating to transport in most 
countries has concentrated on the major urban areas and the axes of 
economic activity: eg. Sofia-Varna and Sofia-Bourgas in Bulgaria; 
Prague-Brno-Bratislava (the only express highway links) in Czechoslovakia; 
and within the Budapest region in Hungary. International links tend to 
have been neglected and inappropriately oriented (for the 
post-liberalisation period). For example, the Hungarian transport system 
has a domestically-oriented radial character, connecting Budapest with 
other Hungarian cities, but international connections (especially the road 
system) are not yet completed. Most Czechoslovak rail lines and highways 
are aligned in an east-west direction but, since transit transport is 
growing in importance, north-south connections will have to be expanded 
significantly. The same is true for Bulgaria where the rail network is 
highly concentrated on the industrially developed and central regions of 
Sofia, Lovech and Razgrad. 
The third characteristic is the west-east difference in 
infrastructure provision within Central and Eastern Europe. The 
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availability and quality of infrastructure decreases with distance from 
Western Europe. This reflects the history of industrialization in 
different countries, and investment for military purposes. Thus, the 
density of road and rail network is relatively high in East Germany in 
comparison with other countries in the region (although the quality of 
construction and maintenance is very poor). Within Poland, infrastructure 
density decreases from the western to eastern regions of the country'eg. 
a decrease of railway track from 12km to 4km per 100 sq.km. and a 
decrease in road surface from 70km to 40km per 100 sq.km. 
Fourth, the transport system in most countries in the region shows a 
distinct bias towards freight and public transportation. Private 
passenger transport is relatively underdeveloped, and public 
transportation prevails for both freight and passengers. The share of the 
private sector also declines along a west-east gradient across Central and 
Eastern Europe, associated with levels of economic development. This can 
can be indirectly illustrated by the (generally low) stocks of passenger 
cars - decreasing from a maximum of 214 cars per 1,000 inhabitants in East 
Germany, 190 in Czechoslovakia, 169 in Hungary, 120-133 in Bulgaria, 
Poland and Yugoslavia, and 44 in Romania. 
With economic restructuring, the public/private balance of transport 
usage is likely to change. Hitherto, public passenger transport (both 
rail and road) has been heavily subsidized. Since the major subsidies to 
public transport are currently being reduced, considerable shifts between 
various modes of transport can be expected to result from tariff changes 
for both freight and passenger transport. 
Lastly, freight and passenger transport in Central and Eastern Europe 
is dominated by rail and road transport (see Tables 9.1 and 9.2). In the 
freight sector, rail movement is the dominant mode of transport followed 
by road transportation. Water and air transport are much less 
significant. The proportion of transport moved by rail varies greatly. 
Railroads accounted for 40-60 percent of transport volume in Bulgaria, 
Hungary and Yugoslavia; 70-80 percent in Czechoslovakia, East Germany and 
Poland; and 90 percent in Romania. In terms of per capita transported 
rail freight, the most "transport intensive" countries have been 
Czechoslovakia and East Germany (in East Germany this indicator even 
increased between 1980 and 1989 to more than 20 tonnes per capita - about 
twice the level in Hungary and Poland, and six times more than in 
Yugoslavia). In general, the volume of railroad freight transport 
remained more or less constant in most Central and East European countries 
over the period 1980-1989 except for Hungary and Poland where a drop by 
about 20 percent has been observed. 
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Table 9.1 : Goods transport by rail, motor vehicles and inland waterway -
1980 and 1989 
Railroad Freight Railroad Freight 
1980 1989(1) 
in bill.tkm 
1980 1989(1) 
in mi11.tons 
1980 1989(1) 
in tkm per in 
capita 
1980 1989(1) 
tonnes per 
capita 
Bulgaria 17.7 
CSFR 72.6 
GDR 56.4 
Hungary 24.4 
Poland 134.7 
Romania 75.5 
Yugoslavia 25.0 
17.0 
72.0 
59.0 
19.8 
111.1 
74.2 
25.9 
77.8 
286.0 
311.6 
129.8 
482.1 
274.6 
84.9 
77.3 
283.7 
339.3 
104.5 
388.9 
283.4 
84.8 
1993.9 
4748.5 
3369.2 
2277.6 
3769.4 
3400.7 
1121.7 
1890.4 
4600.3 
3590.1 
1908.4 
2920.8 
3265.1 
1094.2 
8.8 
18.7 
18.6 
12.1 
13.5 
12.4 
3.8 
8.6 
18.1 
20.6 
10.1 
10.2 
12.5 
3.6 
Motor Vehicle Freight Motor Vehicle Freight 
Bulgaria 
CSFR 
GDR 
Hungary 
Poland 
Romania 
Yugoslavia 
1980 
in bill 
15.9 
21.3 
21.0 
11.4 
44.6 
11.8 
19.0 
1989(1) 
.tkm 
17.5 
23.8 
16.9 
13.2 
38.5 
6.0 
21.8 
1980 
in mill 
816 
1235 
730 
584 
2168 
451 
202 
1989(1) 
.tons 
943 
1258 
541 
546 
1348 
362 
125 
1980 1989(1) 
in tkm per in 
capita 
1790.0 
1395.1 
1255.7 
1064.1 
1246.7 
529.7 
851.7 
1942.6 
1522.6 
1026.5 
1273.3 
1010.8 
264.0 
920.1 
1980 1989(1) 
tonnes per 
capita 
91.9 
80.8 
43.6 
54.5 
60.7 
20.3 
9.0 
104.9 
80.4 
32.9 
52.6 
35.4 
15.9 
5.3 
Inland Waterway Freight Inland Waterway Freight 
Bulgaria 
CSFR 
GDR 
Hungary 
Poland 
Romania 
Yugoslavia 
1980 
in bill 
2.6 
3.6 
2.2 
1.9 
2.3 
2.4 
5.0 
1989(1) 
.tkm 
2.0 
5.1 
2.3 
2.2 
1.2 
2.4 
5.0 
1980 
in mill 
4.9 
10.5 
16.3 
3.5 
22.3 
12.3 
26.0 
1989(1) 
.tons 
3.4 
13.5 
20.4 
3.9 
14.0 
18.4 
19.3 
1980 
in tkm 
1989(1) 
per in 
capita 
294.0 
234.8 
129.0 
174.6 
65.2 
105.9 
223.1 
216.8 
325.9 
139.3 
211.1 
31.3 
106.1 
211 .4 
1980 1989(1 
tonnes per 
capita 
0.6 0.4 
0.7 0.9 
1.0 1.2 
0.3 0.4 
0.6 0.4 
0.6 0.8 
1.2 0.8 
(1) 1985 figures for Romania. 
Source: National statistics. 
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Table 9.2 : Passenger transport by rail, motor vehicles and inland 
Bulgaria 
CSFR 
GDR 
Hungary 
Poland 
Romania 
Yugoslavia 
waterway -
1980 
in bi 
7.1 
18.0 
22.0 
14.7 
46.3 
23.2 
10.4 
1980 and 
Railroad 
1989(1) 
ll.pkm 
7.6 
19.7 
23.8 
12.7 
55.9 
31.1 
11.7 
1980 
in mill, 
100.0 
415.6 
607.0 
389.0 
1101.0 
347.9 
107.0 
1989 
1989(1) 
persons 
99.0 
411.0 
592.0 
323.0 
952.0 
460.3 
117.0 
1980 
Railroad 
1989(1) 
in pkm per 
capita 
794.8 
1180.1 
1315.8 
1368.4 
1296.5 
1045.9 
465.9 
845.2 
1256.7 
1448.9 
1228.0 
1469.3 
1367.7 
491.9 
1980 1989(1) 
in persons per 
capita 
11.3 
27.2 
36.3 
36.3 
30.8 
15.7 
4.8 
11.0 
26.3 
36.0 
31.1 
25.0 
20.3 
4.9 
Motor Vehicles Motor Vehicles 
Bulgaria 
CSFR 
GDR 
Hungary 
Poland 
Romania 
Yugoslavia 
1980 
in mi 
15.4 
33.8 
29.6 
21.9 
49.2 
24.0 
29.6 
1989(1) 
ll.pkm 
19.9 
39.7 
30.2 
22.0 
58.1 
21.7 
26.2 
1980 
in mill 
730.4 
2134.6 
3490.0 
2413.0 
2379.0 
1033.7 
938.9 
1989(1) 
.persons 
936.7 
2320.3 
3463.0 
2828.0 
2564.0 
837.3 
804.3 
1980 1989(1) 
in pkm per 
capita 
1735.4 
2207.6 
1768.8 
2044.2 
1377.4 
1081.8 
1328.2 
2210.9 
2537.1 
1837.6 
2120.5 
1526.4 
954.1 
1107.4 
1980 1989(1) 
in persons per 
capita 
82.3 
139.6 
208.5 
225.2 
66.6 
46.6 
42.1 
104.2 
148.3 
210.7 
272.6 
67.4 
36.8 
33.9 
Inland Waterway Inland Waterway 
Bulgaria 
CSFR 
GDR 
Hungary 
Poland 
Romania 
1980 1989(1) 
in bill.pkm 
39.0 
11.7 
205.0 
77.0 
127.0 
79.0 
Yugoslavia 20.0 
12.0 
8.6 
189.0 
67.0 
68.0 
78.0 
1.0 
1980 
in mill 
0.4 
0.5 
6.8 
4.0 
9.4 
1.7 
0.1 
1989(1) 
.persons 
0.1 
0.4 
7.4 
3.6 
5.8 
1.8 
0.0 
1980 
in 
1989(1) 
pkm per 
capita 
4.4 
0.8 
12.2 
7.2 
3.6 
3.6 
0.9 
1.4 
0.6 
11.3 
6.3 
1.9 
3.4 
0.0 
1980 1989(1) 
in persons per 
capita 
0.0 
0.0 
0.4 
0.4 
0.3 
0.1 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.5 
0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
0.0 
(1) 1985 figures for Romania. 
Source: National statistics 
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Motor vehicle freight transport has been gaining in importance in 
Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia (an increase of transport volume by 10 percent 
and 12 percent respectively between 1980 and 1989), but declined by 20 
percent in East Germany, by 14 percent in Poland and by almost 50 percent 
in Romania. In Hungary and Yugoslavia, there has been a decline in 
transport volume in terms of tonnage, but an increase of transport 
distances (the transport volume increased by about 15 percent in terms of 
tkm during the period). Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia show the highest per 
capita motor vehicle transport intensity (with 105 and 85 tonnes per 
capita) - the former about twice as high as Hungary (53 tonnes), three 
times as high as the former GDR (33 tonnes) and Poland (35 tonnes). 
As with freight, public passenger transport is concentrated on rail 
and road transport in all Central and East European countries, and the 
importance of water and air transport is negligible. Rail transport is, 
however, less important than for freight; rail accounts for about 20-40 
percent of passenger transport volume in Bulgaria (the rest is accounted 
for by motor vehicle transport), Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Hungary, 
40-50 percent in East Germany and Poland; and 59 percent in Romania. In 
per capita terms, the highest movement of persons using rail transport was 
observed in Poland and East Germany, followed by Romania, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary and Bulgaria. The latter three countries, however, displayed a 
much greater usage of public motor road transport which was much less 
common in Romania. 
9.3 Telecommunications 
Telecommunication services, in most cases provided exclusively by the 
state, have traditionally belonged to the so-called "non-productive 
sector". This sector (like infrastructure in general) has traditionally 
been neglected as far as the allocation of centrally distributed 
investment resources is concerned. In Bulgaria, which reports the highest 
number of telephones per 1,000 inhabitants of all the Central and East 
European countries as a result of official telecommunications policy 
(leading to an annual increase of telephone connections of 10 percent), 
capital investment in telecommunications still only amounted to about 1.5 
percent of total investment over the period 1975-1985, and there is still 
no national digital network. Overall, low density and poor quality is 
characteristic of Central and East European telecom networks. Towards the 
end of the 1980s, there were on average about 170 telephones per 1,000 
inhabitants in Central and Eastern Europe (see Table 9.3) - much lower 
than the equivalent figure for Western Europe. 
During the 1980s, there was a relatively rapid expansion of Central 
and East European telephone systems. In Czechoslovakia, for example, 
automisation of the telephone system is almost complete; in 1988, there 
were 3.98 million telephones in Czechoslovakia, 99 percent of which are 
connected with automatic telephone exchanges, and only one percent with 
manual exchanges. However, only 1.4 million telephones were in homes in 
1988 (i.e. 255 telephones per 1,000 people) which represents a 
considerable lag in comparison with other developed countries. 266,000 
applications for instalment of new telephones have not been satisfied, and 
the supply does not cover the growing demand. 
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Thus, Central and East European countries still have lower telephone 
stocks than the EC countries at the end of the 1970s. Bulgaria, which had 
the highest level of telephone provision in the region in 1988, still had 
fewer stocks than any EC country with the exception of Portugal and Spain. 
These figures do not fully reflect the extent of the East-West development 
gap as they refer to main telephone lines only (CMEA countries: number of 
telephones in use), and the quality of the service is not taken into 
account. 
There are considerable regional differences in the telecommunications 
infrastructure of Central and East European countries (see Table 9.4). In 
particular, there is a marked urban-rural development gap. In 
Czechoslovakia, there were 264 telephones per 1,000 inhabitants in 1989, 
but the figure for Prague was 671 compared with the figure of 176 for West 
Slovakia. Similarly for Hungary in 1988, the figure for Budapest was 204 
but only 29 in Szabolcs-Szatmar. In Poland, the worst situation is found 
in the eastern part of the country eg. in the voivodships of Ostroleka, 
Siedlce, Krosno or Cezestochowa the number of telephones per 1,000 
population falls below 45; and in Yugoslavia (1989), the national average 
was 188 telephones per 1,000 inhabitants, with regional differences 
ranging" from 322 in Slovenia to 149 in Bosnia-Hercegovina. 
Finally, in East Germany, there were relatively few regional 
differences, with the exception of East Berlin where, in 1989, 424 
households in every 1000 had a telephone, although even this figure is 
very low by western standards. Across the former GDR, 160 households in 
every 1,000 had a telephone facility in 1989; the telephone network was 
least dense in Rostock (115 per 1,000) and in Potsdam (118 per 1,000), 
with the greatest density in Schwerin and Leipzig (174 per 1,000). 
The scale of the upgrading required is illustrated by the anticipated 
growth in telecommunications in East Germany envisaged by the German 
télécoms authority, Telekom: from 100,000 telephone connections in 1990 
to five million in 1990; from 10,000 to 260,000 telefax connections; and 
from 5,000 to 74,000 data transmission (Datex) lines. Due to the current 
bottlenecks in telephone communication between West and East Germany, the 
financial resources made available up to the end of November 1990 for 
these "priority programmes" had been revised twice, rising first of all 
from DM 4.5 billion to DM 5.5 billion and then to DM 7.3 billion. 
More advanced telecom services, provided through the digitization of 
the network (especially data transmission and linkage of computers), is 
virtually unknown in Central and Eastern Europe. Modern trends for 
digitization, decentralisation and diversification have thus been almost 
completely missed, and the sector now, in many respects, resembles the 
situation of the EC countries in the 1950s and 1960s when 
telecommunications had been regarded as a slow-growing and loss-making 
public sector utility. 
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Table 9.3: Telephone stocks in the CMEA and selected EC countries 
(per 1.000 population) 
1978 1988 Growth in % 
Bulgaria 
Czechoslovakia 
East Germany 
Hungary 
Poland 
Romania 
Yugoslavia 
103 
197 
177 
107 
88 
59 
266 
246 
239 
158 
128 
90 
188 
258 
125 
135 
148 
145 
152 
CEE region 114 169 148 
France 
Germany 
UK 
Greece 
Italy 
Portugal 
Spain 
225 
282 
272 
215 
202 
92 
167 
446 
445 
389 
347 
333 
161 
264 
198 
158 
143 
161 
165 
175 
158 
Sources: COMECON Data 1989, WIIW, The Macmillan Press Ltd. 1990, 
p166 and "Performance Indicators for Public Telecommunications 
Operators". SDTl/lCCP/TISP/89.10, OECD, 1990 
Table 9.4: Regional disparities in telephone stocks (per 1.000 
population) - ' 
Bulgaria 
Czechoslovakia 
East Germany 
Hungary 
Poland 
Romania 
Yugoslavia 
National 
average 
258 
264 
160 
148 
128 
90 
188 
1989 
Regional 
minimum 
_ 
176 
115 
29 
< 45 
-
149 
Regional 
maximum 
_ 
671 
424 
204 
-
-
322 
Regional 
disparity 
_ 
495 
309 
175 
-
-
173 
Source: National statistics; WIIW. 
Unsatisfactory development of the telephone network system also forms 
a hindrance for the creation of unified database systems, for the creation 
of a computer network and for the introduction of modern communication 
facilities. In data transmission, the problems are aggravated not only by 
unavailability of terminals but also by the poor quality and unreliability 
of communications networks. Hungary, for example, has only recently 
introduced its first line-switched data transfer system for 200 
subscribers with up to 1,100 such lines planned to be in operation during 
the early 1990s. The package-switched networks will be introduced with 
the help of Western firms. 
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Computer networking and data communications lines are almost unknown 
owing both to systemic reasons (eg. underdeveloped banking sector, high 
degree of centralization etc) and equipment bottlenecks. Most Central and 
East European countries list the underdevelopment of telecommunications 
services as one of the key areas hindering future development. 
9.4 Education infrastructure 
The educational level of the population in most countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe is believed to be satisfactory, and education in 
general can certainly not be considered a serious bottleneck to 
development. Overall, illiteracy is said to be virtually non-existent, 
school enrolment is high and, according to most official indicators 
related to the education sector, there is virtually no quantitative gap 
relative to the EC countries. The educational level in technical 
disciplines is considered to be particularly good. 
The main problems are in the quality of the educational 
infrastructure and in the need to adapt to new conditions after the recent 
political changes. The latter will require a re-orientation of the 
curriculum to incorporate the conditions of a market economy, mainly in 
the humanities, at both secondary and university levels (eg. economics, 
management and similar disciplines). The lack of appropriately trained 
teaching personnel is a problem which cannot be solved in a short period 
of time, even with external technical assistance. 
Pupils' enrolment in primary and secondary schools reached high 
levels in the 1980s: in 1988 Poland had 1,466 pupils per 10,000 
inhabitants, Bulgaria 1,378, Czechoslovakia 1,383, Hungary 1,293, Romania 
1,320, East Germany 1,233 and Yugoslavia 1,204. However, there are 
greater differences in the enrolment rates for secondary vocational 
schools and universities. In all the Central and East European countries 
there is a widespread system of night courses both at secondary and 
university levels. 
9.5 Healthcare infrastructure 
The basic indicators for the health services of Central and Eastern 
Europe imply a generally satisfactory level of health care, but again the 
quality differences are not taken into account. The number of hospital 
beds per 10,000 population varies from 61 in Yugoslavia to 103 in 
Czechoslovakia (1988). During the 1980s, the stocks of hospital beds 
remained more or less unchanged in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania and 
Yugoslavia; it has declined slightly in East Germany, but increased in 
Bulgaria and Hungary. Similar development trends can be observed in the 
number of medical practitioners (including dentists). The levels reached 
by the end of the 1980s are, at least nominally, quite satisfactory: the 
number of medical practitioners per 10,000 population amounted to 38 in 
Bulgaria, 37 in Czechoslovakia, 33 in East Germany and Hungary, 26 in 
Poland, 23 in Yugoslavia, and 21 in Romania. 
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The main problems in the health sector in all the Central and East 
European countries lie not in the lack of personnel (or even in 
insufficient qualifications), but rather in the non-availability of 
equipment and pharmaceuticals. Virtually all the Central and East 
European countries have serious shortages of even basic medicines, hygiene 
articles etc, and also a lack of hard currency necessary for imports. 
Another factor affecting the efficiency of the health sector is the 
extremely low level of wages, usually significantly below the national 
average. Considerable organisational and institutional problems will have 
to be solved as the whole system of social insurance is yet to be 
established. 
Significant problems of the health sector (related to its quality, 
efficiency as well as to environmental problems) in all the Central and 
East European countries become apparant on examination of infant mortality 
and life expectancy figures. Life expectancy is lower by five to seven 
years in comparison to West European levels, and in some countries eg. 
Czechoslovakia, the figure has even declined recently. Recent figures 
have indicated the following levels: 72 years in Bulgaria; 71 in 
Czechoslovakia; 73 in East Germany; 70 in Hungary; 72 in Poland; 70 in 
Romania; and, 72 in Yugoslavia. Infant mortality rates have been as high 
as 25 per 1,000 live births in Yugoslavia and Romania, 16 in Hungary and 
Poland, 14 in Bulgaria, 12 in Czechoslovakia, and eight in East Germany. 
Considerable regional differences also exist. In Bulgaria, the 
availability of hospital beds varies from 52 (per 10,000 inhabitants) in 
Sofia to 97 in the districts of Lovech and Haskovo. Characteristically, 
fewer hospital beds are available in larger Bulgarian cities. In 
Czechoslovakia, the national average was 79 hospital beds per 10,000 
inhabitants (hospitals under local authority supervision only - all 
hospital beds: 103 in 1988), but the figures were 85 in East Bohemia and 
only 56 in Bratislava. There were also regional differences in the number 
of medical practitioners (particularly disturbing in the polluted regions 
of North Bohemia and Moravia). In Hungary, the availability of hospital 
beds is somewhat lower than in Czechoslovakia (93-96 per 10,000 population 
in 1988) and the regional differences were more striking. The levels 
stood at 143 beds in Budapest (with only 45 in the neighbouring region of 
Pest) and more than 100 in the western regions of Vas, Veszpren, Zala and 
Gyor-Sopron, and around 80 in the south-east regions like 
Szabolcs-Szatmar, Hajdu-Bihar and Bekes. The number of medical 
practitioners ranges between 51 per 10,000 inhabitants in Budapest (37 in 
Baranya, 40 in Csongrad), 17 in Szabolcs-Szatmar and 20 in Bekes (national 
average is 29.4). The available health indicators for East Germany are no 
longer relevant; about 1,800 doctors and dentists as well as 5,000 other 
medical personnel emigrated to the West during 1989 alone, and the 
situation in the hospitals especially has become critical. In Yugoslavia, 
the regional differences relating to the number of medical practitioners 
are not very large (national average is 23 per 10,000 population, with a 
somewhat better situation in Croatia and Slovenia). The differences in 
the number of hospital beds, however, is considerable: 80 in Croatia and 
Montenegro, but only 50 in Macedonia and 40 in Bosnia-Hercegovina 
(national average is 61 ). 
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9.6 Energy infrastructure 
Energy consumption in Central and Eastern Europe in 1987 was 441.5 
million tonnes of oil equivalent. The per capita final energy consumption 
in the region in kilogram oil equivalent, is higher than in Western Europe, 
in large part due to the history of post-war economic development. In 
common with other industrializing countries, Central and Eastern Europe has 
a higher percentage of industrial users than Western Europe (52 percent as 
against 34 percent). Differences in the dependence on oil between Eastern 
and Western Europe are also notable. Following the two global oil shocks, 
reliance on oil in Western Europe fell from 60 percent of total energy 
consumption to 45 percent between 1973 and 1984, while it remained constant 
at 22 percent in Central and Eastern Europe during that period (except in 
Yugoslavia, which showed a decline comparable to Western Europe). 
Differences also exist within Central and Eastern Europe: for example, per 
capita energy consumption in East Germany is 46 percent higher than in 
Hungary. 
Energy in Central and Eastern Europe is based on exploitation of 
local resources and reliance on imports from other countries, most notably 
the Soviet Union. The principal local energy source in Central and 
Eastern Europe is coal, particularly low-grade brown coal. Coal reserves 
are unevenly distributed among the different countries - for example, East 
Germany has 13 times the per capita energy reserves compared to Romania, 
largely the result of the East Germany's coal deposits. Despite extensive 
exploration in the region, oil and gas has not been found as plentiful as 
in the Soviet Union (only in Romania have substantial oil and gas reserves 
been discovered and developed). Consequently, energy production continues 
to be based on coal. In spite of the apparent abundance of coal reserves, 
all the countries in the area are net importers of energy. 
Total energy production in Central and Eastern Europe in 1987 was 336 
million tons oil equivalent. In meeting their energy needs, the countries 
of the area have striven to be self-sufficient. However, because of their 
high energy consumption and the difficulties in extracting the poor 
quality coal of the area, Central and Eastern Europe has traditionally 
relied heavily on oil and gas imports from the Soviet Union. The balance 
between locally-produced and imported energy has shifted considerably over 
the last few decades. In the 1960s and 1970s, most Central and Eastern 
European countries were dependent on Soviet oil and gas as a matter of 
official policy, but this strategy was abandoned as a result of the oil 
shock of the early 1980s. With the rapid rise in the world price of oil 
as well as a decrease in the proportion of this price that the Soviet 
Union was prepared to subsidize, the expense of imported energy forced 
Central and Eastern European governments to reconsider their energy 
policies. The Soviet Union's insistence on Central and Eastern European 
contributions to oil exploration and development projects was a further 
burden on these countries. Finally, oil exports from the Soviet Union 
were increasingly being diverted to the West in order to increase their 
hard currency earnings. 
In consequence, Central and Eastern European countries have begun 
developing their own energy resources more rapidly over the last decade. 
In most cases, this involved an expansion of coal production programmes, 
but governments have also been looking to alternative energy sources 
because of the rapid depletion of those coal areas which can be profitably 
mined and the environmental damage caused by the use of brown coal and 
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lignite. Many countries have started nuclear energy programmes and 
extended the use of alternative energy sources, such as hydroelectric 
power. However, efforts to find new sources of energy have proven 
difficult. Nuclear power programmes have been subject to cutbacks and 
cancellations due to public concern about the safety of nuclear power 
technology in the wake of the Chernobyl disaster in 1986. Hydroelectric 
power is limited to the availability of sufficient water resources, 
restricting its feasible development to the southern countries in the 
area. 
Due to these problems in trying to find new sources of energy, there 
has been increasing pressure to cut down on the high degree of energy 
wastage. All the governments of Central and Eastern Europe have been 
trying to devise methods of reducing energy consumption, particularly in 
industry, through the introduction of new usage standards and pricing 
systems. However, they have been hampered by the economic pressures 
placed on the industrial sector to become competitive with the 
introduction of free market reforms. 
Currently, electrical power is transmitted between the Central and 
Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union through the Integrated 
Electricity Grid, which has its headquarters in Prague. The principal 
energy flows are between the Soviet southern electricity grid and Hungary, 
Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. The system is vulnerable to local supply 
difficulties; this has occurred, for example, in Romania since the 
mid-1980s as the country has exceeded its agreed quotas at the expense of 
Yugoslavia and Hungary. 
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CHAPTER1 0 : REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 
10.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters in Part I of this report have examined regional 
disparities and conditions for a range of socio-economic indicators -
population, employment, unemployment, output, foreign investment, 
environmental conditions and infrastructure in Central and Eastern Europe. 
This chapter integrates the main issues arising from the analysis and 
identifies the most important categories of regional problems. 
The starting point for this review of regional economic problems in 
Central and Eastern Europe is to consider the broader scenario in the 
region as a whole. From this perspective, there is a clear opportunity 
for west-east (and north-south) differences to emerge as the region 
undergoes a transition to a market economy at varying rates of progress. 
East Germany has been reunited with Wèst Germany and absorbed into the EC; 
Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary have made considerable progress with 
economic reform; in Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Romania, the outcome of 
political reforms is still uncertain; and the Soviet Union's western 
republics (the Baltic States, Ukraine and Byelorussia) are showing signs 
of seceding from the USSR amidst a major economic crisis. 
The danger of these variations in stage of economic transition is the 
negative impact on the relationship between individual countries. This 
compounds the problems derived from the region's history of political 
instability, national and regional hostilities and socio-cultural 
differences. Some countries are better placed than others, but all are 
expected to suffer significant economic and social dislocation. Clearly, 
there is a risk that, even with current consensus on the objectives of 
restructuring, political and economic reforms will be obstructed by 
dissatisfaction and demoralisation among the population. The scale of the 
restructuring task is evident from the experiences of the former GDR, at 
one time the "shop-window of socialism"; if East Germany is experiencing 
such severe transitional problems, then the prospects for other Central 
and East European countries (which have no access to the substantial 
resources of West Germany) may be worse, although the rate of 
restructuring may be more managed. Under these circumstances, the 
potential for international tension requires economic development 
strategies to consider the problems of Central and Eastern Europe on a 
region-wide basis. 
With respect to regional economic conditions in the individual 
countries, the following section outlines some of the main categories of 
economic development problems in Central and Eastern Europe: industrial 
restructuring, social problems, infrastructure deficits, environmental 
degradation, agricultural underdevelopment and change, agglomeration and 
peripherality, and territorial minorities. 
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10.2 Industrial restructuring 
The regional economic problems of Central and Eastern Europe are 
dominated by the effects of industrial restructuring. The main feature of 
industrial structures has been a concentration of employment in heavy 
manufacturing industry (mining, iron and steel, textiles, chemicals, 
engineering and shipbuilding) involving the intensive use of raw materials 
and energy. Industry has been almost entirely in state-ownership, 
operated through centrally-planned "national enterprises". 
The organisation of industry featured a considerable degree of 
vertical integration and the organisation of manufacturing in large 
production units. In Hungary, for instance, more than 80 percent of 
manufacturing employment was accounted for by 1,140 state-owned 
enterprises with an average of more than 1,000 employees. 
The spatial distribution of industry is based on major 
industrial-urban agglomerations in the form of industrial "zones" or 
"axes". For the most part, these equate with the availability of raw 
materials. In addition, state planning has attempted to impose more 
centrally-determined patterns of industrial location. 
The large scale and organised division of industrial operations based 
on individual, or a limited number of heavy industrial sectors has given 
rise to so-called "monostructure" regions involving significant dependency 
of employment with few alternative job opportunities. Many of these 
sectors are now at risk from economic restructuring giving rise to 
potentially severe regional problems in areas dominated by coal and metal 
ore mining, heavy engineering, chemicals and textiles. The closure of 
particular industrial plants, or the decline of production, with 
redundancies as a natural consequence, are likely to cause some of the 
most serious regional problems. Even if output rises, the productivity 
increase arising from investment in new machinery will lead to job losses. 
Further disdvantage may arise from the cessation of armaments production 
or the conversion of armament factories to civil production. Although 
alternative production may safeguard some jobs, it is likely to yield 
considerably lower earnings for employees. The reorientation of trading 
relationships away from trade and barter agreements with the Soviet Union 
could also be significant; it has been estimated that, for some regions, 
this could involve a loss of production of up to 50 percent. 
Figure 10.1 maps the location of many of the regions facing 
potentially serious industrial restructuring, including southern areas of 
East Germany, the Upper Silesian district of Poland (including the regions 
of Katowice, Krakowskie and Bielskie), and the eastern areas of Hungary. 
Taking the Central and Eastern European region as a whole, there is a 
large area of industrial restructuring stretching from southern Poland 
through the Slovak Republic to central Hungary. 
The scale and concentration of development, and the close spatial 
linkages between raw material extraction, energy production and the 
location of industry, increase the potential impact of restructuring on 
particular regions. For example, in Czechoslovakia, the spatial impact of 
restructuring on mining and heavy industry will coincide. Mining industry 
regions are expected to be especially badly affected, and many coal mines 
in Czechoslovakia in northern and central Bohemia (eg. the Kladno basin), 
central Slovakia (Handlova) and northern and southern Moravia (Ostrava, 
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Hodonin) may become unprofitable. The majority of metal ore mines are 
also at risk of closure, mainly in eastern Slovakia (Spisska Nova Ves), 
northern Moravia (Bruntal) and central Bohemia (Pribram). The declining 
heavy industries may affect, in particular, Ostrava and surrounding 
districts (northern Moravia), Kosice (eastern Slovakia) and Plzen (western 
Bohemia). Conversion of armament production affects mainly central 
Slovakia (Martin and Povazska Bysktrica). Districts with significant 
employment in heavy machinery, electronics and chemical industries will 
also be affected, and the outdated textiles industry (eastern Bohemia) 
will require major modernisation. 
The areas of East Germany most affected by industrial restructuring 
are concentrated in the south of the region, with major industrial centres 
at Chemnitz (textiles), Halle (chemicals), Suhl (light industry) and 
Dresden (engineering and electronics). Structurally-weak regions 
dominated by single industries include parts of Sachsen, notably Zwickau 
(textiles and vehicle engineering), Borna (energy and fuel), 
Eisenhuettenstadt and Riesa (steel), Thueringen (the Thueringen-Sachsen 
uranium mines), Erfurt and Gera (electronics), and Cottbus in Brandenburg, 
where the dominant sectors are energy and fuel, including brown coal 
mining. 
In Hungary, the primary "crisis-sensitive" regions are those 
heavy-industry dominated regions on the so-called energy axis running from 
the north-east to the south-west of the country. The North Hungarian heavy 
industrial region is a depressed area, and industrial problems are also 
expected in certain North and Middle Transdanube regions and in the county 
of Baranya. To a certain extent, the dominance of Budapest has been 
reduced through planning measures since the 1960s to achieve a more even 
spread of industry. Consequently the proportion of industry in Budapest 
has been reduced by almost one-third. However, Budapest still dominates 
the industrial sector excessively, in particular as a centre for 
manufacturing. The city region has 60 percent of the textile industry, 70 
percent of woollen mills and 90 percent of pharmaceutical output. 
For Poland, Upper Silesia is the largest industrial-urban 
agglomeration in Poland and in Central and Eastern Europe. Its 
concentrated industrial structure (coal mining, ferrous and non-ferrous 
metal ores and engineering) is perceived to be inefficient and to have a 
15-20 year technological lag with West European counterparts; and the 
area suffers from a heavily polluted environment and deficient 
technological infrastructure. Other areas at risk are the mining 
operations in the Old Polish Basin and in the Sudetes, iron and steel 
mills in Warsaw and Cracow, the metal and machine-tool industries 
concentrated in the major towns of Western Poland, and the textile industy 
in Lodz and Bielsko-Biaka. 
Contrary to the position in some other Central and East European 
countries, regional industrial concentration in Bulgaria is decreasing 
with newer centres of growing industrial importance on the Black Sea Coast 
(mainly at Varna-Devnya, Burgas-Kameno and the Dimitrov shipping complex) 
and in the Danube area, notably at Silistra. However, Sofia still 
dominates the industrial geography of the country, and 75 percent of 
industrial potential lies within an area bounded by a major road route 
passing through Sofia, Plovdiv, Stara Zagora, Burgas, Varna, Shumen, 
Veliko Tarnovo, Pleven, Botevgrad and returning to Sofia. Within this 
area, industrial production is based on a network of six major industrial 
complexes. 
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In Yugoslavia, the dispersed pattern of industrial development among 
the constituent republics means that the regional problems arising from 
restructuring may be less concentrated than in other countries. A major 
impact is likely to be experienced in the northern republics which are 
most highly industrialised, notably in Bosnia (Zenica-Vares) and Slovenia 
(Ljubljana). However, concentrations of heavy industrial sectors such as 
steel (which is obsolete and in need of modernization) are located 
throughout the country at Zenica (Bosnia), Sisak and Rijeka (Croatia), 
Jesenice (Slovenia), Smederevo (Serbia), Niksic (Montenegro) and Skopje 
(Macedonia). 
10.3 Social problems: unemployment and migration 
One of the most immediate economic and social effects of 
restructuring is rising unemployment. The reform processes will affect 
social groups, industrial sectors and areas differentially. Evidence from 
Poland, Hungary and Yugoslavia indicates that the poorest segments of 
society will bear the greatest burden of government attempts to overcome 
the economic crisis. Regions with industrial monostructures face the 
prospect of closure of major enterprises, high unemployment and few 
alternative employment opportunities. Concentrations of major 
unemployment could entail significant socio-political tensions that might 
seriously hinder economic reform. Labour unrest is already evident in 
several countries (notably Yugoslavia and Poland) in the face of the 
effects of privatisation and wage freezes. 
At the end of 1990, unemployment in four of the countries in Central 
and Eastern Europe and East Germany stood at the following levels, in 
terms of numbers and percentages of the labour force: 
- Bulgaria 68,354 
- Czechoslovakia 77,000 (1.0 percent) 
- East Germany 642,182 (7.3 percent) 
- Hungary 81,379 (1.7 percent) 
- Poland 1,126,000 (6.1 percent) 
In East Germany a further 1.8 million workers were on short-time 
working in December 1990, of which 300,000 were only working 0-25 percent 
of the time. The total of short-time workers increased again by 160,000 
by February 1991. 
These unemployment figures are expected to rise significantly during 
1991 - projections for Hungary estimate unemployment exceeding 200,000 
(four percent of the labour force), and for Poland a total of at least two 
million people (11.7 percent). 
The regional effects of unemployment depend on the nature and pace of 
the reform programme, in particular the rate at which different sectors or 
activities are liberalised. So far, it appears that the effects of 
industrial restructuring have not yet been substantial. In Poland, for 
example, the differential pattern of unemployment is currently based on 
differences in urban/industrial development. Regional unemployment rates 
range from 2-3 percent in Warsaw to 15-18 percent in the less developed 
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region's of eastern Poland. Similarly, in Yugoslavia, the south-north 
distribution of unemployment reflects industrialisation (from two percent 
in Slovenia; 20 percent in Bosina-Hercegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro; 
and 55 percent in Kosovo). Figure 10.2 provides a map at regional scale 
of the areas of potentially serious unemployment. The worst areas include 
eastern Poland, northern and eastern areas of East Germany, and eastern 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary. There were no available data for Romania. 
Once restructuring gets underway on a significant scale, these 
patterns are likely to change considerably. Estimates of the possible 
impact of unemployment in the future suggest that industrial areas will 
experience sharp rises in unemployment, possibly in excess of 30-50 
percent in some industrial areas of Poland. Already, in East Germany, 
those areas dependent on heavy industry such as chemicals are being 
affected by restructuring, and unemployment is greatest in Neubrandenburg, 
Schwerin and east Berlin. Recent data (July 1991) for Poland indicates 
that the locations of the worst unemployment are shifting towards the 
urban and industrial areas. 
With respect to population migration, the restructuring processes 
imply á significant reallocation of production factors arising from the 
break-up of major state enterprises, the closure of loss-making firms and 
increases in productivity. The mobility of labour will be an essential 
part of the process, yet significant population migration could also be an 
undesirable consequence of lack of jobs and poverty. 
In the Central and East European region, this problem has hitherto 
affected East Germany most. A combination of the desire for consumer 
goods, wage differentials of around 35 percent (between West and East 
Germany), rising unemployment in East Germany and major differences in 
living standards has caused "intra-german" migration of about one million 
people during 1989 and 238,000 in the first half of 1990. During 1989-90, 
much of the high level of emigration from East Germany originated in the 
southern regions (Sachsen lost almost three percent of its population 
during 1989-90). The outmigration continues at a high rate; 10,000 
people per month are leaving from Sachsen alone. 
In Poland it has been estimated that up to 12 million people are 
"potential migrants", particularly from ' the Upper Silesia region and 
surrounding area to reduce the excessive conentration of industry and 
people (although it is clear that not all of these people will actually 
move). In Central and Eastern Europe as a whole, more than 1.3 million 
people (including citizens of the Soviet Union) have migrated to the West 
since the political events of 1989. The high levels of unemployment may 
increase this flow as people seek employment opportunities and higher 
living standards in Western Europe. 
10.4 Infrastructure deficits 
The shortage of infrastructure is considered the major causal factor 
of most of the present problems in Central and Eastern Europe. Transport 
infrastructure in the region is generally of poor quality and overloaded. 
For example, rail networks are extensive but significant parts are 
one-track, the load-bearing capacity is low, and many sections are not 
capable of high-speed travel. Electrification is limited, and the rolling 
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stock suffers from under-investment. With respect to the road network, in 
both Czechoslovakia and Hungary less than one percent of the total road 
network consists of express highways, and many rural roads are not 
metalled. 
There are two main characteristics of regional infrastructure 
provision in Central and Eastern Europe. First, infrastructure 
development relating to transport and telecommunications in most countries 
has concentrated on the major urban areas and the axes of economic 
activity. The concentrations of urban/industrial development in the 
southern parts of East Germany (and in Berlin) are also associated with 
higher levels of telephone ownership and living space. In Poland, the 
provision of telephones in rural, eastern parts of the country is less 
than half the level in Warsaw, Lodz or Krakow. The concentration of 
infrastructure in core regions means that infrastructure and services in 
rural areas, and connections with peripheral and border regions, are very 
secondary. This pattern has in turn encouraged further concentration of 
industrial location of economic activities and agglomeration. 
The second characteristic is the west-east difference in 
infrastructure provision; the availability of infrastructure increases 
with proximity to Western Europe. This reflects the history of 
industrialization in different countries and investment for military 
purposes. Thus, the density of road and rail network is relatively high 
in East Germany, although the quality of construction and maintenance is 
very poor. In Poland, the main feature of transport infrastructure is 
that its density decreases from western to eastern regions of the country. 
10.5 Environmental degradation 
The pattern of industrial development outlined above is frequently 
associated with environmental degradation, caused by the rapid expansion 
and massive development of urban-industrial agglomerations and the 
concentration of major chemicals and raw material processing facilities. 
Soil, water and air pollution is a consequence of inadequate technology 
and lack of investment in purification plants and waste processing 
facilities. 
In general, the worst environmental problems are again concentrated 
in the larger urban and industrial areas. The combination of industrial 
production, power generation and motor vehicle emissions causes serious 
air pollution with a concentration of dangerous materials 3-4 times that 
permitted under West European standards. In Bulgaria, on the basis of 
known heavy pollution in major towns and cities, environmental problems 
are estimated to affect more than 4,300 sq. km of the national territory 
- predominantly highly urbanized areas where 38 percent of the population 
live. Sharp increases of morbidity and high death rates have been 
observed. It is estimated that more than 20 (ie. some 40 percent) of 
industrial agglomerations are in need of urgent measures to combat 
life-threatening environmental damage from raw material processing, energy 
and chemical industries. 
Environmental problems are closely associated with mining activities, 
particularly the preference given to brown coal in primary energy 
consumption. The excavation in the northern Bohemian area of 
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Czechoslovakia has caused the worst devastation of landscape and 
environment in the whole country. in East Germany, also, some of the 
worst pollution is in Sachsen-Anhalt where 40 percent of the workforce is 
employed in primary industries. Similarly in Romania, environmental 
degradation exists in areas with lignite surface mining in Oltenia and the 
non-ferrous mining centres of Baia Mare, Copsa Mica, Zlatna and Slatina. 
Severe adverse effects are also associated with power production, for 
example in the Bulgarian republics of Mihaylovgrad (Kozloduoy), Haskovo 
(Maritsa Istok) and Sofia (Bobov Dol) due to air pollution and the 
accumulation of millions of tonnes of solid waste. The chemical industry 
is another major source of pollutants, notably air pollution and 
groundwater and soil degradation, eg. the sites of the chemical industry 
in Sachsen-Anhalt (Halle) in East Germany. 
Fluvial systems have been a major casualty of pollution damage. In 
Romania, the area with some of the greatest problems is the Danube Delta 
which suffers from severe environmental degradation and is in urgent need 
of the restructuring of water channels, the improvement of water 
circulation among rivers and lake basins and the re-establishment of 
"ecological equilibrium" in certain badly-degraded areas. 
Figure 10.3 maps the areas of serious environmental degradation in 
the region of Central and Eastern Europe. These coincide in many cases 
with areas associated with mining or large-scale industrial or urban 
development. Areas of particularly severe pollution include the Upper 
Silesia area in southern Poland, southern parts of East Germany, northern 
Hungary, and central and eastern areas of Romania. 
In Poland, gross environmental pollution has resulted in the 
identification of 27 areas of "ecological disaster", covering 11 percent 
of the country's surface area and 35 percent of the population. Four of 
these areas are considered unfit for human habitation, and environmental 
pollution has been identified as one of the main causes of relatively high 
infant mortality rate and low average life expectancy. 
10.6 Agricultural underdevelopment and change 
There are several inter-related regional development problems 
relating to agriculture, all of which could lead to a rise in unemployment 
as a consequence of restructuring. Privatisation and efficiency 
improvements such as greater use of technology and improved local 
infrastructure could lead to significant job losses and outmigration. 
First, the proportion of employment engaged in agriculture is very 
high (by West European standards) in parts of Central and Eastern Europe. 
Agriculture is the dominant employer in the north of East Germany in 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (Neubrandenburg and Schwerin), and some areas still 
have more than 50 percent of people employed in agriculture. A similar 
position exists in Poland. Some regions have in excess of 47 percent of 
employment accounted for by agriculture with relatively few industrial 
employment opportunities eg. in Biala Podlaska and Komza. The process of 
agricultural change is likely to reduce the labour intensity of 
agriculture considerably. 
Second, significant agricultural land has, in the past, been 
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nationalised and organised into cooperatives. This varies between 
countries: in Czechoslovakia and Romania, almost 90 percent of 
agricultural land was nationalised. In contrast, in Poland 75 percent of 
the land is privately owned; in Hungary and Yugoslavia the equivalent 
figures are 70 and 83 percent respectively. State-owned agriculture is 
characterised by vast agricultural complexes. Bulgaria has 300 complexes, 
averaging 18,000 ha each, which cover four-fifths of the agricultural 
land. 
Third, there is the problem of underdevelopment. In parts of Central 
and Eastern Europe, conditions for agriculture are good with fertile soils 
and favourable climate, for example in north-east Bulgaria, southern 
Romania, east of the Danube in Hungary, and along the rivers Elbe (central 
Bohemia), Morava (central and southern Moravia), and in western and 
eastern Slovakia, in Czechoslovakia. However, in terms of efficiency and 
productivity, many agricultural regions are relatively backward, again 
mainly because of lack of appropriate infrastructure. 
10.7 Agglomeration and peripheralitv 
The process of industrialisation in Central and East European 
countries has led to concentration and excessive development in some major 
cities. Capital cities such as Prague, Budapest and Sofia have seen 
population development out-stripping the provision of services. In the 
case of Hungary, the main problem is the lack of other cities that could 
compete with Budapest, whereas in Bulgaria, the attempted déconcentration 
of development has been inter-urban rather than inter-regional; hence, 
there is now a series of Bulgarian centres where infrastructure provision 
has not kept pace with industrial development, notably Plovdiv, Varna, 
Bourgas, Rouse, Pleven and Stara Zagora. 
The consequence of industrialisation and concentration leading to 
agglomeration has been the deprivation or neglect of smaller rural 
localities, particularly those in border areas and remote or upland 
regions. Depopulation and underdevelopment is a common characteristic of 
peripheral regions (especially in Bulgaria and Romania) which were 
deprived of centres large enough in size and functions to counter negative 
migration processes. 
10.8 Territorial minorities 
Finally, one of the distinctive regional problems of Central and East 
European countries are regions with territorial minorities. Cultural and 
social differences have been translated into hostility, especially where 
the minority has been subject to chauvinist pressures and repression under 
communist rule eg. the Turkish minority in Bulgaria or Hungarians in 
Romania. The combination of greater political and personal freedoms, 
together with economic dislocation again has the capacity for causing 
social tension and migration flows. In Poland, for example, many people 
in Upper Silesia have declared themselves to be ethnic Germans; the 
creation of a local Polish-German association, and proposals for German 
aid to construct an airport or to provide educational facilities 
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inevitably distort relationships between the majority population and the 
regional minority. More generally, many regional and local political 
pressures were kept subdued under former regimes, and these are now being 
released. 
The problems are most apparent in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and 
Romania - less so in East Germany and Hungary. The potential for social 
tensions in Yugoslavia is especially great. Aside from the ethnic 
variation among the various republics, the country's population of 24 
million also includes significant minorities of Albanians, Hungarians, 
Roma, Turks and Romanians. 
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Figure 10.2: PRINCIPAL AREAS OF INDUSTRIAL RESTRUCTURING 
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Figure 10.3: AREAS OF SEVERE ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION 
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CHAPTER 1 1 : 
MACRO-ECONOMIC STRUCTURAL REFORMS 
OVERVIEW 
11.1 Introduction 
In all Central and East European countries, there is currently debate 
over the pace of economic transition, the most appropriate measures and 
the consequent economic and social costs. In certain cases, basic 
agreement still has to be reached on the need for economic reform. As 
noted for Bulgaria: it is "quite difficult to look forward to the future 
while still engaged in squabbles about the past and identifying who is to 
blame for the present state of the economy". This problem is most 
apparent in Romania where the political and economic restructuring process 
is less advanced. The reform programme has set limits on moves towards a 
market economy because of the social risks and costs, a continuing belief 
in the." capability of national planning, and ideological opposition to 
extensive privatization. Instead,, "the National Salvation Front and the 
government aim to rationalize central planning and use it to accomplish 
structural changes in production and technology" (Jackson, 1990a). 
Thus, distinctions exist between Central and East European countries 
with regard to the transition of economic systems. First, for East 
Germany, unification means a "rapid, make-it-or-bust conversion to 
market-economy structures at great social cost" (Hoehmann and Meier, 
1990). Second, in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, political agreement 
has been established regarding progress towards a market economy, and 
reform programmes have been initiated. Third, in Bulgaria and Romania 
(and also Yugoslavia which is already, to some extent, market-oriented), 
the transition is in various stages of development but lacking political 
concensus or superseded by other political problems. 
The following chapter examines the macro-economic structural reforms 
in Central and Eastern Europe. It describes the challenge of responding 
to severe economic development problems and it reviews the major component 
of reform programmes. 
11.2 The challenge of restructuring 
The current phase of economic restructuring is more fundamental than 
at any time since 1945, since its stimulus was a reforra of political 
conditions, most notably the much-reduced influence of the Soviet Union 
over former socialist countries in Eastern Europe. The common goal of the 
restructuring process is a transition to a market economy. 
However, the economic development problems facing Central and Eastern 
European countries are considerable. The low efficiency of plant and 
machinery is associated with comparatively low productivity levels, 
inefficient and wasteful energy consumption and outdated technological 
infrastructure. Heavy industry predominates with an emphasis on heavy 
engineering, iron and steel, energy and raw materials production. 
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Dependency on trade with the USSR means that international trade links 
beyond the Central and East European area are weak. State planning and 
management has created monopoly suppliers of goods and services, large 
production units with highly vulnerable organisational structures, a high 
level of under-employment or "hidden unemployment", and industrial 
management with limited experience of commercial decision-making. Market 
competition functions very inefficiently, and the small firms sector 
outside agriculture contributes a very low proportion of total output. 
Environmental degradation of ground, water and air quality has frequently 
been severe. Currencies lack complete convertibility, major price reforms 
are required, and there is the threat of increasing inflation. Foreign 
debts in some countries are running at high levels. 
Thus, while the goal of restructuring may be straightforward, the 
means are much less so. The problems and potential policy responses, 
taken individually, are considerable, but their interlinkage means they 
must be addressed together. Macro-economic stabilization requires a 
diversion of resources to promote exports generating hard currency, but 
based on exchange rate convertibility and domestic price reform. The 
development of capital markets to permit the reallocation of resources 
needs to be accompanied by privatisation, new property rights and a new 
institutional and legal framework to allow the private sector to operate 
(and to be protected). The fall' in real incomes and unemployment 
associated with the reforms also necessitates social protection. 
Accordingly, the problems require radical solutions, but in the context of 
societies and economies that may not be able to withstand radical measures 
(Rollo et al 1990). 
The restructuring of economic systems in the Central and East 
European countries has five major elements in common - price reforms, 
privatization, foreign investment, international trade and relations and 
social measures - although clearly there are many other measures being 
introduced such as institutional reform, the decentralised management of 
regional and settlement development, and environmental reform. In the 
remaining sections of this chapter these issues are discussed in turn. It 
should be noted that the discussion largely ignores East Germany where the 
macro-economic situation is totally different. Comparisons of inflation 
rates, price fluctuations or privatisation between East Germany and the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe are not meaningful. 
11.3 Price reforms 
Price reforms are being introduced to provide a system of 
price-setting for goods, services and factors of production that operates 
on the basis of free-market supply and demand rather than state decisions. 
Price distortions, which are partly the result of protecting loss-making 
industries and enterprises, are to be phased out as enterprises are 
privatised or efficiency improvements initiated. In several countries, 
notably Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, controls on the prices of 
commodities are being removed, generally in stages, beginning with some 
foodstuffs, housing (rents), energy and transport. 
Price liberalisation has inevitably led to rapid growth in price 
levels. In consequence, legislation has been introduced to avoid 
uncontrollable price rises. As prices have increased, parallel steps have 
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been taken to limit inflation. Subsidies to enterprises have been 
eliminated, wages and income policies have been designed to freeze the 
wages of public sector employees, and fiscal policy measures have 
encouraged savings and investment. Nevertheless, all countries (except 
East Germany) have been experiencing major inflation. Although the 
extremely rapid rises may have been reduced in some countries during the 
course of 1990, by the end of the year, monthly inflation rates were still 
2-8 percent. Estimated rates for 1990 ranged widely from 10 to 600 
percent. 
11.4 Privatization 
Privatisation is the second important area of economic reform. A 
distinction is drawn between "small-scale privatisation", involving the 
formation of small firms through the transfer of ownership of shops, small 
workshops, service facilities and other small establishments; and 
"large-scale" privatisation which involves the reorganisation and 
transformation of major state enterprises into joint-stock companies. A 
further aspect of privatisation is the restitution of property, 
nationalised under communist rule, to the former owners or their heirs. 
Estimates of the scale of privatisation are difficult to verify. It 
has been suggested that there are approximately one million small 
businesses in Central and Eastern Europe, mostly one-person or family 
operations; 2,000-3,000 large firms, generally in the form of joint stock 
companies; and approximately 10,000 joint ventures with foreign capital. 
Most rapid progress is being made in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary 
and Poland. Overall, private businesses probably account for only 10-15 
percent of non-agricultural production. 
There are several problems within the privatisation programmes. 
First, there is a high failure rate associated with new private firms. 
Second, there are practical obstacles to privatisation. Bureaucratic 
impediments have meant that the privatization of large state companies has 
been particularly slow in Poland and Hungary; and the very 
labour-intensive process has been further delayed by the shortage of 
qualified accountants and lawyers. Third, new social tensions are 
generated by privatization. The removal of central support is inevitably 
linked with job losses and the prospects of further increases in 
unemployment. 
11.5 Foreign investment conditions 
New decrees are opening up the possibility of participation in 
international capital flows, and stimulating joint ventures and foreign 
capital investment. First, restrictions on the sectors or activities in 
which foreign investment is permissible are being lifted. Second, the 
association and combination of domestic and foreign capital (ie. joint 
ventures) is being permitted. Third, restrictions on reinvestment or 
export of profits are being eased, but not always completely liberalised. 
The response of foreign investors is difficult to assess. Data on 
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the number of joint ventures varies greatly, and the definitions used 
variously refer to the number of new permits issued, the number of company 
registrations or the number of actual investments. Clearly the number of 
joint ventures has been growing, but much more in countries such as 
Hungary and Poland than in Romania or Bulgaria (Further details on the 
response of foreign investors are provided in Part I, Chapter 7). 
Hungary is offering favourable tax holidays to foreign investors and 
now permits the purchase of up to 100 percent of a local enterprise and 
the repatriation of profits. This has led to a very rapid growth in the 
number of joint ventures during 1990; according to the Government, there 
are now more than 5,000 joint ventures operating in Hungary with capital 
invested of more than US$ 1 billion. Much of the investment is accounted 
for by Germany, Austria and the US. 
For some other countries, the level of foreign investment has been 
disappointing. The main criticism by foreign investors has been the 
degree of bureaucracy encountered. In Romania, for example, a decree-law 
passed in March 1990 allows joint ventures and new foreign investment, but 
it entails bureaucratic procedures, fees and taxes, prohibitive provisions 
on the transfer of profits abroad, and there are problems of political 
stability arising from the slow progress towards a market economy and 
democratization (Gafton, 1990). Similarly in Bulgaria, the utilisation of 
foreign investment is still expected to involve specified projects and be 
undertaken through negotiations with the appropriate state enterprises and 
institutions. 
11.6 International trade and relations 
In addition to promoting foreign investment in the CEE countries, 
increased trade and contacts with Western countries and membership of 
international organisations are regarded as a priority. The generation of 
hard currency, the development of investment and finance markets, and the 
receipt of Western assistance and know-how are important motivating 
factors. The maintenance and rescheduling of substantial foreign debts is 
also significant, especially in Poland (where hard currency debts amount 
to US$ 47 billion), Bulgaria (US$ 10 billion) and Hungary (US$ 21 
billion). There are no rescheduling requirements in Yugoslavia and 
Czechoslovakia. 
In support of these objectives, currency convertibility has been a 
major step, generally in stages - internally at first, then 
internationally. This has meant a significant devaluation in the value of 
currencies. Other common policy measures include the ratification of 
agreements and participation in international organisations, notably the 
World Bank and IMF. The liberalisation of foreign trade has meant the 
loosening of import controls and foreign exchange regimes, the 
simplification of the opening of foreign currency accounts, and permission 
for enterprises and citizens to purchase foreign currency and to hold 
foreign currency accounts. 
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11.7 Social measures 
The primary social concern of governments in Central and Eastern 
Europe is the dislocation that economic reforms could create and the 
prospect of high unemployment exacerbating socio-political tensions. With 
unemployment rising, the prices of consumer goods being increased" and 
wages of public sector employees being frozen, the potential for social 
discontent is significant. 
In response, policy measures have been designed to provide basic 
social security and unemployment benefit. Networks of employment offices 
have been set up throughout Poland and Czecholsovakia to provide 
information on jobs and to disburse benefits; and in Hungary, public 
works programmes to provide employment and to encourage labour mobility 
are being considered. 
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CHAPTER 12; REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 
12.1 Introduction 
The contribution or participation of the regions in structural 
reforms, and the speed with which market-based regional policies can be 
initiated, depends partly on the degree of régionalisation of economic 
development strategies in the past. This chapter examines the nature of 
regional development strategies in centrally-planned economies, national 
experiences with regional development and current approaches to regional 
policy, notably in East Germany. 
12.2 Regional development strategies in centrally-planned economies 
In the past, the centralised control and allocation of resources has 
given Central and East European governments potentially far greater 
leverage to reduce regional disparities than their Western counterparts. 
They have been able to implement regional policies very effectively 
"through their near monopoly over investment so that the required 
discrimination can be imposed on appropriate branches of the economy" 
(Turnock, 1989b). It has been possible, for example, to direct the 
location and spatial linkages of large firms. Although the agglomerations 
and concentrations of heavy industry have maintained their importance, 
light industry has frequently been used to develop backward areas and to 
promote the growth of regional centres (Turnock, 1989a). The Central and 
East European countries have also been ideologically committed to equality 
and regional equity. 
However, regional development in Central and Eastern Europe is 
confronted by the same dichotomy that is faced in all countries: the 
relative priorities given to national growth and regional development. 
The requirements of national economic development have inevitably meant 
prioritising key sectors, and regional plans have often been subordinated 
to sectoral plans. 
"In practice, therefore, communist governments have been obliged to 
compromise on equity in order to maximise output: disparities between 
regions and income groups have been reduced only slowly and significant 
variations remain" (Turnock, 1989b). 
Especially in the earlier periods of industrialization, the main task 
of regional public administration was to implement the aims of central 
government. Regional administrations, and most industrial enterprises, 
were directly subject to sectoral ministries. In the drive to 
industrialize as rapidly as possible, social issues as well as structural 
and regional distortions to the economy tended to be ignored (Perger, 
1989). 
The nature of command economies under Communist governments involved 
126 
very significant spatial centralisation of economic activity and control 
functions in particular. The size and scale of very large, 
vertically-organized agricultural and industrial enterprises and 
infrastructure required organization at the national level rather than 
regionally or locally. There tended to be a much greater reluctance (than 
in Western countries) to establish industries in smaller towns and to 
develop marginal areas given the distance from the centre" of 
administration and the additional problems arising from poor transport and 
power supply (Turnock, 1989a). Where regional development was given 
greater priority in Central and Eastern Europe, programmes and policies 
were undertaken primarily through spatial planning. The objectives have 
generally been to equalize socio-economic development - to prevent 
migration or to promote decentralization from capital cities; and to 
promote new resource exploitation or industrialization. However, the 
plans for individual territorial units have usually been components of 
more general national and sectoral plans. Decentralized decision-making 
for economic management has been limited, tightly controlled from the 
centre, and subject to reversal at times of economic crisis or political 
instability. 
The implementation of regional planning and regional policy in 
Eastern Europe has to be seen through the same political lens as other 
aspects of economic reform. Although regional development may have been 
implemented in response to economic motives, political factors have also 
been important, in particular the need to suppress or satisfy regional 
interests such as territorial minorities. The reorganization of regional 
administrations, for example, involving the subdivision or redefinition of 
regions, can be seen as a classic means of reducing the influence of 
regional interests. The devolution of economic management to the regional 
level, which (to varying degrees and generally during periods of economic 
growth) has been part of several economic reform experiments in the past, 
was frequently halted or reversed when the economic climate worsened or 
political control was tightened. 
12.3 National experiences with regional development 
The degree to which regional policy or regional planning was given 
priority in Central and Eastern Europe was closely related to the nature 
of macro-economic policies. Reflecting its comparatively liberal, 
market-style economy, Hungary has undertaken the most progressive regional 
policy among Central and East European countries. The Hungarian regional 
strategy, implemented during the 1970s and early 1980s, involved a 
regional equalisation policy which allocated central government funds to 
very "disadvantaged" regions, assistance to support employment in "crisis" 
regions, as well as the provision of a fund for new start-ups. However, 
regional policy was implemented over a period when the objectives of 
national economic policy changed significantly - from the inception of the 
New Economic Mechanism in 1968 and the policy of regional equalisation and 
decentralisation, to the period of retrenchment after 1979 and 
reconstruction in richer, already developed regions. This inevitably 
affected the vigour with which regional policy was implemented. 
The main aims of regional policy in Hungary have been varied: the 
prevention of rural depopulation; the expansion of medium-sized cities to 
alleviate the problems of overcrowding and overloaded infrastructure in 
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Budapest; the equalization of regional incomes and living standards; and 
greater freedom for local government. Policy measures have been largely 
based on settlement and industrial planning. The National Settlement 
Development Strategy, launched in 1971, classified 1,100 settlements into 
a four-tier functional hierarchy, each tier having population and 
development targets. However, the abandonment of some 2,000 settlements 
not included in the Strategy led to its overhaul and redesign in 1961 in 
favour of a more uniformly based settlement plan (Carter, 1989). 
Official support or discouragement has effectively determined the 
location of firms. Despite the growing self-control of financial 
investment by enterprises since 1968, the central supervision of 
industrial investment remained dominant. Thus, certain types of 
enterprise, especially those associated with environmental pollution, were 
actively decentralised from Budapest and relocated in areas like the Great 
Hungarian Plains. New plants were sited in small towns and villages to 
create jobs for women and redundant agricultural workers (Carter, 1989). 
A further regional development measure was infrastructure investment, 
undertaken jointly by central and county governments. However, 
infrastructure investment was determined by the level of government grants 
to the counties. Since the richer counties within the regions secured 
larger grants, over a 20-30 year period 80 percent of infrastructure 
investment was allocated to prosperous regions in the north of the 
country, and historical north-south divisions within the country were 
largely maintained. 
With a switch in government policy, the regional convergence achieved 
during the 1970s was reversed in the 1980s as a result of national 
development priorities replacing regional objectives. The equalisation 
strategy was superseded by "differentiation" tendencies which led to 
greater development of the more prosperous industrial areas (of greater 
importance to national economic development). "This suggests that the 
degree of achievement of regional policy objectives has depended less upon 
spatial policies than upon macro-economic and labour market policies" 
(Sillince, 1987). 
The regional equalisation approach has also been applied in 
Yugoslavia where development measures for the less developed republics and 
provinces were an important component of Yugoslav economic development 
policy. Early economic reform in the 1950s and 1960s involved some 
devolution of decision-making regarding state investments to republic or 
community levels. The initial strategy to address considerable regional 
inequalities involved the large-scale transfer of resources to 
under-developed regions through the direct allocation of investment and 
plan targets for income distribution. This was replaced in 1965 by a 
special fund for the Development of Insufficiently-Developed Areas, based 
on the categorisation of republics and provinces into "developed" 
(Slovenia, Croatia, Vojvodina, Serbia Proper) and "less developed" 
(Montenegro, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Macedonia and Kosovo). The policy 
involved the allocation of up to two percent of the social sector 
economy's gross material product to the development of the less developed 
regions as well as the inter-regional reallocation of resources (Flaherty, 
1988; Bazler-Madzar, 1988). 
It is important to note that the Yugoslav development policy retained 
significant central control over the allocation of regional expenditure; 
it maintained the principle of central decision-making over 
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enterprise-related investment despite the self-management of enterprises. 
Indeed, federal economic management increased again during the 1980s. In 
terms of the results of policy, considerable development gains were 
achieved in the less-developed regions, but the divisions between the two 
classes of region remained. Regional disparities increased continuously, 
eg. in 1960, Slovenia's social product per capita was 4.8 times higher 
than in Kosovo, and by 1989 this had increased to 7.5 times. 
Consequently, over the past few years the adequacy of the present system 
has been questioned as being too arbitrary and crude: "there has never 
been a detailed regional development plan" (Dawson, 1987). 
The central control of regional development is still more evident in 
some of the other Central and East European countries. In Poland, 
regional development has taken the form of regional planning or the 
regional allocation of centrally-determined funds. The planned location 
of industry was an important instrument under these policies and it was 
utilised to promote the development of five new industrial areas in 
central Poland (Konin, Plock and Pulawy), in the south-west 
(Legnica-Glogow) and south-east (Tarnobrzeg). Government agencies (the 
Central Planning Office and the Ministry for Physical Planning and 
Construction) were responsible for formulating and implementing "regional" 
or "spatial" policies, but they generally involved only the production of 
economic, physical and urban plans relating to land use. As elsewhere in 
Eastern Europe, regional expenditure was determined by the allocations to 
regional authorities (voivodships) from the central government. However, 
there has been a relationship between the proportion of central 
contributions to regional budgets and the level of economic development in 
the regions. To a certain extent, this indicates some encouragement of 
regional equity through a reduction of economic development differences 
between the regions (Ciechocinska, 1989). 
In Bulgaria also, measures have been undertaken to promote regional 
development but firmly within the context of centrally-designed and 
administered planning. The goals of spatial planning have been to reduce 
regional differences in socio-economic development and to equalize 
regional incomes. As a result, various specialised industries and 
activities were often located within separate regions. Regional issues 
were also dealt with centrally, especially in matters concerning national 
and international markets. "Regional policy...is used for the 
redistribution of resources, for the formation of enterprises from which 
socio-economic development is organized and for the delimitation of 
territorial-production complexes... in particular regions...planned with 
respect to economy, society and ecology" (Popov and Demerdijev, 1989). 
Where specific regional programmes have been introduced, they were 
associated with special objectives such as the regulation of population 
migration and the exploitation of new natural resources eg. in 
south-eastern Bulgaria, notably the Strandja and Sakar regions. 
The picture is the same in Czechoslovakia where regional policy has 
been an indisputable part of the general economic strategy, but so-called 
(economic) regional policy was organised as a part of direct 
(administrative) regional planning. In East Germany, the primary 
objective of planning was to combine sectoral and territorial 
administration. Economic management was based on decisions of sectoral 
ministries, operating through Kombinate comprising various numbers of 
enterprises. Investments and developments within regional and other 
territorial units were undertaken almost wholly on the basis of central 
planning and plan targets; the allocations to the districts {Bezirke) or 
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counties {Kreise) were based on central assessments of territorial 
requirements. However, there was "no separate regional development 
planning for achievement of either increased or more equal development 
between regions of places of work or infrastructure" (Braeuniger, 1989). 
Lastly, regional development in Romania was perhaps more of a 
political action than anywhere else in Eastern Europe. As with other 
aspects of Romanian economic reform announced in the mid-1960s, the 
devolution and déconcentration of central planning was very limited, and 
the spatial dimension of "concentrated decentralization" produced only a 
few large local centres. The most significant feature of the regional 
development process began in the early 1970s with the policy of 
"systematization". An artificial hierarchy of settlements was established 
which distorted the historical settlement system, involving the 
development of selected towns and neglecting others. "These reforms were 
dominated by political objectives: the main purpose was to suppress 
regional or national minority interests" (Perger, 1989). In response to 
economic difficulties, even the limited decentralization of industrial 
development authority was reversed by the early 1980s. Central management 
became progressively stricter until complete autarky was in force by 1985 
with each individual territorial unit subject entirely to central control. 
12.4 Current regional development approaches 
The current situation regarding the development of regional policies 
in Central and Eastern Europe has to be seen in the context of two sets of 
factors - historical and administrative. First, it is important to 
appreciate the role of historical factors in Central and Eastern Europe 
and their effect on regional development. The break-up of the 
Austro-Hungarian empire and the designation of new borders left Hungary 
with no major cities to rival Budapest. In Poland, it has to be 
recognised that the country disappeared for over 100 years and only 
reappeared after 1918. The country has had relatively little time to 
readjust, and the impact of the 19th century is still apparent. Also, 
after 1945 the boundaries of the country shifted westwards. This led to 
major differences in agriculture, for example between large-scale farms of 
the former Prussian estates in the north and the very small-scale 
agriculture in the south of the country. 
Second, the reform of territorial structures is in progress in several 
countries. As noted earlier, the structure of territorial units under 
Communist political rule and central planning is not necessarily 
appropriate for market economies. In Poland, the former map of 17 
provinces was split up into 49 voivodships in 1973, primarily for political 
reasons since it was easier to maintain central control of a large number 
of weaker regions. Currently, several former CMEA countries are 
reassessing their regional structures. An important task is the creation 
of regions that are large enough to be competitive on a European scale and 
that are "visible" on a map of Europe. A further objective is to give 
people a regional identity as part of the need to stimulate individual 
responsibility and collective effort within units which are smaller than 
the state as a whole. This reasoning underpins the rapid reorganisation of 
territorial structures in East Germany with the creation of five Laender 
from the 15 districts {Bezirke) that formerly represented the largest 
territorial units. Territorial reform is also evident at the local level; 
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in both East Germany and Poland, the Kreise and communes are considered to 
be too small and are in the process of being enlarged. 
The relationships between central and regional government levels are 
also being restructured. There is a commitment to the ideal of government 
only intervening where absolutely necessary but, after 40 years of strong 
and pervasive state control, there is a considerable amount of learning 
and experience necessary. 
At the start of this report, it was noted that the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe can be classified into three groups on the 
basis of their progress with economic and political reform. The same 
three-fold categorisation is also relevant to the current situation 
regarding the development of regional policies. 
In the first category, East Germany has inherited a comprehensive set 
of market-based economic development instruments; some are extensions of 
West German policy measures, and others have been specifically designed 
for East Germany. At the other extreme, is the group of Bulgaria, Romania 
and Yugoslavia which retain elements of central planning and control; to 
a certain extent, regional development is still considered in terms of the 
central allocation of regional , expenditure and centrally-determined 
regional planning. The remaining countries - Poland, Czechoslovakia and 
Hungary - are in between: central planning has been abolished and market 
reforms introduced, but the restructuring process does not yet involve a 
market-based regional policy. 
12.4.1 East Germany 
In East Germany, regional policy (beyond the macro-economic 
structural policy measures outlined above) comprises special adjustment 
assistance for industry and special infrastructure programmes. Regional 
economic aid is available through the Gemeinschaftsaufgabe (GA) 
"Verbesserung der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur" (Joint Task for the 
Improvement of Regional Economic Structures), the framework for regional 
policy which has operated in West Gemany for over 20 years. The entire 
area of the former GDR has been designated as eligible for GA assistance, 
initially for five years. 
Within the designated GA area of East Germany, the Federal Government 
and the new Laender are providing DM 3 billion per year for investaent 
grants for trade and industry; the regional allocation of the funds is 
being provisionally undertaken according to population. Under GA 
regulations, the investment grants may provide support of up to 23 percent 
(of investment costs) for new start-ups, 20 percent for expansion projects 
and 15 percent for reorganisation and rationalisation projects. The 
grants may be cumulated with other investment aid which is not defined as 
"regional" (such as the investment allowances described in section 10) up 
to a maximum level of 33 percent of investment costs. 
To supplement the standard GA regional aid, it was decided during 
early 1991 to provide further resources for those parts of the Laender of 
Mecklenburg-Verpommern, Brandenburg, Sachsen-Anhalt, Thueringen and 
Sachsen (as well as the eastern area of Berlin) which are particularly 
affected by structural change. A "special programme" with a Federal 
budget of DM 1.2 billion (and matching Land assistance) has been made 
available for 1991 and 1992 for the creation and safeguarding of new jobs. 
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The new employment assisted under the programme should be associated 
primarily with private sector investment projects which contribute to the 
diversification of regional economic structures and accelerated 
application of product and process innovations. 
The allocation of the special programme expenditure is as follows: 
Land 
- Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 
- Brandenburg 
- Sachsen-Anhalt 
- Thueringen 
- Sachsen 
- Berlin 
DM mill 
150 
180 
200 
220 
360 
90 
Total 1,200 
Most of the areas eligible for the additional regional aid are in the 
southern part of east Germany: Sachsen and Thueringen alone account for 
almost half of the aid. However, in order to ensure that the assistance 
is concentrated where structural change is most severe, the eligible areas 
in any one state are restricted to a maximum of 40 percent of the Land 
population. 
In addition to industrial investment support, GA funds are being used 
to supplement communal investeent in local economic infrastructure eg. 
industrial estates and utilities. Although the communes are expected to 
make some contribution of their own, GA funding may support up to 90 
percent of the infrastructure financing cost. The grants are awarded 
predominantly on a "first-come-first-served" basis (there is no legal 
entitlement) and, for 1991, are already fully utilised. 
Further support for ccmununal investment is available through a loan 
programme approved under the Unification Treaty as. well as additional aid 
of more than DM 50 billion, agreed in early 1991, which is partly 
available for infrastraucture development. Over the period 1991-1993, a 
budget of DM 10 billion has been made available from the ERP Special Fund. 
(The ERP originated in the European Recovery Programme, part of the 
post-war Marshall Plan, which was initially used for reconstruction and, 
since 1953, has promoted economic development in West Germany.) The Fund 
will be apportioned between the Kreditanstalt fuer Wiederaufbau, KfW (the 
Credit Bank for Reconstruction), the Deutsche Ausgleichsbank (German 
Equalisation Bank) and the Berliner Industriebank (Berlin Industry Bank) 
to provide lending to local authorities for investment in environmental 
protection, industrial sites and estates, transport facilities, urban 
development and social infrastructure. Private investment may also 
qualify for loan support insofar as it is of benefit to the local area. 
Debt financing and funding for projects already underway are only 
available under exceptional circumstances. The duration of loan funding 
is a maximum of 20 years with up to five years free of principal 
repayment; the current rate of interest is 7.5 percent. By the end of 
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1990, around one quarter of the available funding had been committed. 
To encourage links between the former border areas, a 
Grenzraumprogramm (Border Area Programme) has been created. This provides 
DM 200 million (of which DM 50 million is from the Federal Government) for 
1990-1991 for the West and East German Laender situated on either side of 
the former inter-German border, and also for Berlin. The fund is being 
used to expand and improve the infrastructure of the zonal border area of 
the former GDR. The projects to be financed under this programme have 
already been established, and the funds have been completely exhausted. 
As part of the privatisation programme, the Treuhandanstalt (Trust 
Office) is making available loans and guarantees based on extensive 
authorisation to borrow up to DM 25 billion in support of redevelopment 
and privatisation ventures. It is anticipated that the interest payments 
will be met from the proceeds of privatisation. 
The improvement of the East German housing stock is being addressed 
by the KfW with loan funding of DM 10 billion (at an interest rate some 
three percent below the market rate) over the period 1990-1993. The loans 
take the form of expenditure grants with an award rate of up to DM 500 per 
square metre or a total value of DM 400,000. 
Further national measures in support of structural adjustment are 
provided through a range of other budgets including advice on 
restructuring, trade fair assistance and retraining and qualification 
measures. 
International aid has been provided primarily by the EC through the 
Structural Funds and the PHARE programme. Supplementary to the EC 
Structural Fund resources already allocated to Germany for the period up 
to 1993 (which do not take East Germany into account), an additional EC 
special programme, with funding of ECU 3 mrd, has been made available for 
the next three years. The special programme is designed for joint 
programmes with the Federal Republic, and a detailed plan of how the 
resources could be used was formulated by the Federal Government in early 
1991. 
Under the PHARE programme, a total of ECU 35 million was made 
available for East Germany during 1990 in three seperate stages. Of the 
total, ECU 20 million was designated for environmental measures (notably 
in Sachsen), ECU 14 million for regional economic development, and a 
further ECU 1 million for training in further education. 
Apart from the Border Area Programme and the special regional 
programme, the above assistance is available throughout East Germany. 
However, it is anticipated that within three years, the emergence and 
identification of regional disparities will permit (and require) more 
regional differentiation of aid, for three main reasons. First, the scale 
of region-wide funding is too great to be maintained beyond the short 
term. Second, the costs in the medium terra will be at the expense of 
economic development in the less prosperous parts of West Germany. Third, 
particular regions in East Germany are at special risk and are in need of 
more concentrated help. 
Within the GA programme, there is a quantified series of designation 
criteria, although developed hitherto for use in West Germany, that will 
be adapted for nation-wide use to allow the designation of eligible areas. 
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Under the ERP and KfW programmes, some loan funding for sectoral purposes 
may remain available throughout East Germany, but regional differentiation 
may also be expected - either through spatial restrictions or interest 
rate preferences for specified areas. 
There is an important political dimension to any new regional policy 
that evolves in the united Germany. In recent years, West Germany - as 
one of the more prosperous countries of the EC - has been under great 
pressure from the European Commission (through DGIV) to reduce the spatial 
coverage of its GA designated areas. The four-yearly German redesignation 
exercises have had to make successive reductions in the GA areas and to 
amend the area designation system accordingly. The Laender in West 
Germany are now concerned that any new regional policy that includes East 
Germany in the assessment of regional disparities will produce a GA 
assisted area map under which many West German problem areas will lose 
out. 
However, the application of any sophisticated designation system, 
similar to that which has been used hitherto in West Germany, will take 
some time. It will take several years for the regional development trends 
in East Germany to become apparent, and change is currently proceeding 
very rapidly. Only when the development process stabilises and trends 
become somewhat more predictable will it be possible to use statistical 
indicators for assessing regional disparities. 
12.4.2 Other Central and East European countries 
Outside East Germany, the regional emphasis of economic development 
is on regionalization rather than regional policy. As noted above, this 
process is involving the creation of new regions and territorial units 
appropriate to the administration of a market economy, but also reflecting 
the pressures from formerly latent regional interests. For example, 
Czechoslovakia is considering re-establishing the historical regions of 
Bohemia and Moravia; more fundamentally, the question of separation of 
the Czech and Slovak republics has been raised. In Yugoslavia, it was 
expected that the development of a confederal system could lead to current 
republics becoming "sovereign" states with independence for creating and 
implementing economic development. However, recent hostilities between 
the republics has thrown all previous assumptions and predictions into 
doubt. 
The creation of new regional structures will take considerable time. 
The rapid completion of the process in East Germany reflects the existence 
of historical Laender and the availability of West German administrative 
experience in creating new institutional structures. Elsewhere in Central 
and Eastern Europe, where this expertise is not immediately available, the 
process is taking place much more slowly. 
With respect to the design of regional policies or instruments, the 
current situation in most countries is that regional policy is "passive" 
without any distinct outlines. Direct economic planning has ceased to 
exist and, as a result, direct regional (economic) planning is no longer 
viable. However, replacements have not yet been found or decided. The 
majority of national policies currently do not contain a "regional 
dimension". 
Regional incentives, comparable to those being applied in East 
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Germany, are not yet feasible in Central and East European countries, 
since an appropriate institutional infrastructure is not yet in place. 
New banks are only beginning to appear to replace the former dominance of 
"national banks", and lending to private business is a relatively new 
experience. Special foundations are being set up with government support 
to provide advice and finance. 
Insofar as a regional dimension to national restructuring policies 
does exist, it is oriented towards the problem of unemployment and 
environmental degradation. In Hungary and Poland, some state programmes 
are being designed, though not yet fully implemented, to counter 
unemployment on a regional basis. Networks of regional employment 
agencies (250 in Poland) have been established throughout the country, 
acting as clearing houses for those seeking work and offering jobs. Local 
agencies for economic initiatives, aimed at creating new jobs, are being 
designed, but few results have been obtained as yet. To a certain extent, 
priority is being given to regions likely to suffer most from regional 
restructuring but with few resources. For example in Yugoslavia, as noted 
above, the relatively small sum of US$ 150 million is being allocated to 
the poorer parts of the country, mostly in the south and generally in the 
form of■■ social security and unemployment benefits. In Poland, central and 
regional governments are cooperating to construct a "skeleton" of regions 
where environmental conditions are favourable and which can be used to set 
standards that can be emulated by regional environmental action elsewhere. 
These examples of employment or environmental initiatives at the 
regional level cannot be considered as regional policy. At this stage, 
they are regionalised aspects of national policy initiatives. 
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CHAPTER 1 3 : FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR REGIONAL POLICY 
13.1 Introduction 
The development of regional policies in the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe is highly problematic given the lack of experience with 
market-oriented regional development strategies and the rapidly changing 
nature of regional problems. However, it is important that the "regional 
dimension" is not neglected in the process of structural reform; regional 
policy has a significant role to play in both the short and medium to long 
terms. The following chapter examines the obstacles to regional policy, 
possible short term regional development objectives and the tasks for 
regional policy in the longer term. 
13.2 Obstacles to regional policy 
There are two main difficulties in developing market-based regional 
policies at this point in time. First, there are objections from the 
policy perspective. At the current stage in the economic reform process, 
countries such as Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia perceive it to be 
premature to discuss important regional economic development strategies. 
The initial priority is clearly to develop strategies at the national 
level. Surviving the economic changes is considered to be of paramount 
importance rather than distributional or equity issues. 
The second major set of objections to the development of regional 
development policies relate to the difficulties in identifying regional 
problems. An important issue is that the "regional problem", during and 
following a period of economic transition, still has to become apparent 
and to be defined, ie. the disparities in the development of regions 
(districts, provinces, counties etc) and the diverse processes and events 
taking place within them. In Hungary, a new government ministry (Ministry 
of the Environment) has only recently been created to establish a new land 
use physical framework plan and to establish a new data set on important 
regional indicators which can be used for planning and policy-making at 
different levels. 
There is the likelihood that current assumptions may become erroneous 
if new development possibilities emerge. For example, the district of 
Miada Boleslav in Czechoslovakia may be significantly at risk due to its 
unfavourable one-sided industrial structure (transportation machinery), 
but agreements with foreign investors could increase its development 
potential very rapidly. Furthermore, there can be no single map of 
regional disparities. According to the "economics of shortages", every 
change will lead to significant problems for some groups and areas. Thus, 
it is argued that policy-makers should wait for a "transformation period" 
of 1-2 years until restructuring in manufacturing becomes clearer. 
Against this background, prognoses of regional development 
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requirements in Central and Eastern Europe are difficult to make. The 
following outline of potential objectives for regional policy, therefore, 
is highly speculative. It divides possible economic development action at 
the regional level into two groups: policy measures over the short term 
(1-2 years), and policies for the medium to long term. 
13.3 Short-term regional development objectives 
In the short term, there are two potential areas for regional-level 
action by policy-makers - firstly, to support and strengthen national 
economic development with complementary regional measures, and secondly, 
to provide emergency aid to relieve the worst regional effects of 
restructuring. 
13.3.1 Strengthening national development measures 
It is evident from the above discussion that, at this stage, the main 
national priorities are national economic survival during the transition 
phase. There is relatively little scope for policy measures aimed at the 
reduction of regional disparities and addressing the difficulties of 
problem regions. The majority of economic development policies will be 
applied nationally and nationwide. The threats to the cohesiveness of the 
Central and East European countries, especially Yugoslavia and 
Czechoslovakia reinforce the necessity of applying policies that promote 
rather than diminish national cohesion. Furthermore, the difficulties of 
identifying and defining spatial disparities at a time of rapid economic 
change present major difficulties for the development of any regional 
policy. 
In this situation, insofar as regional discrimination is possible in 
the application of policy measures, the regional component of initial 
economic policies during the transition period should promote potential 
growth regions. Regional policies should support national economic 
development measures by promoting those regions that can take a lead (and 
respond positively) in the restructuring process. Since all regions will 
be facing considerable difficulties in adjusting to the new, 
market-oriented economic environment, it may be necessary to concentrate 
regionalised resources on those regions and activities which are crucial 
for international competitiveness and trade. Based on the current map of 
regional development, and assumptions about how the restructuring 
processes may proceed, it is possible to identify various eligible "areas 
of potential" that may remain - or become - growth regions during and 
following the transition period. 
First, there are regions of industrial development potential. These 
are likely to be diversified industrial regions with a relatively good 
material and technical base and experienced personnel (in sectors such as 
chemicals, machine-tools and electronics), good infrastructure and 
international links; the best examples of these areas are generally the 
capital city regions. 
Second, the "areas of potential" include regions dominated by primary 
sectors; in Hungary (lowland areas), north-east Bulgaria and elsewhere in 
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the region, there are considerable areas of agricultural development 
potential. Third, major opportunities should be available to areas with 
foreign investment potential. In the most advantageous position will be 
capital cities and other urban/industrial centres. Requirements include a 
relatively diversified and modern industrial base and good technical 
infrastructure, but also efficient public and private support services. 
Fourth, regions of geographical potential are areas sharing borders 
with developed market economies eg. the western border areas of Poland, 
the Baltic Sea regions with links to Scandinavia, Czechoslovak regions 
bordering Germany and Austria, and Hungarian regions on the border with 
Austria (all Hungarian border regions are expected to benefit except those 
on the border with Romania). Lastly, there are areas of tourism potential 
where the environment is relatively unspoiled and which will provide novel 
tourist locations for western visitors in particular. Examples include 
the coastal areas and the lakes in northern Poland, the Adriatic coastline 
and mountains of Yugoslavia (already relatively well exploited). 
13.3.2 Emergency aid 
Earlier it was noted that the scale of industrial reorganisation 
could have significant and damaging social consequences in the form of 
high unemployment and population migration. In Western Europe, the 
reaction to the closure of major plants in old-industrialised regions has 
been to initiate strategies for the creation of replacement jobs. Such 
strategies inevitably take time and, at present, the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe may not have the time, resources or expertise to 
implement appropriate measures. 
In the short term, it will be necessary to employ some emergency or 
"firefighting" measures to contain the worst effects of restructuring in 
the monostructure problem regions where unemployment could potentially be 
greatest. An analogy to this may be the Notstandsgebiete (Emergency 
Areas) delineated in Germany after the Second World War to reconstruct 
areas with severely damaged productive capacity and to alleviate high 
local levels of unemployment. Policy measures were aimed at clearing away 
war damage and reconstructing plant and infrastructure which had been 
damaged or dismantled. 
In the context of Central and Eastern Europe, there would be two main 
tasks for policy in such "Emergency Areas" in the short term: to 
ameliorate the worst effects of national economic policies, notably 
unemployment; and to help overcome the worst environmental disasters that 
have been created over the past 40 years. After 1-2 years, it can be 
anticipated that there would be scope for reassessment and the initiation 
of a medium to long-term regional development strategy. To contain 
unemployment in the Emergency Areas over the short term and to alleviate 
the effects of job losses, consideration could be given to continuing 
government support - in certain areas - for existing industries and 
enterprises. This should allow time for a controlled phasing of 
restructuring, notably privatization and improvements in productivity, and 
the preparation of strategies for the creation of replacement jobs. Such 
an approach would also help to stabilise the movement of population and 
discourage excessive inter-regional and international migration that could 
exacerbate economic and social tensions. It is likely that mining and 
agricultural areas would be most immediately in need of such emergency 
aid. 
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Immediate action to start solving the most severe environmental 
problems is also necessary. Although the problems of industrial 
restructuring and environmental degradation are closely inter-linked and 
will have to be addressed as part of a longer term strategy, short-term 
response to pollution will be necessary. As noted above, in several parts 
of Central and Eastern Europe, the level of dust, gases or other noxious 
emissions and the pollution of water sources have become threatening to 
human life, as well to overloaded local ecosystems. This task is of 
international interest, since the effects of environmental damage 
frequently transcend regional and national borders. 
13.4 Medium and long term regional development objectives 
Once major macro-economic reform measures are in place with a new 
framework of national economic development, it will be necessary to 
consider longer term regional development issues. In addition to the 
general;· task of industrial restructuring and environmental clean-up, key 
problems include congestion and over-development in the large 
urban/industrial agglomerations, the lack of investment and infrastructure 
in peripheral areas, and a more balanced distribution of settlement and 
industry. 
Potential regional policy measures for Central and Eastern Europe can 
be divided into six groups: infrastructure development, aid for local and 
regional restructuring, agricultural restructuring, the equalisation of 
urban and regional development, international cooperation and cross-border 
initiatives, and the promotion of regional policy research. 
The first important priority should be infrastructure developaent -
physical, telecommunications, administrative and service. With respect to 
physical infrastructure, it was noted earlier that the road and rail 
network in Central and Eastern Europe is generally of poor quality and in 
urgent need of upgrading. In several countries, only the most important 
centres are connected by fast road and rail links. The priorities are 
threefold - international, national and regional road and rail 
infrastructure. A further aspect of physical infrastructure development 
is airports policy. Particularly for foreign investment and business 
contact, the region of Central and Eastern Europe lacks major 
international "hub" airports comparable to Frankfurt and Schiphol. 
Regional transit airports would help to reduce the relative isolation of 
centres some distance from capital cities. 
The priorities for telecom-urn'cations infrastructure are somewhat 
different. The long-distance, international connections need to be 
urgently upgraded, but a more important immediate deficit is at the local 
level eg. the efficiency of local switching systems and telephone 
exchanges, telephone connections, and fax and telex access. The evidence 
from East Germany indicates that the main deficit is not in 
longer-distance networks but in the "final kilometre" - the connectivity 
and accessibility of local systems. Other areas of infrastructure 
development include administrative infrastructure, the public and private 
services infrastructure, and basic utilities, particularly in Hungary and 
Romania, where investment in services such as water supplies, sewage 
treatment facilities and waste disposal is necessary. 
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The second major target for regional policy is local and regional 
industrial restructuring - aiding restructuring by maintaining the 
competitiveness of diversified industrial regions but diversifying in 
areas dominated by mono-structures. Assistance should be targeted at 
industrial diversification and the creation and maintenance of small and 
medium-sized firms. Insofar as the transformation process can* be 
"managed", the privatisation and reorganisation of state-owned enterprises 
can play an important part in the creation of replacement jobs eg. by 
making available resources such as buildings, machinery and equipment, and 
by establishing training and retraining facilities. Examples from Western 
Europe that may be of relevance are the "reconversion companies" set up by 
large firms in France or the "enterprise subsidiaries" created by 
nationalised industries in the United Kingdom. 
As noted earlier, the most important point that applies to regional 
development throughout Central and Eastern Europe is that restructuring 
problems and environmental pollution need to be considered together. The 
most severe problem areas should be the focus of comprehensive, 
concentrated and coordinated restructuring programmes that include a range 
of components such as small and medium-sized enterprise support, 
environmental improvement measures, local and regional infrastructure 
development, training measures and social facilities. 
As part of the restructuring process, environmental improvement and 
protection is important for all countries in the region, partly to redress 
the effects of past pollution, but also to improve production methods. In 
addition to investment, the main requirements are for the transfer of 
technical knowledge and technology eg. the provision of purification, 
refuse-disposal and recyling technology, and the modernisation of 
production in the chemicals, energy, heavy engineering and mining 
industries. 
Alongside the reform of industrial enterprises, agricultural 
restructuring is a priority. To a certain extent, the problems and 
solutions are similar to those faced by industrial sectors since 
state-owned agricultural cooperatives were often operated as 
agro-industrial complexes with a high level of specialisation and division 
of labour. However, agriculture in Central and Eastern Europe also faces 
some distinctive problems, especially associated with under-developed, 
private agricultural holdings. 
In the longer term, once a market economy has been firmly 
established, the objectives of regional policy in Central and Eastern 
Europe are likely to be the equalisation of urban and regional development 
with respect to urban and industrial areas. This would encompass reducing 
congestion and concentration in major agglomerations, promoting the 
development of small-and medium-sized towns, and encouraging growth in 
peripheral and under-developed regions. 
International cooperation and cross-border developeent should be a 
further area of regional policy activity. Within Central and Eastern 
Europe, the withdrawal of Soviet political and military influence and the 
replacement of communist governments has been accompanied by the collapse 
of the economic CMEA agreements, and particularly trade and barter 
agreements with the Soviet Union. Thus, opportunities should be sought 
for interaction and exchange of experience in economic development among 
Central and East European countries. In the regional development field, 
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organisations and arrangements should be used to promote cross-border 
initiatives. A further area of potential cooperation relates to links 
between regions and cities of the Community and those in Central and 
Eastern Europe. The creation of links and networks between West and East 
European regions and cities could provide a useful channel for assistance. 
Lastly, regional policy research within Central and Eastern Europe 
should be encouraged to monitor, evaluate and improve any regional 
development measures employed. Research institutes in Central and Eastern 
Europe should be encouraged to work intensively on regional development 
and regional policy issues ie. "help for self-help", by assisting the 
expansion of research facilities and the provision of technical equipment. 
Consideration should be given to the establishment of a pan-European forum 
that would sponsor applied research of practical value to regional 
policy-makers in Central and Eastern Europe and allow the transfer of 
ideas, knowledge and experiences from West to East. 
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